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INTRODUCTION
We are experiencing a transformation as radical as the shift from religious to secular
authority in medieval Europe and from monarchy to democracy in the western world of the
eighteenth century. Public power in western democracies is migrating from the national realm to
the global one.1 The institutions through which we seek to protect ourselves from physical
violence, promote economic prosperity, keep the environment clean, and further the other
attributes of the good life are now as much global as national. Domestic legislatures, executive
branches, courts, and administrative agencies do not decide alone. They are constrained by the
decisions of international bureaucrats, they abide by the rules adopted by transnational networks
of regulators, and they comply with the decisions of international tribunals. By establishing,
participating in, and adhering to global regimes, domestic polities today share power with
government officials and citizens elsewhere in the world and with international organizations to
an extent that is unprecedented in recent memory.
What shape will global authority take? What configuration of public power and rights
against government will emerge? This Article takes a first step towards developing a positive
theory of rights in institutions of global governance through a study of the European
Commission, one of the oldest and most powerful international organizations in existence today.
Rights, it turns out, are the creature of historical challenges to international organizations and the
calculated, rights-innovative response of those organizations based on national constitutional
traditions.
The Commission began in 1952 as a specialized international secretariat responsible for
the administration of European coal and steel production in six member countries.2 In 1957, the
same countries signed the Treaty of Rome, in which they made ambitious commitments to a
common market in goods, services, capital, and labor. The state parties entrusted the
Commission with the far-reaching powers of a classic executive branch.3 Yet the Commission
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was conceived as an organization responsible for administering an international regime, in which
the participants were states, not citizens. Hence individual rights were largely absent from the
Treaty of Rome.
The transformation, half-a-century later, is remarkable. The Commission must engage in
a full, adversarial hearing when enforcing European law against individuals and firms. It
maintains a public, electronic register of all legislative and administrative documents and makes
those documents immediately accessible to European citizens. Before the Commission submits a
legislative proposal to the Council and Parliament for a decision, it must invite public comment
on an early draft and incorporate the comments in the final proposal. In sum, European citizens
are guaranteed a host of procedural rights familiar in national systems of democratic government.
Administration through adversarial hearings, extensive disclosure of government
documents, and consultations open to all groups and citizens is familiar, but not universal.
Another, equally liberal democratic outcome could have been imagined just as easily. Rather
than require a full adversarial hearing before the Commission, the Court of Justice might have
used its extensive fact-finding powers to scrutinize the facts, law, and policy choices
underpinning the Commission decision.4 (The Court of Justice is the highest court of the
European Union and has jurisdiction over European legislative and administrative acts.) There
might have been no right to official documents.5 And public comment on draft legislation might
have been staged at the very end of the legislative process, when the Commission proposal was
under consideration in the European Parliament.6 The alternative, imagined Commission would
have been a very different government body, yet it still would have met comfortably the
standards of today's set of liberal democracies.
Why do Europeans today enjoy this particular constellation of rights when the
Commission exercises authority? How do we explain the legal rules that constrain and shape the
Commission's powers? In this Article, I draw on the insights of the extensive political science
literature on European integration and Europe’s system of networks, public-private partnerships,
and transnational governance. The theory of historical institutionalism, in particular, has much
to tell us about the rise of individual rights in Commission decisionmaking. 7 Historical
institutionalists posit a critical role for institutions in determining political outcomes. They
typically define institutions as the formal organizations of political and social life, including the
rules and norms associated with those organizations, such as constitutions and administrative
procedures. In this school of thought, once institutions come into being, they show remarkable
stability and affect collective results in predictable ways. The institutions themselves are
explained as responses to particular historical circumstances and not by reference to the
contemporary functions that they are believed to serve. Given the extraordinary staying power
of institutions in the face of the changing material conditions of political communities, historical
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institutionalists suspect that the original reasons for establishing institutions are not the same as
those that make them necessary today.
Historical institutionalism has been used mainly to explain political and social
developments within or across countries. This study of individual rights in Commission
decisionmaking contributes to the theory by revealing the dynamics of institutions and
institution-building unique to global political communities. First, I show that the rights and
procedures developed within the confines of the nation-state are extremely influential in shaping
the new rights and procedures that emerge to structure collective life in the post-national setting.
The European Union emerged out of six, then nine, then twelve, and finally fifteen consolidated
nation-states.8 Each has a highly formalized and deeply entrenched set of organizations and
rules that developed largely independently of one another because of the territorially bounded
nature of economic and social life in the era of nation-building. National constitutional rules,
such as the procedures that must be followed by government administration and the rights of
citizens to object to government decisions, serve as powerful templates in designing European
institutions. When officials and citizens interact in international institutions, they do not set out
to design, what, by common consensus, is the fairest and most efficient of organizations, rather
they promote the different national models of democracy into which they have already been
socialized. Purposeful, strategic human action is constrained by the mental maps of democracy
developed in national polities.
Second, consistent with historical institutionalism, I find that constitutional rules in
global communities are created and altered at critical, historical moments, after which they
remain fairly stable and shape political outcomes. For historical reasons largely outside their
control, the national and supranational officials in European institutions occasionally face
challenges to their authority and they behave strategically to preserve their powers by changing
the constitutional rules.9 While the bureaucratic politics replicate in some respects the dynamics
of institutional change within the nation-state, the nature of crisis and adaptation in the
international setting displays unique characteristics. Challenge comes not only from individuals
and groups responding to economic or technological imperatives but also from citizens with
allegiances to national constitutional symbols and practices who seek to retain them in the face
of growing European authority.
The response of international institutions at such moments also differs systematically
from the response of national government bodies examined in country-specific studies. The
European Union has emerged through consent-based procedures involving states of roughly
equal standing. Compared to previous historical episodes of consolidation of political authority,
force and power have been remarkably absent in the construction of a new European political
space. When European institutions respond to challenges, they cannot use force, power, or even
majority decisionmaking mechanisms to tip the balance against the challengers. European
institutions, like most international institutions, are weak as far as organizations of political life
go and they must appease and accommodate challengers. The positive side of the story, with
8
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respect to the European Commission, is that European citizens enjoy more extensive rights
before the Commission than they do before their national administrations. The irony is that the
numerous checks on the Commission's powers risk undermining one of the rationales for the
creation and perpetuation of pan-European governance: to reassert popular sovereignty in the
face of problems and actors that escape the territorial confines of the nation-state.
By advancing a theory of rights specific to international organizations, this Article also
contributes to the literature on international relations and international law. Theories of
international systems have sought to answer two related questions: why do states create
international institutions and, once created, do international institutions behave autonomously
and hence act as an independent causal force in international politics? The field is divided
between the realist and liberal institutionalist camps. Realists take the view that international
organizations are established to facilitate relations among states by handling minor tasks and do
not have the power to shift outcomes away from the bargains that the states would reach in their
absence.10 Liberal institutionalists attribute far more significance to international organizations,
both in the functions that states confer upon them and in their power to shape outcomes in
international relations.11 Yet both schools treat the international organization itself as a black
box. Courts and administrations in international regimes are presumed to operate according to
certain functional imperatives that are common to courts and bureaucracies everywhere,
regardless of whether they are national or international. This Article moves the study of
international systems one step further by asking a third question, “Why are individuals
guaranteed certain rights before international organizations?” and answering with a set of
interrelated, internally consistent hypotheses about national mental maps, historical challenge,
and the strategic response of international actors.
The evidence for my explanation of European rights as the creature of historical crisis
and strategic institutional response comes from the historical record. In Part II of this Article, I
demonstrate that rights before the Commission were created in three phases, each of which was
the product of a strategic move by one or more European institutions to preserve authority in the
face of opposition and each of which drew from a template of good government developed
elsewhere. As a result, today, European citizens enjoy three major, historically distinct, sets of
rights in their relations with Europe's executive branch: the right to a hearing, the right to
transparency, and the right to civil society participation.
The first historical turning point was the accession of the United Kingdom in 1973. The
common law system of administrative law contained a number of anomalies compared to the
continental systems that were already part of the European Community.12 In 1973, the risk was
that English courts would not enforce Commission decisions that failed to abide by the common
law's guarantees of fair and lawful public power. I show that the Court of Justice and the
Commission responded by adopting the common law right to a fair hearing in European
competition proceedings, a right that then migrated to other areas in which particularized
Commission decisions adversely affect the interests of firms or individuals. The second critical
moment was the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. I demonstrate that, to
guarantee Danish ratification of the Maastricth Treaty second time around, the twelve Heads of
State made a series of commitments to transparency, patterned on the Danish, and more
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generally, northern model of open government. The European Parliament then combined its
long-standing institutional interest in more information on Commission policymaking--critical
for the exercise of Parliament's legislative powers--with the northern transparency ideal to push
for extensive access to documents legislation. The third and final juncture was the resignation of
the Santer Commission in 1999, in response to vitriolic criticism from a European Parliament
intent on asserting its new treaty power to hold the executive to account. I show that the
Commission's response was to adopt legal measures guaranteeing that civil society--citizens and
organized interests--would be consulted in the lawmaking process, hence improving its
democratic credentials in the eyes of the general European public and creating allies among the
civil society groups that were to be consulted. This innovation was patterned both on the trend
towards civil society participation in other international organizations and the European tradition
of corporatist interest representation.
Understanding the European experience with rights is crucial for a number of reasons.
First, as this Articles amply demonstrates, rights before Europe’s executive branch are very
different from the rights guaranteed under American administrative law. Yet this point is missed
by American scholars and lawyers alike, to the detriment of their students and clients. The
similarities that Americans tend to discern between European and American administrative
procedure have the quality of bad puns rather than true resemblances. Only a sustained
examination of the roots and evolution of European rights can do away with the misinformation
caused by those bad puns and uncover the real nature of European rights. Second, the causal
theory that I develop to explain the creation of rights in Europe can be applied to other arenas of
global governance, including those in which the U.S. is a direct participant. As I show in the
Conclusion, the dynamic of competing national rights traditions and strategic institutional
interests is one that we can expect to animate a variety of international bureaucracies and
tribunals. Therefore, the European experience contains useful lessons for Americans as they
navigate today’s emerging system of global governance.
My argument is organized as follows. Part I presents the major positive theories of
European rights, legal constitutionalism, intergovernmentalism, and neo-functionalism, together
with my historical-institutionalist alternative. In Part II, which constitutes the bulk of the Article,
I recount the history of rights before the European Commission through the lens of historical
institutionalism. For each phase, this consists of a detailed examination of the nature of
procedural rights before and after the critical historical event; a description of the event and the
nature of the challenge it posed to European authority; specific evidence of the salience of
national mental maps of rights following the event and the strategic use of the right by certain
European institutions to consolidate their powers; an analysis of the evolution of the right after
the historical moment; and a comparison the new, invariably more expansive, European right
with the right in the place of origin. Because mental maps of good government developed within
each nation-state were critical, the account of rights before the turning point includes a review of
the constitutions and administrative procedure laws of the Member States. In Part III, I return to
the competing theories of European constitutional design and demonstrate that the predictions
they generate as to the nature of rights, the institutional proponents of rights, and the timing of
rights are not borne out by the evidence. Lastly, in the Conclusion, I take stock of rights before
the Commission and argue that they are more extensive than in any of the places of origin
because of the uniquely weak character of the Commission compared to a classic executive
branch. In the Conclusion, I also show that, like any good theory, mine generates a number of
specific hypotheses and predictions for the future direction of constitutional change in the EU
and another, still emerging, system of global governance, the World Trade Organization.
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I. EXPLAINING RIGHTS
Theories that seek to develop positive explanations for rights have focused generally on
national constitutions as opposed to international regimes.13 Until recently, citizenship was
conceived exclusively as a matter of belonging to historical, territorially defined communities
and hence the duties and entitlements of citizenship were developed within the framework of the
political institutions that governed those communities. Beyond the confines of the nation-state,
there were international organizations, but they were believed to order relations among sovereign
states, not individuals, and hence their operations did not give rise to duties and rights inhering in
individuals, nor could those same individuals make direct claims on international organizations
for protection and other collective goods.14 In this section, I canvass briefly the major
approaches to explaining rights in national constitutional orders, with the aim of laying the
ground for the discussion of theories of European governance. Any real exploration of theories
of national constitutionalism is beyond the scope of this Article. However, a passing familiarity
with the principal schools of thought is necessary because their insights have animated the
nascent debates on the nature of political institutions and individual rights in the European
Union.
A. National Constitutional Theory
At the domestic level, broadly speaking, there exist two types of theories, one that treats
rights as value choices by voters, legislators, public officials, and judges and the other that treats
them as the product of strategic behavior designed to maximize the individual preferences of
those same individuals, generally operationalized as material interests. The first I label legal
constitutionalism, in light of the prevalence of the approach in the legal academy, and the second
I label rational choice constitutionalism. Both make distinctive assumptions about two central
elements of any explanation for the emergence and survival of constitutional rules: human
preferences and the way in which individuals collectively create and change the rules. In the
remainder of this section, I review the assumptions of the theories and give examples from the
scholarship most relevant to the subject of this Article, that is, procedural rights in the
decisionmaking of government administration.
1. Legal constitutionalism
Legal constitutionalists assume that individuals have preferences for certain types of
collective life that go beyond self-regarding interest, what I call values. When they come
together to design or reform government, individuals give expression to their commonly held
values or, if their values turn out to be different, some persuade others that their position is the
better one. Constitutional rules are designed to promote the moral choices of members of the
political community. The rules of government, in turn, guide human action because they are
internalized by individuals, or, in other words, become norms of behavior. Thus, a legal
13
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constitutionalist explains constitutions, parliamentary laws that set down basic government
procedures and rights, and judgments of constitutional courts as a function of the substantive
value choices made by national leaders at a constitutional convention, representatives in a
legislative assembly, or judges on a deciding court. Citizens act in accordance with the
constitution, law, or judgment because they are automatically recognized as legally and morally
correct and hence deserving of obedience.
For instance, in American constitutional law, the decision of the Constitutional
Convention to divide legislative power between the Senate, the House of Representatives, and
the President is explained as a function of Madison desire's to avoid the rise of factions.15 The
institutional design that Americans live with today ensures balance--or put differently stalemate-over action because Madison preferred the "enlarged and permanent" interest that would emerge
over time to the "irregular passion" of majority action.16 Likewise, the right to property and
contract contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is explained as an endorsement by
the Founders of Locke's view of limited government.17 To move to a more recent statement of
rights, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed in 1946 to structure the relations
between federal administration and citizens, was taken by James Landis as a codification of what
was fair and just.18 George Shepherd and Martin Shapiro explain the APA as a compromise
between what the Republicans in Congress thought was good government--an administration
limited by the common law's protection of property rights --and what the Democrats believed
was good government --an administration free to alter the status quo and use its expertise to
create prosperity for all citizens.19
2. Rational choice constitutionalism
Rational choice constitutionalism dates to the early 1980's and is informed by the
disciplinary methods of economics and political science. The behavioral assumptions of rational
choice scholars depart significantly from the ones employed in legal constitutionalism. They
start from the premise that preferences of actors are fixed and self-regarding. Although many
scholars claim that any type of preference can be accommodated in their model of human action,
including altruism, on closer examination preferences are generally operationalized as the
preservation and improvement of material wealth or physical safety. When citizens collectively
decide how to govern their joint affairs, they do so by adopting rules that maximize individual
preferences in a Pareto-efficient manner. And once the rules are adopted, they are obeyed
because they promote self-interest. Thus, in this school of thought, constitutions and rights are
explained as the self-interested decisions of citizens and legislators rather than as the expression
of the type of public life they believe to be morally right.
Some of the most influential work by rational choice scholars conceptualizes
constitutions as solutions to collective action dilemmas. Jon Elster argues that rights and
independent courts to enforce rights are enacted by today's legislators in order to afford them
protection against the arbitrary actions of tomorrow's.20 Those with political power today tie
their hands through constitutional rules such as majority voting and the right to a fair trial only
15
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because they fear that, tomorrow, their opponents will hold the reins of government. Likewise,
political scientist Adam Przeworksi argues that constitutions are obeyed only when politicians
have a material interest in doing so.21 According to Przeworksi, the most basic rule of any
democracy, the rule that the individual or party that wins the majority of votes takes political
office and allows the losers to keep their property, only is viable when property is distributed so
widely that the losers have an incentive to respect the rule. Election losers without property have
nothing to fear from staging a rebellion and attempting to establish a dictatorship. Election
losers with property have a lot to fear because they know that if they fail, the winners might very
decide to ignore the rule themselves and establish a dictatorship in which they expropriate all
property. Majority rule and property rights, therefore, are obeyed only when election losers have
a material interest in doing so.
To turn to the rational choice approach to public administration, Matthew McCubbins,
Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (McNollgast) argue that legislators enact procedural rights in
order to protect the deal that is struck among competing interests in the legislature when that deal
is sent to administration to be implemented.22 With administration, the analytical tool is the
principal-agent relationship. Unless the principal (legislator) has control instruments, the agent
(the administration) will do its own bidding. According to McNollgast, administrative
procedures and individual rights prevent policy drift when government agencies are charged with
implementing statutes. First, procedure empowers organized interests and hence ensures that
the interests that lobbied successfully in the legislature can protect their gains in the
administration. Additionally, formal procedure facilitates oversight by legislators.23 It bears
mentioning that, given the behavioral premises of rational choice theory, the policy choices
contained in the original enabling act being implemented by the administration are themselves
the product of the self-interest of voters, organized interests, and legislators.24
A hypothetical will serve to synthesize the differences between legal and rational choice
constitutionalists. Take a constitutional rule prohibiting torture. For a legal constitutionalist, the
rule exists because citizens do not want themselves--or their neighbors-- to be subjected to
arbitrary physical violence, because they all agree that freedom from arbitrary physical violence
is the only moral way in which to organize their joint affairs, and because the rule against torture
is so deeply engrained that they adhere to it without further reflection. A rational choice
constitutionalist would explain the same rule based on an individual preference for personal
safety, a historical community in which resources are so widely distributed that individuals can
guarantee their own personal safety only by agreeing with other individuals to a rule against
torture applicable to all, and the persistence of historical conditions under which individuals
suffer threats to their own physical well-being if they harm others. The legal constitutionalist
would criticize the rational choicer for the simplistic understanding of human motivation and the
failure to account for norm-driven behavior, in which strategy plays no role. The rational
choicer would reply that the legal constitutionalist ignores the historical record, which is full of
examples in which rules that would appear to be morally superior, such as a rule against torture,
fail to materialize or are routinely flouted. The relationship between values, collective outcomes,
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and rule-abiding behavior is natural for the legal constitutionalist, problematic for the rational
choicer.
B. European Constitutional Theory
As in the domestic context, students of European governance have developed radically
different accounts of rights depending on their disciplinary affiliations. In this section, I present
the leading theories and develop their implications for procedures and rights before the
Commission.25 Each generates predictions for three aspects of participation rights: the type of
rights, the European institution responsible for promoting rights, and the timing of the emergence
of rights. In Part III of the Article I return to these theories of rights to explore how their
predictions fare when put to the test of the historical record presented in Part II and when
compared to my historical institutionalist analysis.
1. Legal constitutionalism
European legal scholars are principally concerned with describing and normatively
assessing the state of individual rights based on higher principles derived from constitutional law
or universal theories of justice. Sometimes, however, European legal constitutionalists examine
the origins of individual rights and, when they do so, they work with the same assumptions about
human motivation and the interaction of individuals in collective life as do their domestic
counterparts. The citizens, legislators, and judges who decide rights and obey them are
motivated by the values and higher principles that serve as the basis for the normative
evaluation.26 The focus of legal scholars is generally the Court of Justice's jurisprudence but
logically can, and does, extend to Europe's legislators, especially when they are engaged in acts
of high constitutional politics such as drafting the European Charter of Fundamental Rights or
the Constitutional Treaty.
Of the European legal constitutionalists who focus on rights before the Commission, the
work of Hanns Peter Nehl is exemplary, both for the breadth and the incisiveness of the
analysis.27 Nehl concentrates on the jurisprudence of the Court. He argues that the Court was
driven by concerns for fairness, rationality, and administrative efficiency in developing the
principles that, today, guide Commission decisionmaking. Nehl is influenced by the neofunctionalist approach, explored in detail below, in which rights serve the institutional interest of
the Court in expanding its powers, but ultimately he is wed to the normative understanding of the
Court's past and future case law. In Nehl's account, the Court was motivated by the imperative
of protecting the dignity of European citizens against the arbitrary exercise of government
powers, promoting administrative rationality, and preserving a workable administrative process.
The Court will continue to grapple with this set of concerns in deciding future cases. Nehl's
legal constitutionalist approach is manifest in the following passage from the concluding chapter
of his book:
[I]t is useful to refer once again to the basic rationales determining the existence
of process standards. The Community Courts have forcefully stressed the
dignitary purpose of those rules and thereby considerably improved individual
protection in administrative procedures. Surely, also from the perspective of the
instrumental rationale, the high degree of procedural protection and participation
25
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is paralleled by an increased standard of rationality, accuracy, as well as
transparency of the decision-making process. . . . Both the dignitary rationale and
the instrumental rationale of process rules as essential components of this notion
are to be combined in a reasonable manner. The task of the Community Courts is
delicate in this regard. They bear the responsibility for maintaining the
workability of the administration and the institutional balance provided for in the
Treaty.28
Given the normative objective of analyses such as Nehl's, it is difficult to derive robust,
forward-looking predictions for the nature of rights. Commission procedure has guaranteed and
will continue to guarantee the basic values of dignity, rationality, and workability, and if there
arise circumstances in which Commission procedure falls short of these guiding principles, they
should be corrected. The question of what type of procedures and rights comport with dignity,
rationality, and workability is addressed on a case-by-case basis, when and if litigants claim that
the Commission's procedure is deficient. A legal constitutionalist analysis, however, does
generate predictions as to which institutions will press for rights in the administrative process:
judges sitting on courts. In Nehl's account, the Court of Justice is the institution that seeks to
protect fairness, while the Commission, as a typical bureaucracy, is mainly interested in
efficiently and expeditiously exercising its powers. Lastly, according to a legal constitutionalist,
the timing of rights should follow, or slightly lag behind, the attribution of powers to the
Commission. As the Commission acquires and exercises enforcement and rulemaking powers,
litigants should go to the Court demanding fair treatment and the Court of Justice should require
the Commission to respect procedural rights to the extent warranted by dignity, rationality, and
efficiency.
2. Intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism
On the political science side of the fence, scholars of European institutions have
developed two, competing theories of the origins of institutions like the Council, Commission,
and Court of Justice and their role in European governance: intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.29 Both types of scholarship proceed from the same behavioral premises as
domestic rational choice constitutionalists: actors' preferences are self-interested and they behave
strategically to maximize their preferences when designing constitutional rules. In explaining
the creation of the common market and other areas of European governance, material interests-profits through cross-border trade, protection against discrimination in the workplace, consumer
safety, and so on--and strategic behavior to further those interests are the essential explanatory
factors. The difference between intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists rests in their
assessment of which actors have been historically important in moving forward the common
market project. As the labels would suggest, intergovernmentalists argue that national
governments, pressured by domestic lobbies and engaged in treaty-making and decisionmaking
in the Council of Ministers, have controlled the pace and direction of European integration.
Neo-functionalists, by contrast, argue that the supranational institutions of the Commission and
the Court of Justice, in collaboration with individuals and lobbies who benefit from integration,
have been the key players.

28

Id. at 167-68.
See generally Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (1998)
(intergovernmental theory explained by the leading exponent); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a
Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 63 (1998)
(neo-functional theory explained by the leading exponents).
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The scholarship has mostly explored the question of why the European Union has
acquired powers in areas where sovereign states traditionally held exclusive authority.30 On the
issue of the design of institutions like the Commission that exercise powers at the supranational
level, including individual rights, political scientists have been relatively silent. The theories
themselves, however, contain a number of implications for the rights question and recently
students of European governance have begun to turn their attention to the matter.
In an intergovernmentalist account, administrative procedure, like the substantive policy
that the procedure is designed to implement, is the product of the interests of states. What type
of interest does a government have in procedure and rights? States may wish to protect their
nationals when they expect them to come before international tribunals or international
bureaucracies. 31 A salient feature of public international law is the national interest in protecting
the well-being of citizens when they leave the sovereign territory of the state.32 The same can be
expected when governments cede sovereignty over certain policy matters, which can involve
events occurring within the territorial confines of the state or citizens of the state, to an
international tribunal or an international bureaucracy. What type of procedure and rights would
a state promote as best protecting its citizens? Although international relations theories are
largely unhelpful on this question, especially once they are asked to incorporate variation among
democratic states, a good working hypothesis is the bundle of rights and procedures available
within the state.33 As with the other elements of international agreements, the most powerful
states within the international regime should be the ones that are able, through bargaining, to
upload their systems of rights onto international tribunals and bureaucracies.
If the intergovernmentalist theory is accurate in the case of Europe, the rights that private
parties enjoy before the Commission should be those that exist in the most powerful Member
States. The actors promoting rights should be Member States, in treaty negotiations or
bargaining on the Council of Ministers, rather than the supranational institutions of the Court of
Justice, the Commission, and the Parliament. Lastly, on the question of timing, rights should be
established as soon as Member States confer autonomous powers upon the Commission that
could be exercised in such a way as to directly undermine the well-being of Member State
nationals.
In the neo-functionalist line of analysis, rights serve the interests of supranational actors,
principally the Court of Justice and private parties that invoke the assistance of the Court in
30
The debate between intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists started as a broader debate between realists and liberal
institutionalists in international relations theory. See supra text accompanying note__.
31
States may also have an interest in administrative procedure because it enables them to control the international organizations
to which they delegate agenda-setting and enforcement powers. Mark Pollack argues, following the McNollgast line of analysis
reviewed in the previous section, that Member States (the principals) may use procedure to protect against policy drift when the
Commission (the agent) is given the power to enforce European treaties and laws. See Mark A. Pollack, The Engines of
European Integration (2003). Pollack demonstrates that the creation of committees (so-called comitology committees) to oversee
Commission decisionmaking follows the predictions of the principal-agent model of administrative authority. Pollack, however,
focuses on procedures and rights that are available to Member States, not individuals, and indeed the McNollgast prediction of
rights for all citizens is unconvincing in a system where each legislator disposes of the resources necessary to monitor
administration. The McNollgast analysis overlooks the fact that legislators can lose, as well as gain, control over administration
by allowing individuals and associations with competing agendas to intervene in administration through procedural rights. It
would be irrational for a Member State to empower domestic interest groups to protect the original bargain contained in a
European law through procedure when many domestic groups will almost certainly have interests that are opposed to the law-and be themselves the source of policy drift--and when the state has an entire administration at its disposal to do the monitoring
directly. In the case of a state as opposed to a resources-poor Congressman, therefore, it is unlikely that the principal-agent
problem would generate rights for citizens.
32
See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 521-55 (5th ed. 1998) (describing protections under international law
for citizens of one state whose persons or property is stationed in the territory of another state).
33
See generally Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54
International Organization 217 (2000) (reviewing realist theories of state preferences for human rights).
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promoting their agendas. Supranational bodies, according to neo-functionalists, seek to
aggrandize their powers. As Mark Pollack puts it, Europe's supranational institutions are
"competence maximizing," meaning that they "seek to increase both their own competences and
more generally the competences of the European Community."34 Rights, in the neo-functionalist
line of analysis, are instrumental to the competence-maximizing agenda of the Court of Justice
because they enable litigants to go directly to the courts and challenge government action as
incompatible with higher, European law, thus bringing most public decisionmaking within the
power of the Court of Justice.35
Neo-functionalists have largely focused on the Court's role in establishing European
rights that individuals can invoke in their dealings with their national administrations, not the
Commission. Martin Shapiro, however, has argued that similar judicial politics are responsible
for the development of rights in Commission proceedings.36 According to Shapiro, a mix of selfinterested litigants, judicial activism, public distrust of technocracy, and the inherent legal logic
of procedural checks on administration has led, and will continue to lead, the Court to create an
extensive set of procedural rights similar to those in American administrative law.37 Shapiro
contends that the structural and legal conditions that resulted in the proceduralization of
American rulemaking in the 1970's are today present in the EU.
The historical process as recounted by Shapiro can be broken down into a number parts.
Litigants using every possible argument to avoid administrative action and espousing a larger
anti-technocracy culture, challenge decisions before the Court on the grounds that the
Commission failed to respect procedural requirements in the administrative process. They do so
using the textual hook of Article 253 of the EC Treaty, which provides that all measures adopted
by the institutions "shall state the reasons on which they are based."38 The duties under Article
253 would appear to be minimal but the provision is used by the Court to develop a
jurisprudence of extensive procedural rights for the parties and, covertly, to engage in judicial
review of the substance of the Commission's administrative determinations. The Court does so
out of a penchant common to constitutional courts for judicial activism as well as the legal logic
of procedure. Once the Court requires the Commission to give reasons, it cannot accept just any
set of reasons; the Court demands reasons that respond to the objections of the parties and
justify, in the eyes of the judges, the measure.39 In Shapiro's account, the imperatives of rights at
the European level are slightly different than in the relation between the Court of Justice and
national administrations: the Court is driven less by the desire to maximize competences and
more by a reaction, common in most advanced democracies, to the vesting of extensive
discretion in the hands of technocrats. Nonetheless, the self-interest of private plaintiffs and the
judicial activist, competence-maximizing tendencies of the Court are critical forces for rights in
both settings.
34

See Mark A. Pollack, Supranational Autonomy, in European Integration and Supranational Governance 217, 219 (Wayne
Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 1998).
35
See generally Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47
International Organization 41 (1993) (recounting the so-called “constitutionalization” of the EC Treaty, whereby international
obligations were transformed into hard constitutional rights that could be invoked by individuals in court through the neofunctionalist lens); Alec Stone Sweet & James Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and
Integration, in European Integration and Supranational Governance 92, 105 (Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 1998)
(elaborating neo-functional theory of constitutionalization of the EC Treaty); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe
(1991) (recognizing and synthesizing the constitutionalization of the EC Treaty).
36
See Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, in University of Chicago Legal Forum 179 (1992); Martin Shapiro, The
Institutionalization of European Administrative Space, in The Institutionalization of Europe 94 (Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne
Sandholtz & Neil Fligstein eds., 2001).
37
Shapiro, The Institutionalization of European Administrative Space, supra note __ at 98-99.
38
EC Treaty, art. 253.
39
Shapiro, The Institutionalization of European Administrative Space, supra note __ at 100.
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Deriving predictions for rights before the Commission from the neo-functionalist account
is easy. They should be similar to the rights that exist in American administrative law. The
Court of Justice should be the actor promoting the rights, in the interest of law, democracy, and
judicial power, and the Commission should resist, in an attempt to retain discretion and
technocratic expertise. Lastly, procedural rights should develop gradually, as litigants test the
waters, the Court of Justice considers and initially rejects novel theories, but then is moved by
virtue of the logic of judicial politics to accept the litigants' arguments.
C. Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism is an approach that was developed by political scientists and
economists in the 1980's and 1990's to understand cross-national differences in political and
economic outcomes 40 In the historical analysis at the heart of this Article (Part II), I
demonstrate that the evidence supports this theory and more than it does the competing theories
(Part III). This school of thought defines institutions as the formal organizations of political and
social life, and the written rules, together with the less formal, unwritten norms, associated with
those organizations.41 Legislatures, courts, parliaments, constitutions, laws, regulations, judicial
decisions, administrative circulars, and standard bureaucratic operating procedures, all fall
squarely within the definition of institution. According to historical institutionalists, once
institutions come into being, they show remarkable staying power and affect political outcomes
in predictable ways (so-called “path dependence”). In the sociological variant of historical
institutionalism, this is because rules and conventions shape the preferences and identities of
individuals. In the rational choice variant, the same persistence of institutions is explained as a
result of their role in solving collective action dilemmas and the difficulty, due to the very nature
of collective action dilemmas in political life, of discarding one sub-optimal set of rules and
organizations for another, better set.42
In this approach, institutions are created and altered in response to historical
circumstances that can only be understood by going back and examining the events that were
faced by the relevant political actors at the moment in time when change occurred. Many
historical institutionalists find that institutions undergo long periods of relative continuity
interrupted by sudden change (historical junctures) followed by more continuity. External
shocks such as war or technological changes can provoke such junctures. Historical
institutionalists regard functionalist explanations with skepticism. The logic of path dependence
and unintended consequences make it unlikely that historical actors created organizations and
rules to serve the needs that they fulfill today.
Historical institutionalism differs from legal and rational choice constitutionalism in a
number of key respects. Let me return to the organizing themes from the beginning of this part
of the Article, human preferences and the process through which constitutional rules are created
and changed. First, in the historical institutionalist approach, when citizens design constitutional
rules, they can be motivated by both value and interest, not one exclusive of the other. That is
because their mental maps are shaped by their previous engagement in institutions and therefore
their capacity for strategic action to further self-interest is limited by the social understandings
that have already developed within a historical community. Second, constitutional rules are not
designed purposively by members of the political community to the same extent as in the legal or
40

See generally Peter Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms, 44 Political Studies 936
(1996); Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (1990).
41
Hall & Taylor, supra note__ at 938.
42
See Paul Pierson, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics, 94 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 251 (2000).
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rational choice accounts. Voters and public officials do seek to further certain types of moral
visions and strategic interests when they create, adhere to, and recreate the rules. However, the
moral visions and strategic interests that the rules serve today may very well not be the reasons
that produced them in the first place. A positive explanation of constitutional rules, therefore,
requires careful examination of the historical record, to discern when and for what reasons they
emerged. Third, and related to the second point, rules undergo episodes of far-reaching
transformation, after which change occurs at the margins, within the basic parameters set down
during the earlier moment of transformation.
As I show in detail in the next part of this Article, the historical institutionalist
understanding of human motivation and institutional change captures the dynamics of rights
creation in European governance more closely than any of the other theories canvassed in this
section. 43 Political actors pursue certain visions of good government that cannot be attributed to
self-interest (contrary to the intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist accounts) yet their
visions are particular to their constitutional experiences within their nation-states, not
universalistic (contrary to legal constitutionalism). The agents of European institutional change
do not work from a tabula rasa. The individuals who shape European institutions are educated
and socialized within distinct national cultures and are strongly influenced by their national
traditions of rights and public law. Furthermore, while the European officials sitting on
supranational bodies act strategically to improve their own powers when designing constitutional
rules (contrary to legal constitutionalism), they do not behave according to a single model of
judicial or bureaucratic power-grabbing (contrary to the neo-functionalist approach). Rather,
European judges and public officials respond to highly contextual, historically specific
challenges to their authority. Related to this last point, the pattern of rule change has followed
the sequence of juncture and continuity observed by historical institutionalists in other settings.
New rights in Commission decisionmaking have come into being, redefining what it is to be a
European citizen, episodically, not incrementally (contrary to the legal constitutionalist and neofunctionalist approaches). Finally, the national, context-specific values which voters, litigants,
and public officials seek to further by promoting certain rights are different from the values that
the rights come to serve, over time, in their new European setting. Thus, rights are created by
purposive actors to further certain interests and values but not the same ones as they serve today.
The table below summarizes the alternative theories and the competing predictions.
Table 1—Creating rights before the European Commission: Theories and predictions

Human
motivations
and collective

Legal
constitutionalism

Intergovernmentalism

Neofunctionalism

Historical
institutionalism

Individuals promote
values of dignity,
rationality, and

Governments bargain to
promote material well-being
of their citizens in

Using doctrinal
hook of the duty to
give reasons

European
institutions respond
to challenges to

43

Historical institutionalism has informed some of the more recent scholarship on the development of the European Union as a
political entity. See Alec Stone Sweet, Neil Fligstein & Wayne Sandholtz, The Institutionalization of European Space, in The
Institutionalization of Europe 1 (Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz & Neil Fligstein eds., 2001). It is often understood as
complementary to the neo-functionalist approach because it provides a theoretical framework for understanding the rise of
supranational organizations and rules. See Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration: A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis,
in European Integration and Supranational Governance 27, 48 (Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet 1998). In my analysis,
however, historical institutionalism is used to emphasize the importance of national institutions for the creation of supranational
ones. Furthermore, neo-functionalist explanations continue to suggest a certain inevitability or teleology in the end result of the
common market and other areas of European governance: economic interests motivate market actors, who pressure political
actors, who in turn establish efficient, European-wide rules. However, historical institutionalists are cautious of this form of
explanation.
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behavior

workability.

Commission proceedings.

supranational
court expands
competence and
furthers antitechnocracy
values and
individual litigants
pursue material
interests.

authority by
adopting rights
derived from
national traditions.

Institutional
agents

European Courts

Member States (treaties and
laws passed by Council of
Ministers)

European Courts

Institution facing
historical challenge

Timing

Gradual, tracking the
attribution of powers
to Commission.

Sudden, at the time that
Commission conferred
powers.

Gradual, tracking
the attribution of
powers to
Commission.

Sudden, shortly
following the
moment of
challenge to
authority.

Bundle of
rights

_____

Rights existing in most
powerful Member States.

Rights in U.S.
administrative
law.

Rights necessary to
consolidate
authority of
institution, based on
one or more
Member State
traditions.

II. THREE GENERATIONS OF RIGHTS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
In this part, I discern three generations of rights before the Commission: the right to a
hearing, the right to transparency, and the right to civil society participation. The explanation of
the adoption and subsequent evolution of each right is organized chronologically. I first describe
the nature of government decisionmaking and individual rights before and after the critical
historical event. Since I insist on the importance of Europeans' old mental maps of legitimate
government authority in designing new, European-wide constitutional rules, the before consists
of the rules of government administration at the national level and the rules that applied to
Commission decisionmaking. Then, I analyze the event that prompted the adoption of the right.
I demonstrate that European institutions responded to historical circumstances by adopting a
template of legitimate administration developed elsewhere and did so for the strategic reason of
preserving supranational, European authority. After the careful analysis of the historical moment
in which the right was adopted, I trace the incremental development of the right in shaping how
the Commission exercises its authority. Lastly, I compare where the right stands today with the
national--or in the case of civil society, international--tradition from which it was drawn to reveal
the dynamics of rights in the European system of global governance.
A. The First Generation: The Right to a Hearing
Compared to an ordinary executive branch, the Commission has few direct enforcement
powers.44 Fines, injunctions, orders, and permits under European laws passed in Brussels are
44
See Francesca Bignami, Transnational Administration: International Data Transfers under the European Privacy Directive,
forthcoming in Mich. Int'l L. J.
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generally decided and issued by national administrations in each of the twenty-five Member
States. Nonetheless, the very fact that the Commission exercises direct powers over citizens of
the Member States, bypassing national governments, is extraordinary in light of the international
origins of the organization. The Commission directly enforces European law in three areas:
competition law (anti-trust), anti-dumping law, and customs law. In 1957, the Commission was
given the power to impose fines and issue orders against firms that engaged in anti-competitive
behavior.45 In 1969, it was authorized to impose duties on foreign goods and, by extension, the
firms selling the goods, if they were being sold at an unfair price ("dumped") on the European
market or were being subsidized by a foreign government.46 In 1979, in a narrow class of cases,
the Commission was given the power to decide whether the customs duties that had been paid or
were due on imported products under the European Customs Code had to be returned to the
importer.47 What were the rights of French, German, Italian, Belgian, Dutch, and
Luxembourger citizens when they first came face-to-face with international authority? What are
their rights today? And how can we explain the difference in the rights that a European citizen
yesterday could invoke when she learned that she was at risk of paying a hefty competition fine
and those same rights today?
1. The right to oppose adverse Commission determinations then and now
a. National traditions of administrative procedure
In all Western legal systems, individuals have the right to contest vigorously decisions of
government administration that inflict hardship upon them. Nonetheless, the stage at which the
individual may contest the determination, the forum before which she may vindicate her rights,
the scope of the rights, and the range of hardships believed to warrant such procedural rights,
differ considerably from one country to another. For purposes of characterizing procedural
rights, European systems of administrative law can be divided into those that fall into the droit
administratif family and those that are part of the common law family. 48 Of the original six
Member States, all were squarely droit administratif systems (France, Italy, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) or closely related to droit administratif systems (Germany). 49
45

See EC Treaty, arts. 81 and 82 (ex 85 and 86); Council Regulation No 17/62, First Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82
(ex 85 and 86) of the Treaty, 1962 O.J. (L 13) 204. This has been repealed and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J.
(L 1) 1. The Commission has since come to exercise powers in the related areas of merger control and state aids. See infra text
accompanying note__.
46
See Regulation (EEC) No 459/68 of the Council of 5 April 1968 on protection against dumping or the granting of bounties or
subsidies by countries which are not members of the European Economic Community, 1968 O.J. (L 93) 1. The Regulation has
been amended on numerous occasions. The law currently in force is Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995
on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Communities, 1996 O.J. (L 56) 1.
47
See Council Regulation (EEC) No 1430/79 of 2 July 1979 on the repayment or remission of import or export duties, 1979 O.J.
(L 175) 1. This law has been repealed and repayment and remissions are currently dealt with under Articles 236 to 239 of
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1.
48
The standard classification of countries into droit administratif and common law systems is based on the nature of the court in
which individuals can seek redress against administrative action. See John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An
Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985); L. Neville Brown & John S. Bell, French
Administrative Law 1-8 (5th ed. 1998). In droit administratif countries, the courts have jurisdiction only over challenges to acts
of the administration and are staffed by specialized judges who can also be employed elsewhere within government
administration. In common law countries, the courts are courts of general jurisdiction, with powers over all types of disputes and
whose judges are the same regardless of the type of dispute. The characteristic of interest here--the extent and nature of
procedural rights before administration--is different from that used to create the standard typology. Nonetheless, the countries
fall into the same clusters.
49
German administrative law is generally characterized as related to, but different from, the droit administratif family. See
Mahendra P. Singh, German Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective 1-20 (2001). Administrative acts are reviewed in
specialized courts but the judges on those courts are recruited and promoted according to the rules governing the entire judiciary.
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Administrative decisions in droit administratif countries are generally made with few
opportunities for individuals to make their views known.50 When the administrative process is
completed, however, individuals have the right to apply to the courts for full review of the
legality of the determination. Individuals have the right to contest adverse administrative
determinations at some point, but not necessarily before the administrative authority deciding on
the act. Fairness is guaranteed through access to strict "control" (contrôle) of the
administration's decision in an independent forum. By contrast, in the English common law
tradition, many of the same requirements of impartiality and procedure that are imposed on
courts are also imposed on government bureaucrats. Government administration acts through
trial-type procedures in which the citizen has the right to challenge the factual and legal premises
of the determination before an unbiased decisionmaker. Once the determination becomes final,
however, access to the courts is restricted, the grounds of review are limited, and the types of
remedies available are strictly defined. The fairness of the administrative act in the common law
turns on the ability to engage in a quasi-judicial process at the time of its adoption.
The basic difference in procedural rights can be traced to differences in experiences with
the administrative state. In France, government administration is highly centralized and
professionalized and consequently the mode through which it exercises power and renders
decisions is characteristic of a bureaucracy. By contrast, in Great Britain, local government
(where most of the decisions that impose direct burdens on individuals are taken) is largely
autonomous of central government departments in London and is not highly professionalized. In
the 1800's, local government was mostly the task of the justices of the peace, responsible for
administration of the poor laws, the highways, and liquor licenses.51 Even now, local
government administration in England is handled largely by boards of elected local officials.
Given these histories, it is no surprise that the droit administratif and common law ideals of fair
government administration differ. In the droit administratif tradition, it consists of
professionalized decisionmaking, without extensive procedural rights for individual citizens, but
with intense scrutiny after-the-fact by judges. In the common law tradition, the ideal consists of
neutral third-party dispute resolution within the administration, entailing extensive procedural
rights for the parties seeking to avoid the adverse government decision, and limited review
afterwards, before judges.
b. Administrative procedure of the European Commission
Procedural rights were first established in European competition proceedings, one of the
few areas in which the Commission, as opposed to the Member States, is empowered to directly
impose sanctions or other burdens upon individuals and firms.52 In the Treaty of Rome, antiMoreover, fines and other forms of administrative sanctions are reviewed by ordinary criminal courts and law suits against
government based on the Civil Code, i.e. sounding in contract, tort, or property, are brought in ordinary courts. As for
administrative procedure, German law also stands between the droit administratif and common law families. The attention to
individual rights in the Basic Law of 1948 has led to fairly extensive procedural rights whenever an individualized administrative
act (Verwaltungsakt) is promulgated. See id. at 74-80. Nonetheless, the bureaucratic culture in German administration is strong
and therefore the quasi-judicial procedures that characterizes British administration are less pervasive in the German case.
50
See Marco D'Alberti, Diritto amministrativo comparato 35 (1992) (comparing Anglosaxon proceduralism and French checking
of administrative decisions by the Conseil d'Etat).
51
See H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law 448 (8th ed. 2000).
52
In this article, I do not cover the limits on the Commission’s investigative powers. These include a privilege for attorney-client
communications, Case 155/79, Australian Mining and Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 ECR 1575, para. 23 (covering
communications made between an independent lawyer and a client for the sole purpose of defending the client in the competition
proceeding at issue), a privilege against self-incrimination, Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission, 1989 ECR 3283 (allowing firms
to refuse to answer questions that directly go to the question of guilt or innocence), and a duty to respect national search warrant
requirements and only collect evidence related to the specific ends of the investigation, Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v.
Commission, 1989 ECR 2859. Rather, I focus on the procedures the Commission must follow and the rights it must respect
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competitive agreements and abuses of monopoly power were prohibited and the Commission
was entrusted with enforcement powers.53 Five years later, in 1962, the Council passed
Regulation 17/62, designed to implement Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.54 The Regulation
stipulated that:
Before taking decisions as provided for in Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16 the
Commission shall give the undertakings or associations of undertakings
concerned the opportunity of being heard on the matters to which the Commission
has taken objection.55
In other words, the Commission was required to “hear” the parties whenever it took any action to
enforce competition law: decisions that an agreement or practice did not violate Articles 85 and
86, so-called “negative clearance" (art. 2); findings of an infringement of Article 85 or 86 and
orders for termination of the infringement (art. 3); decisions under Article 85(3) that an
agreement was exempt from the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements (art. 6); decisions on
the retroactive application of European competition law to agreements existing before the
passage of Regulation 17/62 (art. 7); the revocation or amendment of exemptions granted under
Article 85(3) (art. 8); decisions to impose fines (art. 15); decisions to impose “periodic penalty
payment” to compel compliance with Commission decisions (art. 16).
The next year, the Commission set down the details of the procedure, which, as shall be
explained shortly, followed French and German law.56 The opportunity to be heard comprised
the following sequence:
o The Commission would notify the parties, in writing, of the “objections raised against
them.” Art. 2.
o The parties would have opportunity to “make known in writing their views concerning
the objections raised against them” and provide exculpatory evidence. Art. 3.
o The Commission would hold an oral hearing at which the parties could present their case,
represented by counsel if they wished. Art. 7.
o The Commission's final decision would be limited to the objections on which the parties
had had an opportunity to set forth their views. Art. 4.
Under Article 190, now 253, of the EC Treaty, the Commission was also under a duty to state the
reasons for official acts, including competition enforcement decisions.57 Lastly, under Article
173, now 230, of the EC Treaty the parties could go to the Court of Justice to challenge the
decision on one of four grounds: lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement, infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application, and misuse
of powers.
The law left open many questions. How detailed did the statement of objections need to
be? Would the parties have to rely on the Commission’s characterization of the facts, as set out
in the statement of objections or would they have a right to review independently the evidence
collected by the Commission? If the parties had the right to review the evidence, did this include
all of the information collected by the Commission or just the evidence supporting the
when it exercises its decisionmaking powers under the Treaties. The Commission’s powers to collect information from
individuals and rights in that context are related but tangential to my inquiry.
53
EC Treaty, arts. 81 and 82 (ex arts. 85 and 86).
54
Council Regulation No. 17/62, First Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 (ex 85 and 86) of the Treaty, 1962 O.J. (L 13)
204. This has been repealed and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.
55
Id. at art. 19.
56
Regulation No. 99/63/EEC of the Commission of 25 July 1963 on the hearings provided for in Article 19(1) and (2) of Council
Regulation No. 17, 1963 O.J. (L 127) 2268.
57
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Commission’s determination? Could the same civil servants who investigated the case also
decide it, or did the decision have to be reached by a neutral third party? In its final decision, did
the Commission have to address all of the points raised by the parties, both those going to their
alleged anticompetitive behavior and those suggesting less burdensome remedial measures, or
could the Commission wait to respond, if and when the decision was challenged in the Court of
Justice?
In the following three decades, the Court of Justice, joined by the Court of First Instance
in 1988, answered most of these questions. In a line of cases on the right to a hearing, the Court
of Justice imposed an extensive set of procedural requirements on the Commission. In the
statement of objections, the Commission must notify the parties of all aspects of the planned
decision, to allow the parties a full opportunity to answer the case against them and object to the
proposed remedial measures.58 It must allow the parties to examine all of the information in its
files.59 Summaries of the evidence or the production of evidence limited to information that the
Commission considers relevant to the case will not suffice. The Commission is not under a duty
to separate prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions and therefore the same civil servants who
investigate the case may also decide it.60 Under the separate but related duty to give reasons, the
Court requires that the Commission give a complete enough statement of the facts and
considerations underlying the final decision so that the parties and the Court can discern whether
the Commission has adhered to the substantive requirements of European administrative law.61
However, the Commission is not obliged to answer all of the objections of the parties in the final
decision. If the parties choose to challenge the administrative determination in the European
Courts, the Commission can advance more detailed reasons for the decision there.62
The Commission has also helped define the contours of the European right to a fair
hearing. Starting in the early 1980’s, the Commission issued a series of policy statements and
binding rules, setting down procedures for exercising the right to examine the evidence. Thus, in
1982, the Commission announced that it would attach copies of the evidence to the statement of
objections issued to the parties at the beginning of a competition proceeding, or, if the evidence
was unwieldy, allow the parties to inspect the files on Commission premises.63 A Commission
rule from 1997 defines the classes of documents that are available to the parties and those that
are protected from disclosure and sets down the procedure for enabling the parties to consult the
documents.64
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The Commission has also created the figure of the hearing officer.65 This is a civil
servant in the Commission department responsible for competition (Directorate-General for
Competition) who presides at the oral hearing. Her primary function is to ensure that the hearing
is fair by allowing the parties to present their statements, putting questions to the parties, entering
new evidence into the record, and allowing witnesses to give testimony. At the conclusion of the
oral hearing, the Hearing Officer issues a report in which she summarizes the proceedings, draws
conclusions from the hearing, and makes recommendations for new evidence-gathering if she
believes it to be necessary.66
Lastly, when the Council enacted a European merger law, based on a proposal from the
Commission, all of the procedural guarantees developed in the context of Article 85 and 86 (now
81 and 82) enforcement actions were extended to merger proceedings.67 Firms, therefore, that
seek to obtain clearance for a merger enjoy the same procedural rights as firms under
investigation for engaging in anti-competitive practices or abusing a dominant position under
Articles 85 and 86 (now 81 and 82).
2. The historical juncture: Accession of the United Kingdom
What explains the choice that has been made in favor of a detailed statement of
objections, full disclosure of all the evidence, and a hearing presided by a civil servant
independent of the investigating officers? In this section I demonstrate that UK accession in
1973 represented a critical test of the European system of legal authority because of the different
common law understanding of lawful administrative action. As explained earlier and analyzed in
depth below, under English law, individuals enjoy rights in administrative proceedings similar to
those to which they are entitled in the courts.68 The Commission's administrative procedure,
based as it was on the droit administratif systems of the original six Member States, did not
afford the same rights. The incompatibility between the European mode of exercising
enforcement powers and the British conception of good government posed a challenge to the
Court of Justice’s and Commission's legal authority over British citizens, on British territory.
Here I show that the Court of Justice and the Commission adopted the British mental map of fair
administration and that they did so for the strategic reason of appeasing British judges and
lawyers and thus extending their authority to the UK.
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a. The common law challenge: The principle of natural justice compared to the French droit
de la défense and the German rechtlichen gehörs
As explained earlier, one of the most significant differences between the droit
administratif systems of the founding Member States and English law is the extent to which
administrative decisionmaking is proceduralized. The picture that was drawn of the two
principal European traditions, however, was impressionistic. Especially in administrative law,
generalization is perilous since administrative procedures and the stringency of judicial review
can differ dramatically from one government department to the next, one field to another. To
show that the Commission's administrative procedure was first designed on the droit
administratif model of the six original Member States and then was transformed to mimic the
minority common law model, I enter into the details of administrative law in the Member States,
in particular, competition law, which would have been the natural reference point for the civil
servants, lawyers, and judges designing Commission procedure. I examine first the law of
France, the place where the droit administratif model originated, then I review the features of
German law that depart significantly from the droit administratif, and finally I compare the two
systems to the English common law.
In France, the right to make one's case before an administrative decision can be issued is
known as the rights of the defense (droits de la défense). The right dates back to 1944, when the
French Conseil d'Etat (Council of State) recognized that individuals have the right, above and
beyond any of the rights created by the legislator in an enabling statute, to refute the
administration's version of the facts if the decision constitutes a sanction.69 In the case, Dame
Veuve Trompier-Gravier, the prefect (préfet) of the Seine region (département) had revoked a
newspaper kiosk permit based on the defendant's alleged misconduct without giving the
defendant the opportunity to refute the charges against her.70 The Conseil d'Etat found in favor
of dame veuve Trompier-Gravier and annulled the prefect's decision based on a theory of general
principles of law (principes généraux du droit), among which figured the rights of defense. In
French administrative and constitutional law, this judgment constituted an extraordinary turning
point, for it was the first in a long line of cases in which the Conseil d'Etat created whole cloth,
without a textual basis, general principles of law that French administration is required to obey.71
The Conseil d'Etat in Dame Veuve Trompier-Gravier disregarded, for the first time, the
fundamental tenet of French constitutional law under which the law (la loi) enacted by
Parliament is the expression of the sovereign French people and judges are to apply the law,
never make it.
Notwithstanding the significance of the rights of defense for French public law, it is
critical to appreciate the limits of the right compared to the common law tradition. It only
applies to administrative sanctions. And sanctions comprise only a subset of administrative
determinations that impose hardship on individuals. The determination must involve personal
facts (caractère personnel) that go to the behavior of the individual concerned for it to be
considered a sanction. 72 Sanctions are distinct from three broad classes of individualized
decisions: administrative acts that rest entirely within the discretion of the administration and
where a hearing of the parties would have no impact;73 administrative acts that are nondiscretionary because they draw the necessary consequences from a previous administrative or
69
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judicial determination and where, again, a hearing of the parties would have no impact;74 and
police measures (mésures de police), characterized as forward-looking decisions, adopted to
protect public safety or health, which concern the whole public and only incidentally affect the
interests of a specific individual .75 In sum, the rights of defense are far from universally
recognized in the daily decisionmaking of French administration, even in decisions that name
particular individuals or are clearly directed at certain individuals or firms.76
In addition, the procedure required of the administration is extremely abbreviated
compared to what would be expected in a judicial proceeding. The party must be informed that
the government is contemplating a sanction, she must be informed of all the charges against her
(griefs), and she must be able to present her case in such a way as to be able to influence the
administration's decision (présenter utilement sa défense).77 With the exception of disciplinary
proceedings involving state employees, the duty to inform the party of the factual and legal basis
of the contemplated decision does not include the communication of all the administration's
evidence, rather it entails a summary description of the facts at issue in the case. Furthermore,
the manner in which an individual is entitled to present her case depends on the circumstances of
the particular decision and does not entail, as a rule, an oral hearing.78
At the time that the European Commission was given powers in the competition area,
France also had legislation prohibiting certain types of inter-firm agreements and abuses of
dominant positions.79 The administrative enforcement mechanism comported with the
bureaucratic rationality ideal and the limited nature of the rights of defense in French law. The
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs was required to refer a suspected competition
infringement to a special commission appointed by the government and known as the Technical
Commission on Cartels and Dominant Positions (Commission Technique des Ententes et des
Positions Dominantes).80 The Commission appointed a rapporteur to investigate the matter and
draft a report and a separate advisory opinion that would then circulate to the members of the
Commission, the parties, and any government ministries that might be concerned.81 The firms
accused of the anti-competitive behavior had the right to submit written observations on the
report, but were not permitted to see the evidence in the file. Moreover, when the Commission
met to consider and vote on the case, the parties did not have the right to appear in person and,
even when they were permitted to appear, they generally were not allowed representation by a
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lawyer since, as one contemporary commentator put it, "the Commission has apparently found
that lawyers are too technical and want to argue the law, which the Commission feels is not
helpful before an economic advisory body."82 The Commission's opinion would then be issued
to the parties and sent to the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs for a final decision on the
infringement and the appropriate remedial action. The Commission's recommendation, although
technically non-binding, was considered an administrative act, subject to outside scrutiny in the
Conseil d'Etat.83 Hence, in France, the specifics of the administration of competition policy fell
into line with the basic features of the droit administratif tradition: there were few procedural
rights before the deciding authorities but access to the Conseil d'Etat for scrutiny of the merits of
the decision was guaranteed.
The only mental map of rights and administrative authority that departed significantly
from the droit administratif model in the first decades of the European Commission was German
law. Although, broadly speaking, the German system is grouped with thedroit administratif
countries, it possessed, and continues to possess, certain unique features. In the realm of
administrative procedure, it afforded greater protection for individuals. The federal
Administrative Procedure Act of 1976, which codifies long-standing principles of administrative
law, requires that before an administrative authority issues an individual act (Verwaltungsakt)
that interferes with rights the parties have a right to be heard (rechtlichen gehörs). Interfering
with rights captures a wider class of administrative action than the French concept of sanction.84
The administration is under a duty to inform the interested party (Beteiligten) of all the facts and
evidence relevant to the decision and give the interested party an opportunity to controvert
them.85 Individuals have the right to a written decision in which the essential factual and legal
grounds of the decision are given.86 Unlike French law, individuals have a right of appeal
against the act within the administration (Vorverfahren), as well as a right of appeal to the
courts.87 However, as a rule, and contrary to the English common law, administrative authorities
are not under a duty to allow the interested party to examine all of the evidence, independent of
the relevance to the party's case, or to make oral representations. Moreover, administrative
authorities are not required to afford an independent, neutral adjudicator to take evidence and
consider the government’s case against the individual, as in the common law tradition.
In competition proceedings as well, German administrative procedure differed from the
French procedure. The parties before the German Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) had the
standard right to notice of the charges and the evidence, the right to respond with a written
statement, and the right to receive a reasoned decision. 88 In contrast to ordinary administrative
procedure and the proceedings before the French Technical Commission, the parties also had a
right to an oral hearing.89 However, again, they did not have a right of access to all of the
evidence in government's file90 nor were the administrative officials responsible for the
investigation independent from those who took the final decision.
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Procedural duties in English administrative law, known as the principles of natural
justice, are more extensive. Natural justice is one of a number of requirements that English
courts impose, as a matter of judge-made common law, on government administration. The
courts interpret parliamentary statutes delegating powers to the administration as containing
certain conditions for the lawful exercise of powers. The administration may not commit errors
of fact and law, exercise discretion so that its decisions are unreasonable or based upon irrelevant
considerations, or make decisions without respecting the procedures of natural justice. Should
the administration breach any one of these principles, the courts will hold administrative action
to be ultra vires.91 These common law doctrines are so engrained that it is hard to envisage a
parliamentary statute that would be interpreted by the courts to authorize the administration to
act in breach. Notwithstanding the British constitutional doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, it
would be extremely difficult for Parliament to write a statute that an English court would
interpret as permitting errors of fact or law, authorizing unreasonable acts, allowing decisions
based on irrelevant considerations, or permitting disrespect for natural justice.
Natural justice comprises two elements: officials are forbidden from deciding cases in
which they may be biased (nemo judex in re sua or "no man a judge in his own cause") and
every person has a right to be fairly heard (audi alteram partem or "hear the other side").92 Both
can be traced back to cases decided in the second half of the 1800's, in which decisions of local
administrative authorities were quashed because they had disregarded the rules of natural
justice.93 The rule against bias has no equivalent in French or German administrative law. Bias
can stem from a number of sources, including a pecuniary interest in the matter, a personal or
family relationship to the parties, prejudging the outcome before hearing all of the evidence, and
the commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions.94 Some of the most common
sources of bias in government administration, however, are permitted by the courts. For
instance, if a minister decides a matter pursuant to a delegation from Parliament, it will be
considered lawful notwithstanding the fact that civil servants under his direction might have been
responsible for investigating the case or that the minister might have prejudged the matter by
announcing a department policy.95
The right to be fairly heard overlaps with the droits de la défense and the rechtlichen
gehörs but applies to a broader array of administrative action than the French right and entails
more extensive duties than both the French and German rights. Under English case law,
administration must respect the right to be heard whenever it plans to take a decision that
adversely affects the legal rights or interests of an individual.96 Although the characterization of
what is a legal right or interest narrows the application of the right, it is nowhere as restrictive as
the French limiting principle of a sanction. Administrative decisions that are entirely forwardlooking, discretionary, or policy-driven, must nonetheless respect the right to be heard. As a
result, administrative decisions such as land-use planning, the allocation of funds to local
administrative authorities, and the awarding of licenses to first-time applicants can only be made
after the affected parties have an opportunity to make themselves heard.97 As for the content of
the right, the courts have held that it includes the right to know the government's case, including
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the evidence and reports in the government's possession.98 The parties are also entitled, as a
general matter, to present their case directly before the deciding authority, although sometimes
written submissions are all that is required.99 Thus, English administrative procedure differs
from its French and German counterparts in both the extent to which the parties have the
opportunity to examine the government's evidence and the emphasis on oral hearings.
The principles of natural justice have not only been developed by common law courts,
but have also been given effect by parliamentary statutes establishing the institutions of the
British administrative state.100 In the early part of the 1900's, a number of special tribunals were
created to administer the social legislation of the welfare state and they have since multiplied in
virtually all policy domains. Tribunals exist for awarding social security benefits, allocating
fishing licenses, deciding on child support, determining whether companies have infringed
information privacy laws, and myriad other policy areas.101 Tribunals are charged with making
decisions that in droit administratif systems would be made by government ministries. Tribunals
are analogous to courts in that they are independent of the ministry responsible for the policy
area in which they adjudicate.102 Furthermore, their proceedings are adversarial: the
government presents the case against the defendant and the defendant has the opportunity to
respond. They are different from ordinary common law courts because they are specialized-their jurisdiction is limited to one administrative scheme—and their procedure is abbreviated
compared to a civil or criminal trial. Appeals on questions of law decided by administrative
tribunals can be taken to the ordinary courts.
The other type of legislative scheme designed to give effect to the dictates of natural
justice is the statutory inquiry. Inquiries are established in areas where, ultimately, the decision
is a discretionary one entrusted to a minister, but where it is believed that the minister should
listen to what the public has to say on the matter. A civil servant is tasked with conducting a fair
hearing of all of the interested parties and then making a recommendation to the minister. 103
This is the procedure that is followed before the government may acquire land, build roads or
airports, alter certain types of health services, and make a number of other types of
administrative decisions. The case law and the parliamentary practice of establishing tribunals in
the place of bureaucracies and statutory inquiries in the place of exclusive ministerial power
demonstrate the extent to which the principle of natural justice permeates the fabric of British
administration.
At the time that the UK joined the European Community, the enforcement of British
competition policy adhered to the principle of natural justice. The institutional apparatus was
split between the Restrictive Practices Court and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
The Restrictive Practices Court (RPC) was a full-fledged administrative tribunal, with
jurisdiction over cartels and certain forms of vertical agreements in restriction of competition.104
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) was also organized as an administrative
tribunal but it only had the power to make recommendations on mergers and anti-competitive
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practices to the administration.105 The government ministry, namely the Department of Trade
and Industry, was responsible for deciding on the appropriate prohibitions. In sum, cartel policy
was the province of a classic administrative tribunal and fully in line with the principles of
natural justice. Monopolies and merger policy was administered through the combination of a
commission independent of the government, before which individuals had a right to be heard,
and discretionary ministerial decisionmaking, without procedural guarantees for individuals. In
both cartels and mergers, however, the contrast with the French Commission Technique and the
German Bundeskartellamt is evident.
The Commission procedure set down in 1962 and 1963 fell in line with the procedural
guarantees of French and German competition law. As in both French and German law, the
parties had the right to learn of the government's essential facts and arguments, respond in
writing, and receive a reasoned final decision. As in German law, the parties also had the right
to an oral hearing. However, the Commission was not required to inform the parties of every
aspect of the planned decision, reveal all of the evidence and reveal it directly to the parties, or
provide for a neutral third party to officiate the administrative proceeding. As in the French and
German systems, it was believed that any injustice that could arise from such defects could be
remedied when the administrative decision was appealed to the Court of Justice. In 1973, this
view was called into question.
b. National value: The influence of the English right to a fair hearing
The English principle of natural justice influenced both the jurisprudence of the Court of
Justice and the European Commission's self-imposed procedural reforms. UK accession brought
a marked shift in the Court's doctrine on procedural rights in competition law.106 In 1966, in the
very first challenge to a Commission competition decision, the parties raised the question of the
adequacy of their rights in the course of the Commission’s proceedings. The parties claimed,
and the Court dismissed, a right to examine Commission evidence, the very same right that the
Court declared in 1979 to part of a fundamental "right to be heard." Consten and Grundig, firms
that had been denied an exemption under Article 85(3) for their exclusive distributorship
contract, argued that the Commission had violated their rights of defense.107 They argued that
they should have had the right to receive and examine all of the evidence gathered in the
Commission’s investigation. Consten and Grundig were especially keen to examine memoranda
from the French and German authorities responding to questions posed by the Commission,
which they believed had influenced the Commission’s decision.
Advocate General Roemer rejected their claims, followed by the Court, largely based on
the finding that the Commission procedure comported with the procedure followed by national
competition authorities and, in particular, the German one.108 The Advocate General recognized
that there was a “right to be fully heard” (rechtlichen gehörs) but that, as far as the right to
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examine the evidence was concerned, Consten and Grundig only had the right to a summary of
the facts that the Commission used in support of the competition decision. The Advocate
General based his conclusion on the law governing the German Cartel Office
(Bundeskartellamt):
A clear summary of their contents [documents that served as the basis for the
decision], which allows those concerned to learn without difficulty of the essential
lines of the opinion of the third parties concerned, is enough. These are also the
principles which govern the procedure before the Bundeskartellamt. (Cf. MüllerHenneberg and Schwartz, ‘Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen und
Europäisches Kartellrecht’, 2nd ed., p. 959.) 109
The Court followed the Advocate General.110
In 1970, when the Commission used for the first time its power to impose fines, the
parties challenged the decision on similar procedural grounds and again they were rejected by the
Advocate General and the Court, with one small exception. In ACF Chemiefarma v.
Commission, a number of quinine producers were found to have participated in a price-fixing
cartel. They argued that the Commission’s statement of objections was not sufficiently precise;
that the Commission should have communicated all of the evidence in the file, or in the
alternative, should have communicated the documents that served as evidence for the
Commission’s allegations; and that the final decision was defective because it did not address
arguments made by the parties on the nature of the pharmaceuticals market.111 The Commission,
as it had in Consten and Grundig, relied on the absence of a duty to disclose the file in the cartel
laws of the Member States in defending its procedure.112 The Advocate General rejected all of
the quinine producers’ procedural challenges and, for the most part, the Court followed.113 Only
on the question of whether the Commission had to disclose the records from staff visits to certain
firms or whether it could simply summarize the results of the investigation, did the Court hedge.
It said that the Commission should have communicated the records, but when the Court went on
to examine the prejudice to ACF Chemiefarma, it found it to be minimal. The failure to
communicate the documents and allow for critical examination of the proof led to the conclusion
that the Commission had failed to prove its case in one limited respect: the life of the ten-year
cartel, and hence the amount of the fine, was reduced by seven months.114
The next competition case, decided in 1972, produced no surprises. In ICI v.
Commission, the member of a dyestuffs price-fixing cartel challenged the Commission’s fine.
The complainant alleged a similar litany of procedural defects and, again, the Advocate General
and the Court rejected them.115
By 1974, the tone of the Court had changed dramatically. Transocean Marine Paint
Association v. Commission was one of the first competition cases to be decided after the
accession of the UK.116 Transocean, an association of marine paint manufacturers, operated a
world-wide sales network for its members. It had previously notified the Commission of the
agreement, and had obtained an Article 86 (3) exemption. When Transocean applied for renewal
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of the exemption, the Commission sent Transocean a notice of objections in which the conditions
being contemplated by the Commission in order to ensure that the agreement would not have
anti-competitive effects were listed. After giving Transocean the opportunity to make written
and oral submissions, the Commission issued the final decision. There, according to Transocean,
was a condition that had not been notified to the parties: Transocean’s members would have to
disclose cross-holding patterns between their directors and other firms in the paint sector.
Transocean challenged the decision on the grounds that it could not have anticipated the
condition from the proceedings and hence never had the opportunity to make its views know.
The Advocate General assigned to the case was one of the new British members of the
Court, Advocate General Warner. He agreed with the Commission that the procedure was
perfectly consistent with the letter of the applicable law. Nonetheless, Advocate General Warner
concluded that the “right to be heard” was part of Community law and that by imposing what
amounted to an entirely new condition without hearing the parties, the Commission breached the
right and the new condition had to be annulled.117 The Advocate General based his conclusion
on a long excursion into the laws of the Member States. He first gave what amounted to a text
book statement of the English rule:
There is a rule embedded in the law of some of our countries that an
administrative authority, before wielding a statutory power to the detriment of a
particular person, must in general hear what the person has to say about the
matter, even if the statute does not expressly require it. Audi alteram partem or, as
it is sometimes expressed, ‘audiatur et altera pars’. 118
He then launched into an extensive discussion of the English "rule of natural justice" under
which “although there are not positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard,
yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature.”119 The Advocate
General then canvassed the traditions of other Member States. In his tally, England, Scotland,
Denmark, Germany, and Ireland clearly embraced the principle, while France, Belgium, and
Luxembourg were arguably evolving in that direction, and Italy and the Netherlands clearly
rejected it. His results did not support a declaration that the right was ubiquitous or even that it
was a majority tradition. Nonetheless, he concluded:
My Lords, that review, which I have sought to keep short, of the laws of the
Member States, must, I think, on balance, lead to the conclusion that the right to
be heard forms part of those rights which the ‘law’ referred to in Article 164 of
the Treaty upholds, and of which, accordingly it is the duty of this Court to ensure
the observance.120
The Court embraced the common law principle put forward by the Advocate General.
For the first time, it found that there was a “general rule” that: “a person whose interests are
perceptibly affected by a decision taken by a public authority must be given the opportunity to
make his point of view known.”121 In the past, the Court had framed its review of the
Commission’s procedures as a matter of policing respect for the rights of defense set down in the
competition laws. In Transocean, by contrast, the Court announced a higher principle that that
could be used to supplement the competition laws. The Court concluded by annulling the
condition and sending the case back to the Commission for further proceedings, in which the
parties could make their views know.
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By the time the Court decided the next major competition case involving procedural
issues, it was clear that the tide had turned towards a court-like administrative process.
Hoffman-La Roche, a manufacturer of vitamins, was found by the Commission to have engaged
in an abuse of a dominant position by forcing buyer firms to purchase all of their supplies from
Hoffman-La Roche.122 Hoffman- La Roche objected to the Commission’s procedure on the same
grounds as the parties in the pre-Transocean cases: in the course of the administrative
proceeding, the Commission had not allowed Hoffman to inspect certain documents which
supported the findings of fact in the Commission’s final decision. Hoffman argued that the
Commission had breached the right to be heard. This time, the Court agreed.
The extent to which the new, English tradition had transformed the judge-made law of
rights before the Commission is graphically illustrated by the difference between the opinion of
the Advocate General and the judgment of the Court. Advocate General Reischel recommended
to the Court that it find against Hoffman-La Roche. As his predecessor Advocate General
Roemer had done in Consten and Grundig, the Advocate General looked to the procedural
guarantees in German competition law for guidance. Like Roemer, he observed that, under
German law, the parties to the administrative proceeding only had a right to a summary of the
evidence, not the right to examine the evidence for themselves:
According to [the German Law Against Restrictions on Competition] in
administrative proceedings the only applicable principle is that the persons
concerned must have the opportunity to give their views on the objections laid
against them and that a decision cannot be found on facts of which the parties
concerned were unaware. The way in which the Bundeskartellamt (the Federal
Cartel Office) applies this principle is evidently to cumminicate [sic] only the
essential content of the pleadings, and in particular to notify them only of the
essential purport of the views of the other parties concerned. There is no right to
carry out a thorough inspection of documents . . . .123
The Advocate General found that there was “no general legal principle” giving a right to
inspect documents and therefore, recommended that the Court find against Hoffman LaRoche.
The Advocate General showed himself to be behind the times. With UK
accession, the nature of Europe’s legal system had radically changed. The common law’s
principle of natural justice had replaced the German law of procedural rights as the
yardstick against which European authority had to be measured. Thus the Court declined
to follow the Advocate General and departed from the cases decided before accession.
The Court declared, for the first time, that the right to be heard was a “fundamental
principle of Community law” and that the ability to examine the Commission’s evidence
was part and parcel of the right:
[I]n order to respect the principle of the right to be heard the undertakings
concerned must have been afforded the opportunity during the administrative
procedure to make known their views on the truth and relevance of the facts and
circumstances alleged and on the documents used by the Commission to support
its claim that there has been an infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty.124
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The rejection of the earlier case law is striking. Both the timing of the change in the Court’s
doctrine, as well as the reasoning of the Hoffmann-La Roche judgment, in which the Court
categorized “the right to be heard” in much the same terms as Advocate General Warner in the
earlier Transocean case, support the conclusion that European administrative law came under the
spell of the English common law. In the twenty-five years of competition cases that have since
followed, the European Courts have worked out the ramifications of the fundamental principle
of the—now European-- “right to be heard.”
The background of how the Commission came to adopt the figure of the hearing officer
at the oral phase of competition proceedings also demonstrates the common law’s influence on
individual rights before the Commission. The historical record shows that the Commission drew
upon the common law's rule against bias, the second element of natural justice. As mentioned
earlier, in 1982, the Commission announced that a civil servant, unconnected with the
investigation, would preside at the oral hearing at which parties accused of anti-competitive
behavior give testimony and refute the Commission’s evidence.125 According to a number of
sources, this innovation occurred in response to a damning report from the House of Lords
European Communities Select Committee.126 There, the House of Lords criticized the European
Commission for combining the functions of judge and prosecutor, in breach of the second
principle of natural justice. The Select Committee said:
It is clearly essential that the rules and proceedings of the Commission should be
seen to be just and fair as well as effective. The evidence received by the
Committee revealed that there exists widespread doubt whether the Commission’s
procedures are just and fair to undertakings whose practices are under
investigation. . . . For most witnesses, including the Bar and Law Society, the
grounds for believing that there was “room for improvement” were derived from
the fact that the Commission combines the functions of investigator, prosecutor,
and judge. In general it was urged that the requirements of natural justice should,
as far as is possible, be observed in the adjudication by the Commission of all
contentious or disputed cases and that there should be no departure from natural
justice on grounds of administrative convenience.127
Since the existing treaty framework would not allow for the appointment of an independent
figure, similar to a member of a British administrative tribunal, the Committee suggested that a
civil servant, removed from the Commission’s investigation, be brought in at the hearing phase:
The Committee suggest that the creation of an additional post of Director in
Directorate-General IV [the Commission competition department] should be
considered. The Director so appointed would enter the case at the stage of the
preliminary meeting [the Committee also recommended introducing a preliminary
meeting in which the parties would be able to clarify the factual basis and
reasoning of the complaint] over which he would preside. He would also preside
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over the oral hearing, and would assume, within Directorate-General IV,
responsibility for the subsequent conduct of the case.128
The Commission very shortly afterwards took on board the crux of the House of Lord’s
recommendation by creating the figure of the hearing officer.
The House of Lords exercised a similar influence over the Commission’s decision to
disclose all of the evidence to the parties, regardless of whether or not the Commission
considered the evidence relevant and hence relied on it to build its case.129 Although the
Committee’s report was only published in February 1982, its inquiry began one year earlier. The
Committee put a number of questions to the European Commission on competition procedure,
circulated the critical comments of British lawyers to the European Commission, and called upon
a high- ranking civil servant responsible for competition (Mr. Pappalardo, Director, DG IV) to
testify before the Committee. The British Lords on the Committee had this to say to the Italian
Director about the Commission’s practice of only allowing companies to examine the evidence
the Commission deemed relevant:
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton. Without wishing to be more offensive than I can
help, Mr. Pappalardo, the difficulty is that if the company concerned knows that
the judge has in his file under the table a whole lot more documents but does not
quite know what those other documents are, it is apt to leave the company in a
dissatisfied position. That is the trouble, is it not?
Chairman (Lord Scarman)
The Court said in the La Roche case that the Commission must produce the
documents on which they rely. What troubles the undertaking is that there are
other documents on which the Commission has not chosen to rely and they want
to know what they say?—I know [Mr. Pappalardo]. This is the problem. There
are various answers to that, not simply the dogmatic approach that since this is an
administrative procedure we do not need to go that far. . . . It is unthinkable for
any official of DG IV to have a document which would be favourable to the
company and to forget it in order to punish the company.
Chairman. You might not understand the document. You might not see that it
was helpful to the undertaking? . . . . I cannot exclude that. [Mr. Pappalardo]
However, it seems to me somewhat theoretical.130
The House of Lords final report recommended that the Commission give access to the entire file
and the Commission, shortly thereafter, did precisely that.
In making the recommendation, the House of Lords relied on a recent opinion of
Advocate General Warner. There the British Advocate General had criticized the Commission
for not disclosing all of the information to the parties to a competition proceeding. He recited yet
another classic common law maxim:
The Commission seems to me moreover to have overlooked that “justice must not
only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done.” Justice is not seen to be
done if there is concealed from an undertaking, for no imperative reason, part of
the text of a complaint made against it.131
This passage from the House of Lords’ report illustrates vividly how British lawyers, statesmen,
and judges throughout the European system, on both national and supranational government
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bodies, working with the British mental map of legitimate administration, joined together to
challenge the droit administratif way of governing. The critique from judges and lawyers
socialized in the common law tradition spurred yet another transformation in European
competition law in the direction of a quasi-judicial administrative process.
c. Supranational interest: The interest of the Court of Justice and the Commission in
extending European legal authority
Why did the Court and the Commission alter the rights available in administrative
proceedings in accordance with the English principle of natural justice? After all, the UK was a
vastly outnumbered minority. In 1973, it was only one of two common law Member States in a
European Community of nine Member States, the rest of which were members of the droit
administratif family or represented variations on the droit administratif system. The same is true
today. The answer lies in the distinctive European system of legal authority. Enforcement of
European law relies upon national administrations, police, and, most importantly in the rights
context, courts. The Commission can issue decisions and the Court of Justice can hand down
judgments, but unless national courts are willing to enforce European law against individuals,
the decisions of the European institutions exist on paper only. When the UK acceded and British
lawyers, judges, and statesmen launched the natural justice attack, the Court and the Commission
came under immense pressure to accommodate them. The consequence of failing to do so was
English courts unwilling to enforce Commission competition decisions because the time-honored
rights of their citizens had been breached. The Court and the Commission reformed competition
proceedings and adopted the right to be heard with the objective of bringing the UK into the
European system of legal authority.
There is a stark and an infinitely more subtle and realistic way of rendering the European
dynamic of legal authority. First, the stark account.132 To execute any decision against an
individual or firm, the Commission and the Court of Justice rely on national administrations and
national courts. A firm that does not comply with a Commission competition decision and the
Court of Justice judgment upholding that decision can only be brought into line—and a bank
account attached or an individual detained for contempt of court--through the decision of a
national government officer, upheld in national court. If the government officer and the judge are
unwilling to enforce the Commission’s decision, it becomes an obligation in the international law
sphere rather than an authoritative command in the positivist sense.133 Especially at the
beginnings of European integration, the Commission and the Court were intensely aware of the
limits of their enforcement authority and this awareness contributed to the making of European
law.134 A Commission decision or Court of Justice judgment could not blatantly disregard
national cultural traditions of the lawful exercise of public power. The judges on the Court of
Justice were particularly attune to the need to accommodate their British brethern, given the

132

I draw upon Joseph Weiler's analysis of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts in enforcing European
law over national law. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of European Law, 100 Yale L.J. 2403 (1991). According to
Weiler, supremacy of European law was achieved not by judicial proclamation in Luxembourg, but rather through a gradual
process in which the Court accommodated national judiciaries and, reciprocally, national judiciaries came to accept European law
and the European Court of Justice as supreme to national law, even national constitutional law.
133
See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed. 1994) (edited by Penelope Bulloch & Joseph Raz). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
134
See, e.g., A.M. Donner, The Court of Justice of the European Communities in Legal Problems of the European Economic
Community and the European Free Trade Association 66, 72, Supplementary Publication No. 1 of the International and
Comparative Law Quarterly (1961) (statement by second President of the Court of Justice on the Court’s reliance on national
courts to refer cases and execute judgments); House of Lords, European Communities Committee, Eighth Report on Competition
Practice, supra note__at 50-51, paras. 133-35 (Director of DG IV stating that Commission’s inspection authority was entirely
dependent on whether a British judge would grant a warrant authorizing entry).

32

Creating Rights
sensibilities of judges to rights claims and the imperatives of protecting individual freedoms in
the face of oppressive government action.
The subtle version of the cooperation dynamic builds on the stark one. In making
decisions and rendering judgments, European judges and administrators take seriously objections
from their counterparts at the national level, schooled in their distinct traditions of public law.135
A national jurist’s claim that European authority has been exercised unfairly must be examined
with extreme care. To put it slightly differently, one of the most important interpretive sources
for determining the scope and limits of the power conferred on the Commission by the EC Treaty
are national legal traditions. As the Court has repeatedly stated, “the Court draws inspiration
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.”136 But, different from what
the Court says, there sometimes does not exist a common tradition. Hence, when it comes to
determining the limits of European public power, in the absence of a common tradition, it is the
tradition that will object loudest to the particular exercise of public power that prevails. This
solicitude for national understandings of legitimate, rights-abiding public authority is related to
the absence of European enforcement powers and the corresponding strategic need for
cooperation from national courts and administrations, but it runs far deeper. It now can be said
to define the new, European constitutional tradition.137
My explanation for the powerful influence of a minority rights tradition is largely based
on speculation. However, there is significant evidence that the Court of Justice was aware of the
consequences of disregarding national mental maps of fair and rights-abiding government
administration. In the first years of the European Community, individuals indeed did go to their
national courts to protest Commission decisions and national courts were willing to review the
decisions, to ensure that their citizens were not subject to arbitrary and unlawful exercises of
public power. The case in point is the challenge brought in the Italian courts by a number of
Italian steel producers to a fine issued by the High Authority, the predecessor to the Commission
and the executive branch for the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty (ECSC Treaty).
In 1965, the Italian Constitutional Court was asked by a trial court in Turin to consider
the constitutionality of a decision issued by the High Authority. 138 The challenge was based on
exactly the same type of argument that, had the Court of Justice not incorporated the right to be
heard eight years later, might have been made by British litigants: the High Authority’s decision
and the review available in the Court of Justice did not satisfy national constitutional principles
135
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of lawful administrative action. The facts are as follows. Under the ECSC Treaty, the High
Authority had the power to regulate the production of steel in the Member States, including the
power to impose certain taxes related to the importation and use of scrap iron for steel
production.139 In 1961, the High Authority requested that producers forward original invoices
documenting their electricity consumption, or certified copies of the invoices, as one means of
monitoring and verifying the amounts of scrap iron being consumed by individual steel plants.
Ten Italian companies replied that they could not comply for various reasons and that the request
was unlawful. The High Authority then issued an order pursuant to its information-gathering
powers under the Treaty.140 The steel companies brought a challenge in the European Court of
Justice and the Court upheld the order.141
Four days later, the High Authority issued new decisions to the parties, imposing fairly
significant fines for the failure to comply with the first order (0.5% of the companies’ annual
turnover) and fining the companies additional amounts for the each day’s delay in failing to
produce the documents, counted from the date of notification of the second set of decisions
(2.5% of the daily turnover for nine of the companies and 5% for the tenth company).142 This
time, the parties challenged the High Authority’s order in both Italian court and the European
Court of Justice. For its part, the Court of Justice upheld the fine, with one exception. It found
that given that the applicants had to obtain the invoices from third parties, i.e. the electricity
company, there were good reasons for the delay in turning over the documents. Therefore the
Court suspended the daily penalties for a period of seven months.143
The High Authority's decision did not fare so well on the Italian front. Four separate
cases were filed in local courts: one in Milan, one in Naples, one in Rome, and one in Turin.
Exercising their rights under Italian law, the steel companies challenged the decisions of the
High Authority on the grounds that the order breached a basic interest (interesse soggettivo) by
taking their property without respect for the Italian Constitution's guarantees of lawful
administrative action.144 The litigants challenged the constitutional validity of the ECSC Treaty,
in particular, the failure of the Treaty and the European Court of Justice to afford the plaintiffs
the same protections against arbitrary and oppressive government action as afforded under the
Italian Constitution. Only the Milan court held, without reservations, in favor of the High
Authority.145 The Naples court first examined whether the Court of Justice was structurally
similar to an ordinary Italian court—as opposed to an Italian administrative court which has less
independence from the executive branch—because under the Italian Constitution, citizens are
guaranteed an ordinary judicial forum to challenge administrative acts that breach basic interests
such as property. The Court of Justice passed muster. Hence, the Naples court found that the
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ECSC Treaty was constitutionally permissible and consequently only the European Court of
Justice, not national courts, had jurisdiction over the decision of the High Authority.
The Rome court held that, in the case of the steel companies, the judicial protection from
unlawful administrative action that they had been afforded comported with the requirements of
the Italian Constitution. In doing so, however, the court found that there was no way of
excluding the possibility that the constitutional rights of Italian citizens would be undermined in
the future through inadequate judicial protection. It said:
[there are] more delicate questions resulting from the inability to impugn before
the European Court the decisions of the High Authority on the grounds of conflict
between Community norms . . . and norms of our Constitution which assure
inalienable guarantees for the rights of individuals.146
The Turin court went the furthest of all. Unlike the Naples court, the Turin court found
that the Court of Justice was indeed a special, administrative court, without the full array of
powers of an ordinary court of law, and hence judicial review in the Court of Justice breached
the guarantee of access to an ordinary court contained in the Constitution. Moreover, the Turin
court found that the grounds of review set down under the ECSC Treaty were limited, in
violation of the Constitution’s requirement that there be full legal protection of the rights and
interests (diritti soggettivi and interessi legittimi) affected by administrative decisions.147 Lastly,
the Turin court linked the case to the broader conflict between the Italian Constitutional Court
and the European Court of Justice on the question of whether European law was supreme to
Italian law. The Turin court repeated the Italian Constitutional Court’s earlier holding that the
Italian Constitution was supreme to the treaties and that a constitutional amendment would be
required to establish the supremacy of European law. Therefore, the Turin court referred two
questions to the Constitutional Court: were the Articles limiting the grounds of review before
the European Court of Justice of High Authority decisions (art. 33) and giving the Court of
Justice exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the validity of European acts (arts. 41 and 92) valid under
the Italian Constitution?
The Constitutional Court decided the question in favor of the High Authority and against
the steel companies. But it did so by systematically comparing the administrative law guarantees
at the European level to those afforded under Italian constitutional law and concluded that the
two were roughly equivalent.148 It did not give the High Authority and European Court of
Justice carte blanche. For students of European law, it should be noted that this decision came
down after the Court of Justice’s judgment in Costa v. ENEL, in which the Court of Justice held
that, contrary to an earlier pronouncement of the Italian Constitutional Court, European law was
supreme to Italian law.149 Obviously, the Italian Constitutional Court was still not persuaded.
According to the Constitutional Court, the independence and impartiality of the Court of
Justice passed Italian constitutional muster:
That Court [Court of Justice] is established and functions according to the rules
corresponding to the basic principles of our own legal system . . . . It is
unanimously recognised that the Court of Justice is endowed with a judicial
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character; and it may be observed that its members must fulfil their respective
functions with independence and impartiality.150
Moreover, the Constitutional Court found that, under the ECSC Treaty, San Michele would be
allowed to impugn the High Authority’s decisions in the Court of Justice on the same grounds as
afforded under Italian law.
The [High Authority’s decision] is subject to attack before the Community Court
by virtue of Article 36, para. 2, by way of appeal with full jurisdiction (recours de
pleine jurisdiction); some maintain even that, once formulated, such an appeal
under Article 3, para. 3 [article guaranteeing review of monetary sanctions issued
by High Authority] may be used to attack acts contemplated in Article 33, para. 2
[individual decisions of Authority]. The latter, by their nature, could not be
subjected to any wider control under the internal order.
The Italian Court therefore concluded that the arrangement for review of administrative acts in
the ECSC Treaty complied with the Italian fundamental right to judicial protection, guaranteed
under Article 2 of the Constitution. It said that the relevant provisions of the Treaty created a
judicial order “[i]n accordance with the rules corresponding to the fundamental features of our
judicial system, even if they do not repeat literally the whole of the rules.”151
What is the relevance of this old Italian case for the right to a fair hearing? At the time
that the UK acceded and Transocean Marine Paint was decided, the case was not so old.
Transocean Marine Paint was decided only nine years later and many of the same judges were
still sitting on the Court. The Italian case served as a warning that, after accession, British
lawyers and judges might challenge the authority of the Commission and the Court of Justice if
the Court failed to accommodate those features of the British public law tradition that set it apart
from continental systems. The procedural guarantees of the principle of natural justice were
precisely such features.
Some will object that because of the British constitutional doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy and because Parliament had incorporated the treaties through the European
Communities Act of 1972, an English court would not assume jurisdiction over the Commission
decision, as the Italian courts had done. But would the English court have interpreted
Parliament’s exercise of sovereignty in the European Communities Act as one in which it
rejected centuries of common law on the rules of natural justice? The answer, especially in the
early years after accession, was not clear. It is certainly not fanciful to argue that this question
was on the minds of the members of the Court of Justice and that, to head off resistance from
English courts, they adopted the right to be heard and a highly proceduralized blueprint of
Commission decisionmaking.152
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3. The evolution of the right to a hearing
Once the Court established the right to be heard in competition proceedings, it rapidly
migrated to other areas of direct Commission enforcement of European law. The common law
understanding of fair administration colonized other areas of Commission action through the
logic of judicial decisionmaking. The Court of Justice extended the right to a hearing to other
policy fields based upon the precedential value of the earlier cases in deciding the later ones and
the similarities that existed, as a matter of fact and logic, between individuals in competition
proceedings and other types of European proceedings.153 The first place where this occurred
was anti-dumping law.
As a policy related to the customs union, international trade is an area in which the
Commission has had direct enforcement powers since the early years of the European
Community. When importers of a product are alleged to have benefited from government
subsidies at home or to be selling the product on the European market at a price below the
“normal value” of the product (“dumping”), the Commission is responsible for enforcement.
The Commission, not national administrative bodies, is charged with determining that there has
been subsidization or dumping and calculating the appropriate duty. The duty is intended to
offset the unfair price advantage of the imported good.
When the first European law was passed in 1968, it provided for a fairly extensive
procedure.154
o The Commission would publish a notice of the investigation in the Official Journal, as
well as individually advise the representatives of the exporting government and the
exporters and importers known to be concerned.
o The parties would be allowed to examine “all information that is relevant to the defence
of their interests . . . and that is used by the Commission in the anti-dumping
investigation.”155
o The parties would be allowed to refute the allegations of government subsidies or sale at
less than the normal value in writing. If they so-requested and if they “showed a
sufficient interest,” the parties would be allowed to present their views orally.156
Furthermore, on the request of the parties, the Commission would organize a meeting of
the foreign and domestic interests, to enable them to exchange their views.
In 1979, however, the Court of Justice suggested that the procedure did not
adequately guarantee the right to a hearing because the parties did not have an adequate
opportunity to review the information collected by the Commission.157 The case
involved a challenge to an administrative decision imposing an anti-dumping duty on ball
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bearings and tapered roller bearings from Japan.158 The Commission recommended to
the Council of Ministers (the European institution with the final decisionmaking authority
in dumping and subsidies proceedings) that a duty of 15% be imposed, without disclosing
to the ball-bearing producers what cost figures had served as the basis for calculating the
duty. Advocate General Warner, ever-ready to vindicate the principles of natural justice,
relied on the competition law that he had been instrumental in creating to find that the
right to be heard applied to anti-dumping investigations:
It is a fundamental principle of Community law that, before any individual
measure or decision is taken of such a nature as directly to affect the interests of a
particular person, that person has a right to be heard by the responsible authority;
and it is part and parcel of that principle that, in order to enable him effectively to
exercise that right, the person concerned is entitled to be informed of the facts and
considerations on the basis of which the authority is minded to act. That
principle, which is enshrined in many a Judgment of this Court, and which applies
regardless of whether there is a specific legislative text requiring its application,
was re-asserted by the Court only yesterday in Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche &
Co. AG v. Commission.159
He easily concluded that the Commission had decided the anti-dumping duty in breach of the
producers’ right to be heard.
The Court never reached the procedural question, since it found for the producers and
against the Commission and Council on the alternative grounds that they had acted contrary to
powers conferred under the European anti-dumping law.160 However, the Advocate General’s
declaration attracted considerable attention in the academic commentary as well as policymaking
circles.161 A few months after the judgment was handed down, European anti-dumping law was
amended in two fundamental respects.162 First, firms on both the foreign and domestic sides
were allowed to inspect all of the information gathered in the course of the investigation and in
the Commission’s files. Second, the firms that exported and imported the product under
investigation were given the right to request that the Commission disclose its “essential facts and
considerations.” The common wisdom in international trade circles is that the revisions were
made to respond to the criticism of Advocate General Warner in NTN Tokyo Bearing.163
Then, in 1985 and again in 1991, the Court annulled two sets of anti-dumping duties
because they had been imposed in breach of the parties’ right to be heard. In the first, Timex, the
main European manufacturer of wrist-watches and the initiator of the anti-dumping proceeding,
had not been allowed to examine information collected on watches from Hong Kong. The
Commission reasoned that the action was against watches from the Soviet Union, not Hong
Kong, and European anti-dumping law only provided for the disclosure of evidence provided by
the parties to the investigation. The Court held against the Commission and the Council,
reasoning that to protect the procedural rights of Timex, it was necessary to interpret the
governing law broadly.164
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In the second case, Al-Jubail Fertilizer v. Council & Commission, the influence of the
right to a hearing in competition proceedings was unmistakable.165 In Al-Jubail Fertilizer, the
manufacturer of fertilizer from Saudi Arabia claimed that the Commission had failed to
communicate a number of facts relevant to the imposition of the duty, including the information
on European costs of production and prices of fertilizer, which had served as the basis for
concluding that there had been injury to the domestic industry.166 Advocate General Darmon
first quoted at length from the opinion of Advocate General Warner in NTN Tokyo Bearing.167
He then noted the analogies between the position of the parties in a competition proceeding and
in an anti-dumping proceeding:
From the viewpoint of an undertaking, the loss of the Community market as a
result of the imposition of a high anti-dumping duty—as in this case—has
financial consequences which are comparable to those which follow the
imposition of a fine for an infringement of Articles 85 or 86 of the Treaty of
Rome.168
Finally, in concluding that the Commission had to respect procedural rights in anti-dumping
proceedings similar to those guaranteed in the competition area, the Advocate General said that
the right to be heard announced in the lead competition case naturally applied in the case at hand:
[A] principle as general as the one defined by the Court in its judgment in
Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, namely that the Commission may not base its
decisions on facts, circumstances or documents on which the party concerned has
been unable to make its views known, would seem to apply to dumping
proceedings as well.169
The Court squarely followed the Advocate General’s opinion. It declared that the right to
a fair hearing was a “fundamental principle” of European law and that it applied to anti-dumping
proceedings because of the adverse impact that an anti-dumping duty could have on the interests
of the parties:
[I]t is necessary . . . to take account in particular of the requirements stemming
from the right to a fair hearing, a principle whose fundamental character has been
stressed on numerous occasions in the case-law of the Court (see in particular the
judgement of 17 October 1989 in Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v. Commission
[1989] ECR 3137 [competition case]). Those requirements must be observed not
only in the course of proceedings which may result in the imposition of penalties,
but also in investigative proceedings prior to the adoption of anti-dumping
regulations which, despite their general scope, may directly and individually
affect the undertakings concerned and entail adverse consequences for them.170
A number of cases have since been decided in which the Court of Justice, now joined by the
Court of First Instance, have defined the scope of the right.171
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The last policy field in which the Commission must abide routinely by the right to a
hearing, as a result of the judicial logic of reasoning by analogy and reliance on earlier
judgments, is customs. Since 1968, the European Community has had a single set of tariff rates
for goods imported into the Community from third countries. The duties are calculated and
collected, pursuant to an elaborate set of European rules, by national customs services in each of
the Member States. Generally national administrations, not the Commission, handle the
collection of custom duties. Since 1979, however, in a narrowly defined class of cases, the
Commission has had the power to make individualized determinations affecting specific firms.172
These are cases in which the importer applies for the repayment (the duty has already been paid)
or the remission (the duty is owed but has not yet been paid) of a customs duty due under the
European Customs Code. The importer’s claim can be based on any one of a number of
circumstances set out in the Customs Code, for instance negligence on the part of the
Commission in administering customs policy.173 Remission or repayment may also be made
under the general fairness clause of the implementing regulation.174 The proceeding is initiated
by the importer by filing an application with the responsible national customs services.175 The
customs services is responsible for determining whether to grant remission, but, in the case of
doubt, may refer the question to the Commission, which has the last word.
Until recently, individual importers did not enjoy the right to a hearing before the
Commission in remissions proceedings. The procedure afforded under national law before the
customs services of the Member States was deemed enough. Even when the national customs
services sent the file to the Commission for consideration, no provision was made for the trader
to make his views known. Then, in Case T-346/94 France-aviation v Commission, the Court of
First Instance held that that a trader who requests repayment of customs duties has the right to be
heard during the proceeding.176 As a consequence of that judgment, the Commission amended its
customs rules in 1996. Under the new provision, when a national customs service sends a file to
the Commission, it is required to include a statement by the trader certifying that the trader has
read the case file and stating either that she has nothing to add or listing the additional
information that she considers should be included.177 But still no provision permitted individual
importers to have any direct contact with the Commission in the course of the repayment or
remissions proceedings.
The Court of First Instance changed the state of affairs in two subsequent cases involving
remissions applications for customs duties owed on high-quality beef imported from Argentina
(known, appropriately, as Hilton beef ). There, the Court of First Instance held that if the
Commission was contemplating reversing a favorable determination by the national customs
service, it was under a duty to give the importers access to the Commission’s file and an
opportunity to respond, in writing, to the Commission’s allegations, including the right to submit
evidence.178 Again, the Commission amended its customs rules to reflect the Court’s holding.179
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In two pending cases, the Court has been asked by importer firms to extend the right to a hearing
even further: the issue under consideration is whether parties to remissions proceedings also
have the right to make oral representations to the Commission.180
The Court has sporadically recognized the right to a hearing in other types of
Commission proceedings which, according to the test developed by the Court and reminiscent of
the earlier formula of Advocate General Warner in Transocean Marine Paint Association, “are
initiated against a person and are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that
person.”181 These are policy areas in which enforcement is almost exclusively in the hands of
national authorities and the Commission intervenes rarely, under exceptional circumstances. In
one case, the exclusion of a Swedish fishing company from a Community fishery zone because
of allegations of illegal fishing activities was enough to trigger a hearing right.182 In another, it
was the reduction of European financial assistance to a Portuguese firm that triggered the
right.183 In these cases, however, the scope of the hearing right is far less extensive than in the
core areas of competition, anti-dumping, and now, customs administration.184 The litigants have
the right to a brief description of the facts and reasoning supporting the contemplated decision, to
make their arguments and advance their evidence in a written submission, and to receive a brief
and by no means exhaustive reply in the Commission's statement of reasons.
Notwithstanding the Court’s central role in establishing adversarial, trial-type procedures
in Commission decisionmaking, it has recognized a critical limit to the right to a fair hearing.
The Commission decision must “adversely affect” the party vindicating the right. This
requirement has led the Court to reject the right in two types of cases. When the Commission’s
decision is characterized as a benefit-conferring, as opposed to a sanction or burden-imposing
one, then the right is not guaranteed. In Windpark Groothusen, the Commission denied an
application for Community aid under a programme promoting energy technologies.185 The
Commission based the decision exclusively on the information submitted in the initial
application, without allowing the applicant to submit observations before the final funding
decision was made. The Court of First Instance, upheld by the Court of Justice, found that there
was no right because “the applicant . . . had merely been placed on a reserve list of possible
beneficiaries of Community financial support.”186
The other type of case in which the Court does not recognize that a party is adversely
affected is where a third-party individual stands to benefit or lose from the Commission’s
enforcement action. In other words, the individual is a member of the wider public in whose
interest the Commission is supposed to act when it applies European law, not the specific
individual or firm against whom the Commission is taking action. For instance, the Court denied
that a consumer group had the right to a fair hearing in an anti-dumping case brought against
audio-cassettes imported from Japan, Hong Kong, and Korea. The Commission, therefore, was
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allowed to deny the consumer group access to the information in its files on the alleged
dumping.187
The Court has employed a variation of this logic in state aids cases. In state aid
proceedings, the Commission takes action against Member States alleged to unfairly assist their
national firms through direct subsidies or favorable treatment in one form or another.
Competitors of the national champions often bring the state subsidies to the Commission's
attention. The Court has repeatedly held that the Member State under investigation has a right to
a hearing.188 By contrast, the procedural rights of the state enterprise and competitor firms are
significantly more limited.189
The most recent chapter in this history is the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of
2000, which, under the Constitutional Treaty of 2004, would be given binding legal force.
Article 41 codifies the extensive case law of the Court of Justice on individual rights in European
administration, including the right to a hearing chronicled above.190 The relevant paragraphs
read as follows:
Article II-41 Right to good administration
1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly
and within a reasonable time by the Institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of
the Union.
2. This right includes:
(a) the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which
would affect him or her adversely is taken;
(b) the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the
legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy;
....
Thus, Article 41 enshrines the long and steady trajectory of the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence
that started with Transocean Marine Paint Association in 1974 and continues to this day.
4. European value: The European and British rights compared
How does the European right to a hearing today, after thirty years of Court of Justice
judgments and Commission policymaking, compare to the British tradition from which it was
drawn? Since generalization in administrative law is dangerous, it is best to compare the
procedures in the same substantive policy area. The one field where such one-to-one comparison
is possible is competition. The results are startling: by the early 1980's, the European right had
overtaken the British one. The entitlements of the right to a hearing, taken as combination of the
duty to give notice of the government's case, disclose the evidence, and allow the parties
opportunity to refute the opposing case, were more extensive before the European Commission
than before the British authorities.
As the reader will recall, early in the history of British competition policy, jurisdiction
was split between two administrative authorities, the Restrictive Practices Court, responsible for
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cartels and certain types of vertical restraints of trade and the Mergers and Monopolies
Commission (MMC), responsible for investigating monopolies and mergers and a variety of
market practices considered to be anti-competitive. By the mid-1970's, the MMC had become
the most active of the two authorities.191 Yet the procedure there fell short of the Commission’s
proceedings in certain respects. The parties did not have the right to examine all of the evidence
gathered by the MMC.192 Furthermore, the letter sent out to the parties at the beginning of the
MMC’s investigation, informing them of all of the facts and arguments against them, was not
believed to be as comprehensive as the Commission’s statement of objections. 193
Although not strictly related to the principle of natural justice, there was a last, notable
difference between British and European competition proceedings which significantly limited the
rights of the parties under investigation. The British system allowed for vastly more discretion in
the hands of the Secretary of State of Trade and Industry, i.e. the Minister, than was enjoyed by
the College of Commissioners in the European context.194 The MMC issued a comprehensive
report on the anti-competitive practices or merger in which it made findings on injury to the
public interest and made recommendations on the appropriate remedies. The Minister, however,
had complete discretion to reject the finding of injury or the proposed remedial measures and this
discretion was often used.195 The application of largely political considerations at the final stage
of the proceedings signified that even though the parties were heard, early on, in a quasi-judicial
proceeding, the final outcome could well be based upon factors of which they had had no notice
and on which they had no opportunity to respond.196
In 1998 and again in 2002, British competition law was completely overhauled. Part of
the reforms were designed to de-politicize British competition law, taking away the Minister’s
powers to depart from the report of the Commission (now called the Competition Commission),
and replacing review by the Minister with a powerful appeals tribunal within the Competition
Commission.197 There lies the irony. In the 1970’s and early 1980’s, rights and procedures in
European Commission competition proceedings were transformed to respond to the common
lawyer criticism of an overly bureaucratic process without adequate opportunities for individuals
test administrative decisions and protect their rights. Now, the British system has been changed
to render it more judicial in nature, expressed modeled on European competition proceedings. 198
Even though this reconfiguration of British administrative authority does not come under the
doctrinal heading of natural justice, effectively, the right to be heard and the rule against bias are
more vigorously protected in a system with a powerful appeals tribunal and without ministerial
discretion. Here we see the influence of new European mental maps of rights on old national
traditions, the effect of which has been to bring the British system closer to the ideal of natural
justice.
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B. The Second Generation: The Right to Transparency
The next wave of rights to transform the structure of Commission decisionmaking and
the relationship between the Commission and European citizens came in 1993. The Commission
has the far-reaching policymaking prerogatives of an executive branch in a parliamentary system
of government. The EC Treaty gives the Commission the exclusive right to introduce laws into
the assemblies with the power to vote and enact laws, the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament.199 The Commission is also responsible for implementing European laws by
promulgating implementing regulations, monitoring implementation by the Member States
(which, as mentioned earlier, generally are responsible for day-to-day enforcement), and suing
Member States in the Court of Justice if their implementation is inadequate.200 What rights did
European citizens have in 1957 when the Commission exercised authority through broadly
applicable policy measures?201 Today? And how do we explain the transformation? In this
section of the Article, I give the first part of the answer to this set of questions by examining the
rise of the right to transparency.
1. The right to examine Commission documents then and now
a. National traditions of open government and the right of access to documents
In Europe, there exists considerable variation among government administrations in how
open or closed they are to the public.202 Most are believed to fall on the closed side of the
spectrum. This is the case for administrations in both the civil law and common law traditions.
Over the centuries, government officials in countries like France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and
the UK have been allowed to draft legislation, promulgate administrative rules, and make
administrative decisions in relative secrecy, without the prospect of widespread public scrutiny
through reporting requirements, the right of access to documents, and other transparency devices.
The exception is government administration in the smaller countries of northern Europe:
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland.
Let me briefly enter into the specifics of Sweden, the legal system that is recognized as
the lead contributor to the northern paradigm. A number of features of that system separate it
from the majority tradition: powerful parliamentary committees, an ombudsman elected by
parliament with investigative and prosecutorial powers over government officials,
constitutionally guaranteed independence for the administration from the prime minister and the
cabinet, and the constitutional right of access to government documents. Although the classic
north-south dichotomy is not as stark as it used to be because of a number of contemporary,
European-wide trends in government administration, the difference still exists.
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Whether a country has general access to documents legislation largely tracks the
categorization of a system as open or closed. In the Nordic systems and the Netherlands,
individuals have the right to request documents related to a broad array of government acts,
without a need to demonstrate any particular connection to the government proceeding.
Especially in Sweden and Finland, the right has deep, historical roots and is part of the
constitutional identity of the nation, or at least of the public lawyers of the nation.203 The
declaration on transparency in the Swedish Treaty of Accession gives a flavor of the symbolic
nature of the right:
Transparency in the management of public affairs and, in particular, access of the
public to administrative documents as well as the protection that the Constitution
guarantees for the media, are and remain fundamental principles that are part of
the constitutional, political, and cultural heritage of Sweden.204
It is important not to exaggerate the scope of the right. The legislation in all of these
countries contains significant exceptions. Everywhere, public officials may refuse disclosure to
prevent harm to the public interest or to other individuals, albeit according to different, national
understandings of what constitutes harm. Moreover, in Sweden and Finland, preparatory
material such as drafts, outlines, and reports generally do not fall within the ambit of the right.205
Drafts, memorandums, and minutes of meetings in government ministries leading to the adoption
of legislative proposals are also excluded from the scope of administrative documents. By
contrast, in Denmark, information produced in connection with administrative proceedings,
regardless of whether it is contained in the final act, is also subject to disclosure.206 As in
Sweden and Finland, however, documents that are highly political in nature, like drafts of bills
and minutes of cabinet meetings, are excluded.207
The Netherlands has probably the most liberal system of all. Individuals may request
documents related to any general policy decision or individual determination made by any part of
the administration, including the documents related to the initial preparation and drafting of the
decision and including material related to government bills.208 The principal exception to the
disclosure of internal documents is the one for documents containing personal opinions of public
officials. Even on that score, however, in the interests of “good administration" and democratic
government, the administration can transmit the information, but is required to do so in an
anonymous form, so as to prevent identification of the individual who gave the opinion.209 It
203
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should also be noted that the Swedish and Finnish laws require officials to keep registers listing
government documents open for public consultation, although the registers do not contain the
full text of documents.210
Among those Member States on the closed side of the spectrum, one group of countries
have recently adopted cross- cutting access to documents legislation but are still newcomers to
the habit and law of open government. The UK adopted a law in 2000, Ireland in 1997, Belgium
in 1994, Portugal in 1993, and Spain in 1992.211 A second set of Member States has adopted
general legislation which significantly restricts the right by requiring individuals to show a
special interest in the document because the document is related to an administrative proceeding
affecting their rights and duties. Italy212 and Greece213 fall in this category. Lastly, Germany
does not provide for a general right of access, rather the right is contained in numerous, sectorspecific laws in areas such as the environment and municipal planning. 214
b. The right of access to Commission documents
Until 1992, European citizens who wished to know how the Commission exercised its
powers enjoyed the same rights, or more accurately, lack of rights, as their counterparts in
Member States belonging to the closed government tradition. They had the right to know of
official acts passed by European institutions pursuant to their powers under the treaties, in the
case of individual decisions through the communication of the decision in writing to the
concerned party, and in the case of generally applicable measures, through publication in the
Official Journal.215 It is difficult to imagine how matters could have been otherwise: all of the
Member States were committed to the basic rule of law principle that, as governments of law and
not men, the law should be put down in writing and should be known to citizens. But European
citizens did not have the right to be informed of what went on behind the closed doors of the
Commission’s offices. As a matter of practice, the Commission was more open than many
national administrations.216 Nonetheless, as a matter of rights, European citizens could not
demand to learn of individual decisions that were not of specific concern to them, to review the
expert reports and technical data that served as the basis for administrative and legislative acts, or
to view the correspondence among Commission departments and between the Commission and
outside parties on the administration of the law.
In 1993, there began a process of transformation of European law. On December 6,
1993, the Commission and the Council entered into an agreement, called a Code of Conduct,
pledging to adopt access to document rights for their respective organizations and agreeing to
common conditions and principles. Thereafter, the Council and Commission separately
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promulgated internal rules of procedure implementing the terms of the Code of Conduct.217 The
rules were worded extremely broadly. The documents covered by the rules were defined as any
written text held by the Council or Commission and the exceptions to disclosure were sketched
in the briefest of terms, covering areas such as public security, privacy, business secrets, and the
Community’s financial interests.218 Four years later, the Amsterdam Treaty created a right of
access to documents:
Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European
Parliament, Council and Commission documents . . . .219
In 1999, the Commission agreed to extend the right of access to material generated in the
European rulemaking process, including meeting agendas, drafts, and final decisions, and
to create a public register of all such documents.220 Finally, in 2001, the Council,
Commission, and European Parliament passed a law giving effect to the right of access in
the Amsterdam Treaty.221
The Public Access to Documents Law, which has been followed by more precise
provisions in each of the institution’s rules of procedures,222 elaborates considerably on
the terms under which Europeans can exercise their right of access. The most significant
innovation is the requirement that each institution establish a register of documents and
that, whenever possible, access be provided through direct electronic access to the
documents listed in the register.223 The law also creates a new category of sensitive
documents, designed to cover material generated in the fields of foreign affairs, security,
and police cooperation, which would enable the institutional author of the document to
veto disclosure.224 As for the exceptions to disclosure of ordinary, non-sensitive
documents, they are specified in far greater detail compared to the 1993 rules of
procedure and require the institutions to engage in more balancing, weighing the
applicant’s public interest in disclosure against the commercial interest or institutional
interest in secrecy.225
2. The historical juncture: The Maastricht Treaty crisis
What explains the radical change in the right of European citizens to know how the
Commission exercises its powers? In this section, I demonstrate that the crisis provoked by the
Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty led to the salience of the northern model of open
217
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government in the eyes of European Heads of State, who consequently made a number of
hortatory commitments to transparency. Once the crisis had subsided, momentum for
transparency continued because of the presence of government officials from the North within
the institutional system—reinforced considerably by the accession of Sweden and Finland in
1995—and because of the advocacy of the European Parliament.
a. Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty: Northern values and the interest of European
Heads of State
The idea of a European right of access to government documents was not new. The first
directly elected European Parliament called for “legislation on openness of government of
Community affairs” in 1984.226 This was followed, in 1988, by a parliamentary resolution
declaring the “right to information” to be a fundamental freedom and requesting the Commission
to propose access to information legislation.227 Again, in 1989, when the Parliament urged the
Member States to adopt a binding declaration of rights, it included the right of access to
information in its proposed Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedom.228
In the Intergovernmental Conference leading up to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in
1992, the Dutch government sought to insert a provision, modeled on the Dutch Constitution,
that would have required the European institutions to pass legislation on access to information.229
The idea did not find strong support among the other Member States, and as a compromise
measure, the Commission proposed that the text be included as a toothless, non-binding protocol
to the Treaty. Thus, attached to the Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on February
7, 1992, was a Declaration, by the Heads of State, on the right of access to information:
The Conference considers that transparency of the decision-making process
strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public’s confidence
in the administration. The Conference accordingly recommends that the
Commission submit to the Council no later than 1993 a report on measures
designed to improve public access to the information available to the
institutions.230
Nowhere was there mention of an individual right and, aside from the usual diplomatic
language, the only concrete action envisaged was a Commission report, which, given the
text of the protocol, might very well have been limited to a call for the publication of
more official documents and better access to existing data bases.
The Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the national referendum of June
2, 1992, was the catalyst that set the right to transparency into motion.231 The Danish
referendum, along with the Euro-skepticism it triggered in a number of other countries,
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was a tremendous blow to the twelve governments that had signed the Treaty.232 Over
one year had been consumed in the negotiations on the Treaty and the result was an
ambitious project of monetary and political union that went well beyond the customs
union and common market of the original Treaty of Rome.233 The Maastricht Treaty was
a step beyond the functional, market-oriented vision of Jean Monnet’s European
Community. It included European citizenship, a common currency, and cooperation on
foreign policy, immigration, and police matters. The signatories had a great stake in
ratification and the Danes and the gloomy mood that set in after their referendum stood in
their way.
Transparency emerged as a powerful concept through which the governments
could reclaim legitimacy for the European project, largely because it was the open
government country of Denmark that had rejected the Treaty. After the “No” vote, the
Danish government submitted a memorandum outlining the changes that would be
necessary if the Maastricht Treaty was to survive a second referendum. At the top of the
list were openness and transparency.234 The response was a steady wave of
commitments to transparency by European Heads of State at European Council meetings
in the fall of 1992. 235 The Commission dutifully produced a series of policy documents
in spring of 1993.236 And in summer and fall of 1993 the last Member States ratified the
Treaty: the Danish electorate approved Maastricht in a second referendum on May 18,
1993; the UK House of Commons voted in favor of the Treaty on May 20, 1993 and the
UK House of Lords approved the Treaty on July 20, 1993; and the German Constitutional
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Treaty, thereby allowing Germany to ratify it, on
October 12, 1993.
b. The aftermath of Maastricht
After the Maastricht Treaty was ratified by all Member States in the fall of 1993,
transparency could very well have faded from the political agenda and could have become a
hortatory duty without any real bite for the day-to-day operation of the institutions. In this
section, I show that the advocacy of Europeans with cultural allegiances and expectations shaped
by their experiences as citizens of the Netherlands, Denmark, and later Sweden and Finland,
combined with the interest of the Parliament in obtaining information for itself, ensured that the
impetus for transparency was sustained. The rights exercised by European citizens day-in-andday-out in obtaining information about how European government is run flow directly from the
legal instruments to which these European actors made a decisive and critical contribution.
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i. National value: The influence of the northern tradition of open government
The evidence of the significance of the northern mental map of rights and democracy
comes in the form of surnames. Who, in the institutions, were transparency advocates? The
parliamentarians who have chosen to make transparency their mission by authoring committee
reports and sponsoring resolutions have mainly come from the North: Jens-Peter Bonde
(Denmark), Maj-Lis Loow (Sweden), Hanja Maij-Weggen (Netherlands), Heidi Hautala
(Finland).237 When the Parliament, Commission, and Council entered into tripartite negotiations
over the final text of the Public Access to Documents Law of 2001, five out of the seven
parliamentarians were from the North: two Swedes, two Finns, and one Dutchwoman.238 This is
not to say that there are no exceptions. A few British parliamentarians have also been active on
the issue and, over the years, parliamentarians from a couple of other Member States have shown
sporadic interest.239 Nonetheless the northern provenance of most of the transparency advocates
is striking, especially given that, in the Parliament’s system of weighted representation, there are
relatively few parliamentarians from the small Member States to the North.
Likewise, within the Council of Ministers, the representatives of northern Member States
have consistently come down on the side of transparency, against representatives of Member
States in the center and south of Europe. The voting record of the Council working party on
access to documents is illustrative on this score. When an application is filed with the Council
and it possibly comes within one of the exceptions to the right of access, it is sent to a working
party of Member State representatives. In 2000, the working party was divided on whether to
grant access in 24 instances. Denmark voted to grant access in 88% of those cases, Sweden in
83%, Finland in 53%, the Netherlands in 29%, the UK in 20%, Ireland in 17%, Greece and
Germany each voted to granted access in only one case (4%), and the remaining Member States
(Austria, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, France, and Sweden) voted to deny access in all 24
cases.240
The citizens and Member States of northern Europe also made their mark in the judicial
branch (Court of Justice and Court of First Instance). Member States intervened on the behalf of
plaintiffs in seven out of the 28 cases brought between 1993, when the first rules of procedure
entered into force, and summer 2002.241 They were all northern Member States: Sweden in four
cases,242 the Netherlands in three,243 Denmark in two,244 and Finland in one.245 Member States
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also intervened in support of the defendant institutions (the Council and Commission,
alternatively). They were countries with traditions of closed government: France in four
cases246 and the UK in four.247
The Netherlands also independently sued the Council over the first Council access to
documents rules. The Netherlands, supported by the European Parliament (which because of the
rules of standing existing at that time was only allowed to sue in the Court of Justice to protect
its own legislative prerogatives and could not bring suit independently) sued the Council on the
grounds that access to documents should be set down in a legislative measure rather than internal
rules of procedure.248 The consequence of adopting the access to documents measure as internal
rules of procedure had been to allow the Council to act by a simple majority, thereby enabling
the Member States in favor of continued secrecy to easily outvote Member States like the
Netherlands in favor of transparency, and to allow the Council to cut out the Parliament entirely
from the decisionmaking process. Both the Netherlands and Parliament considered that the
exceptions to the access to documents principle were far too broad and hence vitiated the right to
transparency.249 They lost, foreshadowing the argument of the next section, where I demonstrate
that Parliament, not the Council or the Court of Justice, was the main institutional proponent of
transparency because it could act notwithstanding the majority, closed government tradition and
it had a strategic, institutional interest in doing so.
The nationalities of the plaintiffs are also revealing.250 Eight were from the UK, eight
from the Netherlands, four from Germany, two from Finland, one from each of Denmark,
Sweden, France, Greece, and Italy, and two were public interest groups with diverse
membership.251 Plaintiff nationalities roughly correspond with expectations, albeit less strikingly
than in the case of government intervenors. In terms of their numbers relative to population,
citizens of northern, open-tradition countries are disproportionately represented. British citizens
are an interesting anomaly: they vindicate access to information rights even though they have
never had access to documents legislation at home, their national administration is widely known
for resisting open government measures, and their government was one out of only two Member
States that intervened in support of defendant European institutions. Part, but certainly not all, of
the high case count can be attributed to a single dispute between the Commission and two British
nationals over certain VAT documents which generated three separate cases.252
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ii. Supranational interest: The interest of the European Parliament in information on
policymaking in the Commission and the Council
In the ordinary politics following the Maastricht ratification crisis, the European
Parliament proved to be the most significant institutional proponent of transparency. Parliament's
central role is less evident than the institutional association analyzed in the previous section
between the Court of Justice and the Commission and fair hearing rights and connection
explored in the next section between the Commission and the right to civil society participation.
That is because a variety of European institutions have adopted legal instruments, issued reports,
and decided cases requiring that the Commission and Council give access to documents. In this
section I present the evidence for ascribing the Parliament such a central role. I then go on to
show that parliamentarians, both from northern and southern Member States, were committed to
transparency, more so than to other rights associated with democratic government, because
transparency overlapped with Parliament’s campaign to obtain greater powers within the
European institutional complex by acquiring more information on the legislative and
administrative affairs of the Commission and Council.
There are a number of episodes in the development of transparency after the Maastricht
debacle that demonstrate the centrality of Parliament. In the aftermath of the high-level
European Council meetings of fall 1992 and the final national ratifications of the Maastricht
Treaty in summer and fall of 1993, the Parliament, Commission, and Council negotiated an interinstitutional agreement on transparency. 253 It is widely held among policymakers and scholars
alike that the inter-institutional agreement of October 1993 served as the basis for the
Commission’s and the Council’s first rules on access to documents. Yet the Council originally
was determined to discuss subsidiarity only and it was intense pressure from the Parliament that
put transparency and democracy on the bargaining table as well.254 In the agreement, the
Council undertook to make some of its debates public, publish voting records, and improve
access to documents. The Commission and the Parliament also committed themselves to a
number of transparency measures.255
Parliament also played a key role in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) leading to
the Amsterdam Treaty and Article 255 on access to documents.256 The Danish parliamentarian
Jens-Peter Bonde issued a number of working documents on the behalf of the parliamentary
Committee on Institutional Affairs recommending the inclusion of transparency provisions in the
Treaty.257 In all of the European Parliament’s contributions to the 1996-1997 IGC, it insisted
that commitments to transparency be made in specific treaty articles.258 A simple comparison of
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Parliament's three major demands--demands not made by the two other important IGC actors
besides the Member States, the Commission and the Amsterdam Reflection Group-- with the
final outcomes of the treaty negotiations demonstrates Parliament’s influence.259 The Parliament
proposed that the principle of openness be written into the Treaty, that a rule of access to
documents be included in the Treaty, and that the legislative meetings of the Council of
Ministers be opened to public scrutiny, both through open meetings and through access to the
minutes, votes and reservations recorded at those meetings.260 While Parliament's requests were
not incorporated word-for-word, the Amsterdam Treaty included all three dimensions.261
After Amsterdam, the very first significant legislative innovation in the transparency area
was adopted at the behest of Parliament. New legislation setting down the structure and
operation of European administration was adopted in summer of 1999. The original proposal
submitted by the Commission did not make any mention of the public’s right of access to the
documents generated in the administrative process.262 Following an amendment proposed by
Parliament, the law provided that a public register of documents would be created and that the
access to documents rules set down in the Commission’s rules of procedure would also apply to
the administrative process.263
The Public Access to Documents Law, adopted to give effect to the commitment of the
Amsterdam Treaty to transparency, was also strongly influenced by Parliament. In the aftermath
of Amsterdam, Parliament tasked its Committee on Institutional Affairs with coming forward
with recommendations for the implementation of Article 255, which were adopted by the entire
Parliament in the plenary session of January 12, 1999.264 Nevertheless, when the Commission
eventually came forward with its proposal for legislation, parliamentarians found it disappointing
in a number of critical respects. 265 The Commission proposal would have excluded from the
coverage of the law all internal documents that were not contained in official acts, in order to
protect the so-called “space to think" of the institutions.266 The list of exceptions to the right of
access was far more extensive than those in the earlier access to documents rules of the Council
and the Commission. It contained some dangerously broad categories such as the protection of
“the effective functioning of the institutions” and “the stability of the Community’s legal
order.”267 Furthermore, when the documents of third parties were involved, the proposal
required that they give their consent before the documents could be released.268 All
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communications with the Member States or with non-Community institutions were at risk of
falling into this loophole.269 Another shortcoming of the Commission’s proposal was the failure
to use the device of the public register to make documents directly available to the public,
electronically, without the need to file a request.270 Lastly, Parliament was concerned that the
Council would use the public interest exception to exclude most documents related to common
foreign and security policy and police and judicial cooperation.271
In response, the responsible parliamentary committee produced a highly critical report
and proposed a number of amendments.272 Parliament approved the amendments to the
Commission’s text, after which followed a series of trilogues between Parliament’s
representatives, the Swedish Presidency of the Council, and the Commission.273 (Trilogues are
tripartite negotiations among the deciding institutions on the final text and are functionally
equivalent to conference committees of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate
in the U.S.) In the final compromise version, Parliament succeeded in reducing considerably the
list of exceptions. Moreover, all European institutions were required to establish electronic
registers of documents. For legislative documents, direct, electronic access to the document is
mandatory and for other documents such access should be provided where possible. In
conclusion, had the Amsterdam Treaty not required that the legislation be adopted by codecision, the law would have almost certainly represented a step backwards for transparency.
(Co-decision gives Parliament decisionmaking powers equal to those of the Council and thus
requires the Commission to anticipate the Parliament's position in the original proposal and to
allow Parliament to vote on the final text.) Parliament ensured that the Council and Commission
did not back-peddle on their existing rules of procedure and, in some respects, improved the
access to documents scheme.274
Why did Parliament campaign so hard for transparency, above and beyond other
principles associated with good European governance, and more assiduously than other
institutional actors? Since the European Parliament was first directly elected in 1979, it has
pushed for access to information on the Commission and the Council for Parliament. Without
information, the meager powers it originally possessed under the Treaty of Rome would have
been virtually non-existent. After Maastricht, the growing currency of the northern value of
transparency led the Parliament to couple the strategic, institutional need for information with the
campaign for open government.
The relationship between the normative ideal of transparency for all European citizens
and the need of Parliament for information to exercise its legislative prerogatives was complex:
the institutional interest furthered the ideal and the ideal was used to promote the institutional
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interest. On the one hand, the right of transparency for all piggy-backed upon the improvements
that Parliament obtained for its own purposes. Before Maastricht, Parliament had successfully
forced a number of institutional changes that required the Commission and Council to forward
documents and give updates on their proceedings on a timely basis. Once the northern right to
transparency became a defining element of the European concept of good government, as a
matter of normative discourse, Parliament’s past successes in obtaining documents, as well as its
subsequent crusades to obtain yet more information had to be extended to all European citizens.
In other words, once transparency became a European value, Parliament could not ask for
information for itself and itself alone. On the other hand, Parliament promoted transparency
because the right served Parliament’s strategic, institutional need for information from the
Commission and the Council. In other words, once the northern mental map of open
government had been transferred to Europe, Parliament had a concrete, institutional interest in
advancing a rhetoric and law of transparency.
To demonstrate the logic of supranational institutional interest and national value, it is
again necessary to do some of the history. Parliament’s campaign for information can be divided
into three categories: the budget, legislation, and administration. In the past, the European
Parliament’s most important, and some would say, only, powers were in the area of the budget.
In two treaties dating to the 1970’s, the Parliament acquired the right to propose amendments to
the European Community’s annual budget and to reject the budget if dissatisfied with the
outcome after final voting in the Council.275 Parliament also obtained the right to review or
“discharge” the European Community’s accounts, after the expiration of the fiscal year, to ensure
that the money appropriated under the budget had been spent lawfully.276 Since Parliament was
first directly elected in 1979, it has consistently called for more documents, reports, and statistics
on the programs to be financed by each of the line items in the budget, as well as more
information on how the monies appropriated were spent.
Dissatisfaction with the scant information provided by the Commission has been
expressed repeatedly, in many forms. The comments accompanying the Parliament’s annual
discharge reports are one place where it can be found. 277 More information on the intended use
of budget appropriations, as well as the implementation of the different programs, is a staple of
the recommendations and criticisms put forward by Parliament. Just to give a flavor of the
critique, I present here portions from the Parliament's report on the discharge of the budget from
the 1982 financial year. Parliament explained the decision to defer the discharge--perceived at
the time as an extraordinary expression of disapproval, similar in terms of opprobrium to a
parliamentary no-confidence vote--based on the failure of the Commission to transmit complete
and comprehensible information on the disbursement of Community funds. Parliament stated
that it: "Strongly deplores the fact that the present Commission has taken a step backwards, as
compared with the preceding college, by refusing to make certain basic document available to
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Parliament."278 And it said that it: "Requests the Commission to consider ways of providing
more and clearer statistical and explanatory information on the execution of the budget." 279 The
discharges of subsequent years are replete with comments in the same vein.280
In the 1980’s and the 1990’s, Parliament also pushed the Commission for more
information in connection with its legislative powers. Until 1986, the Parliament only had the
power to give non-binding opinions on European legislation through what was known as the
consultation procedure.281 The real decision-making power rested with the Commission, which
had the power to propose legislation, and the Council, which had the power to adopt legislation.
In the Single European Act of 1986, the co-operation procedure was introduced in certain policy
areas. Co-operation required that Parliament review proposals at two, separate stages in the
legislative procedure, once after the Commission issued the initial proposal, and a second time,
after the Council had voted on the proposal. On the second reading, Parliament could propose
amendments, which the Council could reject, but only by a unanimous vote. Parliament’s
legislative powers were improved in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Maastricht introduced codecision, which preserves the two readings structure of cooperation, but requires the Council to
adopt Parliament’s amendments if the legislation is to pass. As the label suggests, in codecision, Parliament and Council are co-legislators: the approval of both is necessary for a piece
of legislation to be enacted. In the treaties negotiated subsequent to Maastricht, co-decision has
been extended to a wide number of areas, so that today, outside of the foreign policy and
criminal law areas, it is the prevalent mode of enacting European laws.
In all three procedures, information on the Commission’s policy agenda, the
Commission’s specific legislative proposal, and the trajectory of the proposal once it enters
Council—where more often than not it undergoes numerous and substantial amendments—is
critical. Without advance warning of the different proposals in the Commission pipeline, and
without access to the information supporting the Commission’s proposals, parliamentary
committees are handicapped in researching the issues and writing their reports and the
Parliament as a whole cannot take informed votes. In the consultation procedure, if the
proceedings in the Council are secret, the Commission’s proposal can be transformed by the
Council and enacted into law without any warning to the Parliament. Parliament’s power of
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consultation is rendered meaningless, since the Commission proposal on which Parliament gives
its opinion may bear no relation to the law ultimately passed by the Council. Information on
Council proceedings is also important in co-operation and co-decision; advance warning of the
likely outcome of the Council vote is necessary for Parliament to react fully and propose its own,
well-considered amendments in the second reading.
The failure to disclose declarations made by Member States when approving European
laws in the Council can also undermine the Parliament’s legislative prerogatives. These
declarations are similar to reservations in international treaties and can modify the text of the
agreement, either by allowing derogations for certain Member States or by altering the
interpretation of the legislation for certain Member States. If declarations are not published,
then, in effect, the Member States on the Council can alter legislation without the knowledge or
input of the Parliament, even on matters on which Parliament had full co-decision powers.282
To safeguard its institutional prerogatives as legislator, the Parliament has negotiated an
inter-institutional agreement with each new Commission since 1990.283 (A new Commission
takes office every five years.) In all, timely and complete information on the Commission’s
policy initiatives and the state of play of negotiations in the Council have figured prominently.
Parliament has also separately urged the Council to notify Parliament of any planned changes to
the proposal in the course of negotiations there.284 It has suggested an inter-institutional
agreement with the Council, patterned on the agreements with the Commission, but without any
success to date.285 As far back as 1981, in connection with the power to approve the annual
budget, which it shared with the Council, Parliament voiced frustration with the secrecy of the
Council and requested information on the state of play of negotiations among the Member States
sitting on the Council:
[Parliament c]onsiders that the procedure of budgetary collaboration between
Council and Parliament during the annual budgetary process should be improved
by a series of practical measures: for example, the Committee of Permanent
Representatives and the Budgetary Committee of Council should supply the
rapporteur and the members of the Committee on Budgets with the working
documents and minutes of their meetings.286
Information has also been at the heart of Parliament’s attempt to establish legislative
oversight of European administration. The implementation of European legislation by the
Commission, through implementing regulations or individualized decisions, very often requires
the approval of committees of national regulators. So-called comitology committees are
designed to serve as a surrogate for the Council and enable the Council to monitor, and
sometimes veto or modify, Commission implementing regulations and decisions. The
Parliament has staged a long battle to eliminate comitology committees in European
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administration and entrust the Commission, acting alone, with implementation.287 Because
comitology committees empower the Council, the Parliament views them with great suspicion.
In Parliament’s eyes, comitology committees constitute a device through which the Council can
undermine legislative commitments, obtaining results that would otherwise be impossible
because of opposition from the Parliament. Parliament, however, has been unsuccessful in
eliminating comitology committees. In compensation, it has sought to establish supervisory
powers over European administration equal to those of the Council.
Parliament has asserted control over administrative decisionmaking since the mid-1980’s
through a series of resolutions, inter-institutional agreements, and now, legislation. The duty of
the Commission to transmit information on administrative proceedings to the Parliament is
common to all of these instruments.288 Today, after over twenty years of institutional wrangling,
the Commission is required to forward Parliament the proposals for administrative action
submitted to the committees, the agendas of committee meetings, the names and organizational
affiliations of committee members, and the votes and minutes from committee meetings.
Furthermore, Parliament today has the right to vote on implementing measures adopted by
comitology committees, although a "no" vote only has moral force and does not bind the
Commission.
Parliament’s need for information on the work of the Commission and the Council has
contributed to its advocacy of the right to transparency through the two mechanisms that I briefly
sketched earlier in this section and that I explore in detail here. First, the value of open
government for all citizens, not only parliamentarians, has driven Parliament to include the
public in what previously was a quest for information restricted to itself. After the right to
transparency became a salient conceptual paradigm, it caused Parliament to redefine the
campaign for information in such a manner as to include all citizens. The value redefined the
strategic institutional interest.
The piggybacking of the right to transparency onto Parliament’s information initiatives is
evident in the administrative area. The first law guaranteeing parliamentary oversight of the
administrative process (comitology committees) both codified the gains that Parliament had
made in the previous decade through inter-institutional agreements, and included a right of
access for the public-at-large.289 As mentioned above, the provision was pushed by Parliament,
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not the Commission or the Council. Parliament’s transparency amendments were watered down
in the end but, had it gotten its way, the law would have read:
Having regard to the rules and principles of transparency and access to documents
flowing from Articles 1 of the EU Treaty, 207 and 255 of the EC Treaty and
Declarations 35 and 41 attached to the Final Act of the Amsterdam Treaty,
...
Except for reasons of confidentiality, all documents shall be made public and
accessible by electronic transmission.290
In other words, the new right to transparency led Parliament to advocate more information about
the administrative process not just for itself, but for all European citizens.
The second reason for Parliament’s advocacy was the moral resource that the right
brought to the institutional interest in information. The right for all citizens was also a means of
improving Parliament’s access to information on the European institutions and hence
Parliament’s powers. As mentioned above, in the 1980’s, Parliament called for a right of access
to information in three separate resolutions. Although the resolution made no difference, given
that the northern value had not yet been placed on the European agenda by the Danes and
Parliament was still fairly powerless, Parliament expressly coupled information as a fundamental
right for all European citizens, with information as a necessary complement to its powers in the
legislative and administrative processes. Parliament said that it:
1. Takes the view that right to information is one of the fundamental freedoms of
the people of Europe and that it should be recognized as such by the European
Community;
....
4. Requests that the minutes of Council meetings which concern the discussion of
and decision-making of a regulation or directive should be published, including
the statements which alter the purpose of the directive or give another
interpretation to the published document;
....
6. Wishes to see open access to information concerning the activities of the
management and the advisory committee [comitology committees involved in
European administration], with a view to obtaining precise information on the
scope of the decisions taken;
7. Proposes that a mediator be appointed within Parliament to monitor
compliance with the obligation incumbent on the Community bodies to provide
information.291
In other words, Parliament linked the battles narrated above to the fundamental freedom of the
right to information. The right to information was ideologically attractive because it could also
serve as an umbrella for the campaign to further Parliament’s legislative prerogatives.
Parliament’s initiatives after the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 also revealed the
instrumental quality of the right for Parliament. As mentioned above, Parliament tasked a
committee (Committee on Institutional Affairs) with producing a report on the legislation that
would be needed to implement Article 255 on access to documents.292 The opinion of a related
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committee (Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights) on the report is telling. After
discussing the means of guaranteeing transparency for European citizens, the Committee moved
on to transparency measures for parliamentarians:
A rapporteur [the parliamentarian tasked by the appropriate committee with
preparing a report on a proposed European law] should have increased rights of
access when drawing up his report. Access to all documents used during the
preparation of a Commission proposal might be considered in this context.
The competent parliamentary committee should be granted rights of access during
the commitology procedure [European administrative process described above].
Parliament as a whole might be granted rights of access in the case of major
interinstitutional issues and problems connected with institutional law.293
The opinion of a second related committee (Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs)
was even more pointed in calling for a right to transparency for both the public and Parliament.
In the foreign and security policy area (so-called Second Pillar) and in the police and
immigration areas (so-called Third Pillar and parts of the First Pillar), Parliament’s legislative
prerogatives are extremely limited.294 Parliament has not, in contrast with areas where it has
cooperation or co-decision powers, been able to cajole and threaten the Council and Commission
with deadlock in order to obtain information and influence. In the opinion, the Committee used
the right of access to documents to make the case for greater parliamentary information and
influence in police and immigration matters:
The current campaign for access to documents of the Justice and Home Affairs
Council is crucial in fostering a culture of transparency within the Union.
....
It goes without saying that the European Parliament should be informed and
therefore consulted before any legislative decision. Public access to documents
must also relate not only to the official institutions and bodies of the Union but
also to all formal or informal working parties in which the Union is directly or
indirectly involved. 295
The conflation of the general right of access to documents with Parliament’s powers to require
information and be consulted is evident.296
3. The evolution of the right to transparency
Since European citizens obtained concrete procedures through which they can exercise
their transparency rights in the Public Access to Documents Law, the only significant
development has been the Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty gives the transparency measures
that have been established over the past decade the status of higher, constitutional law. In the
first part, the duties incumbent upon the European institutions are set down.297 The second part
of the Constitutional Treaty, which incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted in
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2000, recognizes the individual right of access to documents.298 Lastly, Article 305 sets down
the structural, institutional conditions of transparency, which are largely repetitive of the rights
set out in the first part of the Constitutional Treaty.299
The principal change wrought by the Constitutional Treaty is the symbolic, constitutional
status conferred upon the principles of openness, transparency, open meetings, and access to
documents. As a practical matter, the new articles do not add much. They recognize the
legislative practice of requiring all institutions, committees, and agencies, in addition to the
Commission, Parliament, and Council, to respect access to document rights.300 They also
constitutionalize the rules of procedure of Parliament and the Council under which debates on
the adoption of legislation are open to the public and under which parliamentary reports and the
votes and statements from high-level Council meetings are made public.301 Lastly, the
Constitutional Treaty specifically requires Parliament and the Council to publish documents
related to their deliberations on legislative matters, but the scope of the requirement turns on the
access to documents rules of the respective institutions and hence access to such documents
would not need to be significantly broader than it stands at present.302
4. European value: European and northern transparency compared
To conclude, let me take stock of the European right to transparency today. The
European right combines different elements from the northern traditions of open government but
it has also taken on dimensions not found in any of those traditions. Europeans have a right of
access to preparatory documents, if not outweighed by the public interest in confidentiality
before the legal act is adopted and almost without exception after the measure is adopted. In
this, the European right approximates the Danish and Dutch laws on right of access. The
institutions are under a duty to maintain registers of all documents that can be easily consulted,
approximating the Swedish and Finnish systems. Yet where possible the institutions are also
under a duty to give individuals direct access to documents, electronically, rather than requiring
them to undertake the lengthy, bureaucratic process of an access to documents request. This
goes beyond Swedish and Finnish law.
The most notable, and different element of the European right is that it extends to
government activities of a highly political nature. The reader will recall that in all of the northern
systems, documents relating to the contribution of government cabinets and ministers to draft
legislation are excluded from the right of access. Likewise, parliaments are not covered by
access to documents legislation. This is not true in the EU. Some of the drafts, minutes, votes,
and declarations produced and recorded in the meetings of the Council, in which representatives
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of national governments negotiate the text of European laws, are subject to the right of access.303
Citizens can also consult documents from comitology committees (part of the European
administrative process) which, in some cases, reproduce the intergovernmental politics of the
Council.304 Although I have not focused on transparency in the European Parliament, the right
of access to documents applies there too, and applies to draft reports and agendas of committee
meetings.305 Furthermore, in the EU, the right to transparency includes open, public meetings of
legislative bodies: Council meetings giving final approval to European laws, parliamentary
committees, and the plenary sessions of the European Parliament.306 The negotiations and
political deals that, even in the northern traditions of open government are freely conducted
behind closed doors, without any hint of a right or duty of transparency, are coming under
pressure, albeit still limited, from the European right to transparency.
The added dimensions of transparency are causally related to the Parliament's strategic
interest in information and the unique European institutional landscape in which the Parliament
operates. As this section has documented, since Parliament was first directly elected it has called
consistently for greater openness in the Council and the Commission to further its own powers.
The need for information extended to information about what the Commission and Council were
contemplating doing, not simply what they had already decided, and hence European
transparency includes preparatory documents unlike Swedish and Finnish transparency.
Parliament's campaign also extended to the highly political, intergovernmental bargaining in the
Council and therefore the European right, in contrast to the northern systems where it originated,
applies there too.
C. The Third Generation: The Right to Civil Society Participation
The last generation of rights before the Commission and the second set, after
transparency, to revamp Commission authority in the area of broadly applicable policies began in
1999. The civil society phase is different from the two previous ones in a number of important
respects. First, the right did not originate in domestic public law, rather it was drawn from the
international arena where civil society had become the dominant paradigm for legitimizing
international organizations. Nevertheless, the right has assumed a distinctly European
significance. The international provenance of the right meant that it was poorly defined
compared to the right to a hearing and transparency, which had been worked out in the
institutionally and historically rich political space of the nation-state. The amorphous nature of
the international value of civil society meant that European political entrepreneurs, constrained
by old, European maps of legitimate relations between public bodies and private citizens, quickly
infused the new right with the familiar, European practice of corporatism.
Secondly, unlike the right to a hearing and transparency, this historical moment of rights
creation is still in progress. A number of important elements remain to be decided: Will
European citizens and their organizations be able to vindicate the right in the European Courts?
What type of policy measures will it cover? And will the right apply, and in what shape will it
303
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apply, to European institutions besides the European Commission? In what follows, I employ
the same organizing scheme as in the previous two sections: the right before and after the
critical event, the historical juncture (event, value, and supranational interest), the development
of the right in the aftermath of the juncture, and the comparison between the European right and
the right in the place of origin. The reader should bear in mind, however, that the right to civil
society participation is still unsettled. I analyze certain facets of the right as belonging to the
aftermath of the historical juncture not for purposes of complete descriptive accuracy but to
relate this episode of rights creation to the previous ones and to draw broader lessons for a theory
of rights in the EU and other, emerging global polities.
1. The right to be consulted on legislation and implementing regulations then and now
a. National traditions of public participation in lawmaking and rulemaking
The procedure through which legislation and implementing regulations are drafted in the
Member States displays both similarities and differences.307 It is similar in that, generally
speaking, the government and the administration enjoy considerable discretion in drafting
legislation and rules and are not under a legal duty to interact with members of the public.
Before submitting bills to parliament for a vote or laying implementing regulations before
parliament, sometimes for a vote and other times simply for purposes of information, the
executive is not required to make its draft public and consult with interested citizens and
organizations. National procedure is also similar in that, in most Member States, there are
carefully defined exceptions to executive discretion in areas such as the environment and landuse planning, according to which officials are required to publicize drafts and consult the public.
The procedure is different in that notwithstanding the government's considerable discretion,
some systems require drafts to be reviewed by a specialized, independent body within the
administration (Council of State) and other systems rely heavily on advisory bodies composed of
interest organizations.
Let me elaborate a bit on this element of domestic public law. First I consider
lawmaking. All of the Member States are parliamentary democracies, meaning that the
executive is elected by the members of the legislative assembly and therefore enjoys the
confidence of the legislative assembly.308 The government cabinet and the administration are
given extensive power to initiate legislation and adopt implementing regulations because they are
considered to be the expression of the popularly elected legislative assembly. In drafting
legislation, most national administrations are not under a duty to adhere to any special
procedures.309 They are not required, under their constitutions or ordinary legislation, to
publicize their drafts and consult the public.310
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There are two important exceptions to government discretion in lawmaking, on which
there exists variation among the Member States. In countries influenced by the French
administrative law tradition (droit administratif), the government is often required to submit
draft legislation to a specialized section of the administration. The Council of State, as the body
is known in France, Italy, Belgium, and Greece, checks the bill for technical drafting errors,
respect for constitutional principles, consistency with other legislation, and so on. Second, in
some instances, the government is required to submit bills to advisory bodies composed of
organizations representing the relevant interests, a practice which is often referred to as
corporatism because it bears a certain resemblance to the powerful corporations of tradesmen
and artisans that governed the city states of early modern Europe.311 This is typical of certain
policy areas, for example welfare, industrial policy, and consumer protection. Such advisory
boards are far more common in places such as Germany and Scandinavia, where interests are
highly organized and there is a long tradition of corporatist relations between government and
intermediate organizations.312 In virtually all Member States, however, including those whose
administrations are not viewed as particularly open to outside interests, advisory boards
composed of peak associations exist in certain fields.313
Now I turn to the procedure for adopting implementing regulations. In most of the
Member States, the same government discretion and exceptions to that discretion apply in the
case of significant implementing regulations.314 There is an additional set of exceptions
however. In most European systems, administrators are required to publicize their intentions and
consult with the public-at-large on their choices in carefully defined classes of rulemaking.
These are generally decisions believed to have concrete effects on discrete, geographically
defined, groups of citizens. In addition, they are generally decisions that are made by local and
regional administrators, not central government. Land-use planning is one example.315
Government building projects and public investment decisions that have the potential of hurting
the environment are another example.316 Rules which are considered insignificant, usually
because they address matters of internal administrative organization, deal with a limited class of
cases, or have limited temporal effects are subject to fewer procedural requirements than draft
statutory instruments. See Cabinet Office, Code of Practice on Written Consultation (Nov. 2000), available at
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legislation and implementing regulations.317 They very often are promulgated by individual
ministers, not by prime ministers sitting in the cabinet of ministers, and they are not subject to
review by the Council of State or advisory bodies.
b. Public participation in Commission lawmaking and rulemaking
Until the late 1990's, the European Commission's procedure for drafting legislation and
implementing regulations was very similar to that of its national counterparts. The Commission
was not formally required to publish drafts or consult the public. As a matter of law, the
Commission's proposal could remain entirely confidential until the moment that it was sent to the
other institutions for adoption, principally the Council, and, starting in the late 1980's, the
European Parliament. As in the Member States, there was an exception for organized interests
represented on corporatist advisory bodies.
There were two different forums for the participation of private associations in European
governance. In 1957, the founding Member States established alongside the other original
institutions, an advisory body called the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) that was
modeled after their own corporatist traditions.318 The ESC was constituted of producer interests- employers, workers, farmers, tradesmen, and professionals--and the organizations sent to
Brussels to represent such interests were appointed by their governments and were generally
highly structured, peak associations with national constituencies. Later, consumer organizations
were added to the ESC. Under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission was required to consult the
ESC on legislative proposals: at the same time that a proposal was sent to the Council for a
decision and the Parliament for an opinion, it was also sent to the ESC for an opinion.
Notwithstanding the role that was carved out for the ESC in the European legislative process, it
quickly came to be known as one of the most powerless institutions in Brussels.
The second forum for corporatist interest representation was the issue-specific advisory
committee, created by law in a particular policy area to assist the Commission when drafting
laws and rules. 319 The interest representation that occurred through advisory committees
differed from the ESC in a number of ways. The Commission, not the Member States chose the
organizations that sat on the committees; the organizations were generally pan-European, not
national, federations; their advice was sought earlier in the policymaking process, as the
Commission was drafting the proposal and not after the proposal had been completed; their
advice was sought on both laws and implementing regulations, not only laws; and, lastly, the
enabling laws establishing the committees generally left consultation to the Commission's
discretion.
The practice of public participation in Commission decisionmaking was, in fact, quite
different from the closed nature of the procedure in the law on the books. The Commission
would often solicit input from producer groups, firms, and associations not represented on the
advisory bodies in order to build political momentum for proposals. It largely did so on an
317
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informal basis although it sometimes would also publish forward-looking policy documents,
known as Green and White Papers and available to the public-at-large, in which it would outline
a number of issues on which it was contemplating drafting legislation and ask for the public's
response. But the law permitted the civil servants in the Commission to draft in splendid
isolation from the European citizenry and the Official Journal is full of directives and regulations
that started in precisely that fashion.
Then, in December 2002, the Commission adopted a non-binding policy document, called
a Communication, in which it outlined the procedure that all divisions within the Commission
would follow for consulting individuals and their associations, billed "civil society," in drafting
policy proposals.320 The procedure is as follows. The Commission describes the issues open for
discussion, the public is invited to submit written comments, and the civil society responses are
published.321 This process is to take place largely through the Commission's website. The
Commission then summarizes the comments and explains how the final proposal was or was not
altered by the civil society responses:
The Commission will provide adequate feedback to responding parties and to the
public at large. To this end, explanatory memoranda accompanying legislative
proposals by the Commission or Commission communications following a
consultation process will include the results of these consultations and an
explanation as to how these were conducted and how the results were taken into
account in the proposal.322
Parallel to the consultation of the public-at-large, the Commission also solicits the opinions of
certain "target groups" which are believed to have a special interest in the proposal because they
will be directly impacted or will be involved in the implementation of the policy, or because they
pursue organizational aims related to the proposal. 323
In the Communication on Consultation, the Commission qualifies the procedure in a
number of essential respects. On the one hand, the Commission minimizes the importance of the
procedure by asserting that the final decision on the content of the legislative proposal is a
political one for it alone to make.324 Moreover, the Commission states that the standards set
down in the Communication are meant to guide administrative practice but do not constitute
legally binding duties enforceable in court:
[A] situation must be avoided in which a Commission proposal could be
challenged in the Court on the grounds of alleged lack of consultation of
interested parties. Such an over-legalistic approach would be incompatible with
the need for timely delivery of policy, and with the expectations of the citizens
that the European Institutions should deliver on substance rather than
concentrating on procedures.325
Lastly, the Commission confines the procedure to "major policy initiatives," namely proposals
for European laws, and excludes the "minor" changes to the European legal framework contained
in implementing regulations and other types of official instruments.326 On the other hand, the
Commission makes it clear that the procedure set down in the Communication on Consultation
320

Communication from the Commission, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue—General principles and
minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 final, December 11, 2002
[hereinafter "Communication on Consultation"].
321
Id. at 19-22.
322
Id. at 22.
323
Id. at 19.
324
Id. at 12.
325
Id. at 10.
326
Id. at 10, 15.

66

Creating Rights
constitutes a floor and that it might choose to consult on more specific matters that would fall
within the ambit of administrative rulemaking.327
The commitments undertaken in the Communication on Consultation have had a
significant impact on the procedure for drafting policy initiatives and legislative proposals.
Since the Communication was published, there has been a steady flow of consultations in a
variety of fields and on a number of different types of policy instruments. I list some of them
here to give a sense of the change in the Commission's working methods. The DirectorateGeneral responsible for customs has published and solicited comments on a draft proposal for a
new Customs Code.328 Earlier in the policy chain, the Commission requested comments on a
Green Paper outlining a number of issues related to the quality and general accessibility of
services in areas of the European market undergoing liberalization. After reviewing and
summarizing the comments, the Commission set down its general approach but concluded that it
was not the time to go forward with new legislation in the area.329 Downstream in the policy
process, the Commission conducted a public consultation on the implementation of the European
broadcasting law, to determine whether there were problems with the existing framework and
subsequently issued a series of official interpretations of the law, as guidance for the Member
States.330 These are but a few examples. In 2003, the first year after the Communication came
into force, there were a total of 21 public consultations.331 It appears that what was, at best, a
sporadic exercise, limited to mammoth policy initiatives in the past, is becoming routine
throughout the Commission.332
2. The historical juncture: The fall of the Santer Commission
What explains the Commission's decision to engage in the systematic consultation of the
public in drafting legislative proposals? Why did it depart from its past practice, as well as the
standard mode of administration in the Member States? This turn of events creates a real puzzle,
more so than the right to be heard and transparency, because civil society consultation was
entirely self-imposed, not compelled in part by the judiciary (as with the right to be heard) or by
European legislators (as with transparency). The historical experience with government
bureaucracies has been that their interest lies in unfettered discretion and that rights and
procedures are imposed from the outside. However, a closer examination of the background
demonstrates that, starting in 1999, consultation was in the Commission's interest. In this
327
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data base for all consultations being conducted by the Commission’s Directorate-Generals. See
http://europa.eu.int/yourvoice/consultations/index_en.htm.
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section, I show that the Commission suffered a spectacular loss of moral authority with the
resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999. At the same time, a discourse on legitimacy
through the participation of civil society had developed in the international arena. What, just ten
years ago, the Commission described as input from "special interest groups"333 could now be
framed as the consultation of "civil society." The Commission adopted the duty to consult civil
society to improve its legitimacy in the eyes of the European public.
a. The fall of the Santer Commission
The Commission has been criticized for fiscal mismanagement and cronyism ever since it
underwent major expansion in the 1970's and 1980's. As long as the Commission and the
Council were the only strong organizations within the European institutional complex, the
charges of inefficiency and corruption never amounted to much. That changed in the 1990's with
the reforms made in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and the rise of the European
Parliament as a powerful actor. Not only did it obtain co-equal legislative powers, as detailed
earlier in this Article, but it was given a variety of legal means through which to hold the
Commission accountable, similar to an ordinary, national parliament.334 When, in 1998, it came
to light that Edith Cresson, the French Commissioner responsible for Research and
Development, had given out an expert contract to her dentist, the Parliament took the scandal as
an occasion to demonstrate its new role as the legislative body to which the Commission had to
answer.335 It voted to set up a Committee of Wisemen to investigate the Commission's financial
and employment practices in January 1999.336 The report that was issued two months later, on
March 15, 1999, was a tough indictment of the Commission and concluded with a fatal
statement: "It is difficult to find a member of the Commission with any sense of responsibility."
The Commission, headed by President Jacques Santer, was at risk of being the first Commission
in history to be censured by the Parliament and rather than face such a motion, it resigned.337
When the new Commission headed by President Romano Prodi took office on September
17, 1999, it faced a real crisis. The Commission's reputation was at an all-time low. On the
agenda was enlargement to the East, after the Luxembourg Crisis and the single market agenda
of 1986, the single biggest transformation of the European Union since its founding. The Prodi
Commission was called upon to manage a complicated task, full of political minefields, at the
same time as it suffered from low esteem from the Parliament and European public opinion more
broadly. The response was to undertake a massive, Commission-wide exercise on good
governance. Numerous divisions and special task forces within the Commission, as well as
outside think tanks and scholars, were called to reflect on how to render the Commission more
legitimate.338 The result was the Commission White Paper on European Governance, published
333

See European Commission, Communication on an open and structured dialogue between the Commission and special interest
groups of 2 December 1992, 1993 O.J. (C 63). The difference between this Communication and the Communication on
Consultation is striking. In 1992, the Commission was focused on encouraging ethical practices among lobbyists and
Commission civil servants. In 2002, by contrast, the emphasis was on promoting greater dialogue between the Commission and
private associations.
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For instance, before Maastricht, the Commission was appointed exclusively through bargaining among European Heads of
State, but in Maastricht, Parliament acquired the power to vote on the Commission as a whole (but not individual members) and
in Amsterdam, the power to vote on the Commission President. See Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and
Materials (2d ed. 1998).
335
See Karel Van Miert, Le marché et le pouvoir 241-59 (2000) (recounting this history from the insider perspective of a
Commissioner at the time).
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Parliament acted pursuant to the power acquired in Maastricht to set up temporary Committees of Inquiry. EC Treaty, art.
193.
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See EC Treaty, art. 201.
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See Discussion Paper, The Commission and Non-Governmental Organisations, building a stronger partnership, (COM (2000)
11) of 18 January 2000; White Paper on Administrative Reform, (COM (2000) 200) of March 1, 2000 (especially Action 4
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in 2001.339 The principal innovation of the White Paper was the civil society concept.340
Through the "involvement" and "consultation" of civil society, the Commission's policies would
be more democratic and of better quality. The Communication on Consultation setting down the
specifics of the consultation procedure followed one year later.
b. International value: The influence of the idea of legitimacy through governance with civil
society
Global politics of the last decade have been marked by the emergence of widespread
skepticism of international agreements and organizations. The benefits of multilateral
organizations such as the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD have been challenged
by a wide variety of social and environmental justice NGOs. To some extent, international
organizations are the scapegoats for the effects of the market-driven processes of the
globalization of capital. Nonetheless, they and their policies have been critiqued for contributing
to the inequalities and loss of local control associated with globalization. In the view of the
skeptics, international economic organizations have not kept their promise of development and
prosperity and instead have facilitated global capital's exploitation of the Third World, labor, and
the environment.
Disparagement of international economic organizations was accompanied by the demand
that NGOs have a voice their decisions. The call for participation was made on the grounds of
democracy, legitimacy, and effectiveness; only if international decisionmakers were responsive
to NGOs would their polices be fair and equitable. This demand extended to a wide array of
international decisionmaking: treaty negotiations, inter-state dispute resolution, foreign lending
decisions, and the allocation and distribution of foreign aid at the local level.
The call for greater NGO participation was tied to the reconceptualization of NGOs as
civil society. NGOs have long been part of the international system.341 The International Labor
Organization created in 1919 provided that representatives of workers and employers would sit
and vote alongside government representatives on its decisionmaking bodies.342 Later, the
founders of the United Nations created a permanent, institutional role for non-governmental
actors by providing in the Charter that the government representatives on the Economic and
Social Council were under a duty to consult NGOs.343 In the mid-1990's, however, these old
developing a set of recommendations for best practice in consultation); European Commission, European Governance:
Preparatory Work for the White Paper (2002); Governance in the European Union (Oliver De Schutter, Notis Lebessis & John
Paterson eds., 2001) (results of academic seminars organized by the Commission in preparation for the White Paper). In total,
there were twelve different internal working groups, each of which was responsible for a distinct set of good government issues.
Within Work Area No. 2 on "Handling the process of producing and implementing Community rules" there was a Working
Group on "Consultation and participation of civil society." European Commission, European Governance: Preparatory Work for
the White Paper 63 (2002).
339
See European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final, July 25, 2001 [hereinafter "White
Paper"].
340
The White Paper contained two other major themes: confining the Commission to the technical, administrative realm while
leaving political decisions to the Council and the Parliament; and improving transparency. Both the technocratic
characterization of the Commission and transparency, however, were well-established arguments for European integration and
the Commission. See generally Christian Joerges, "Economic order"--"technical realization"--"the hour of the executive": some
legal historical observations on the Commission White Paper on European governance, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/01, at
16 (discussing neo-functionalist roots of technocracy argument in White Paper).
341
See generally Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 183
(1997) (analyzing the history of NGO participation in international law).
342
The ILO is composed of an annual General Conference, a Governing Body which meets three times a year, and a Secretariat.
Representatives of workers and employers sit on both the General Conference and the Governing Body. See Steve Charnovitz,
The International Labour Organization in its Second Century, 4 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1, 25 (2000).
343
See UN Charter, art. 71 ("The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for the consultation with nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with
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actors took on a new identity as civil society. The official rhetoric of the UN system, the World
Bank, and a variety of other international organizations shifted from "NGO" to "civil society"
and “civil society organizations.” 344
The change in language was not simply a matter of form. It was related to a vast body of
academic and policymaking literature in which civil society, by which is generally meant social
and environmental justice NGOs and not market actors or their associations, was put forward as
the key to legitimate global governance. An analysis of the normative claim in favor of civil
society participation in international organizations is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it
to say that the organizations of global civil society are believed to foster transnational
solidarities, pluralism in the international system of governance, republican commitments to
collective self-government, and communitarian values.345 Most dramatically, some claim that
the organizations of civil society represent the global people. 346 The transformation that the
practice and rhetoric of international organizations underwent in the 1990's is nicely captured in
a statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development:
I am happy to see that nowadays there is practically no international organization,
not only in the United Nations system but also outside it, that is not actively
seeking ways of integrating the civil society. What was new in December 1995 is
becoming a common concern of international organizations now.347
The Commission was influenced by this reconceptualization of organizations outside of
the state in adopting its procedure for drafting lawmaking proposals. The evidence for this claim
can be found in the origins of civil society talk within the Commission. The Commission is
composed of over thirty Directorate-Generals but only three--the Directorate-Generals
responsible for international trade, development (international aid), and employment and social
affairs--began to conceive of their relations with private associations as relations with "civil
society" in the late 1990's. Departments such as DG Agriculture, DG Internal Market, and DG
Competition did not develop a civil society discourse even though they routinely deal with
intermediate associations of farmers, workers, firms, and consumers. In other words,
departments with regular contacts with other international organizations were far more likely
than departments that largely dealt with internal matters to develop a discourse on civil
society.348 And it was their discourse that was then taken on by the Commission as a whole. In
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United
Nations concerned."). See generally United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), The NGLS Handbook of UN
Agencies, Programmes, and Funds Working for Economic and Social Development 6-7 (2d ed. 1997) (describing the mechanism
for consulting NGOs).
344
See Peter Willetts, The Rules of the Game: The United Nations and Civil Society, in Whose World is it Anyways 247, 258
(John W. Foster, Anita Anand, Jing de la Rosa eds., 1999). A simple search of the United Nations Bibliographic Information
System (the bibliography of the UN’s official library) confirms the impression widely held among academics and policymakers.
A search for the key word “civil society” for the years 1984 through 2003 reveals the growing popularity of the term. From one
document in 1984, the yearly hits gradually increase to 29 in 1997 and then explode, with eighty in 1998, 101 in 1999, and 261 in
2003.
345
See generally John Keane, Global Civil Society 169, 202 (2003) (putting forward the pluralism and solidarity argument for
international civil society); Michael Edwards, Civil Society 42-43 (2004) (setting forth the republican and communitarian
justifications for international civil society).
346
See, e.g., Richard Falk, The World Order between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil Society
Institutions, in Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order 163, 170-71 (Daniele Archibugi & David Held
eds., 1995); Mary Kaldor, Civilizing Globalization: The Implication of the Battle in Seattle, 29 Millennium Journal of
International Studies 105 (2000); Keane, Global Civil Society, supra note__ at 169, 202; Willetts, The Rules of the Game, supra
note __ at 260.
347
UNCTAD, Report of the Trade and Development Board on its fifteenth executive session held at the Palais des Nations,
Geneva on 27 June 1997, Annex II, TD/B/EX (15)/9 (August 11, 1997).
348
DG Employment first engaged in a “social dialogue” with labor and management organizations, following the specific
mandate contained in the Maastricht Treaty, arts. 137-39 and then in a “civil dialogue” with non-profit organizations and
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the White Paper that first proposed consultation for the entire Commission, the Commission
singled out the experiences of the trade and development departments: "This [involving civil
society] already happens in fields such as trade and development, and has recently been proposed
for fisheries."
The experience of DG Trade, responsible for international trade, most clearly
demonstrates the influence of the civil society concept from the international sphere. In October
1998, the negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment collapsed because of
opposition from anti-globalization organizations.349 The response of the Trade Commissioner,
Sir Leon Brittan, was to organize a series of public meetings, open to all "civil society
organizations," starting in November 1998.350 At the meetings, a number of general and sectoral
issues on the agenda of the upcoming Seattle WTO Ministerial were discussed (transparency,
development, the environment, investments, intellectual property, goods, trade). The European
delegation at Seattle included representatives of labor, business, the environment, farmers,
development organizations, and so on. After the Seattle protests of December 1999 and the
collapse of WTO negotiations, DG Trade instituted a more formal version of the meetings held
the previous year. Consultation, known initially as the “Trade Policy Dialogue with EU Civil
Society” and now simply as the “Civil Society Dialogue” includes period public meetings on
trade issues as well as regular Internet chats with the Trade Commissioner.
The use of civil society language by the Commission departments responsible for
international aid also supports the claim of international influence. In the foreign aid domain, the
Commission has a long history of implementing development policy through NGOs.351 Since
1975, the Commission has also consulted NGOs on broader policy questions through the Liaison
Committee of NGOs, now known as CONCORD (European NGO Confederation for Relief and
Development). The relationship was and continues to be weighted toward the clientelistic,
implementation side, in which the Commission is the donor agency and the NGOs are the
funding recipients, although there have been recent efforts to ensure more NGO participation at
the initial stages of policymaking.352 By the mid-1990’s, the very same NGO actors came to be
known as civil society.353
voluntary associations starting with the Social Policy Forum that it organized in May 1996. See Stijn Smismans, European
Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses and Institutional Interests, 9 Eur. L. J. 473, 475-78 (2003) (analyzing the rise of civil society
participation in DG Employment and Social Affairs). By 1998, DG Employment came to refer to its interolocutors as part of
“civil society.” See Summary Report of the European Social Policy Forum, Brussels 24-26, 1998, at 49, published by the
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and the European Commission’s DirectorateGeneral for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs (on file with author). The early adoption of civil society
rhetoric in DG Employment does not support the case for international influence since DG Employment deals largely with
internal, European affairs. However, this historical fact does not controvert the claim that one strand in the Commission’s
proceduralization of policymaking drew upon developments in the international realm.
349
See WWF European Policy Office, Civil Society and Trade Diplomacy in the “Global Age (Sept. 2002), available at:
http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/civil_soc/Civil_society_%20and_Trade_Policy_in_the_EU.pdf (recounting this history).
350
See E-mail from Eva Kaluzynksa, DG Trade, Civil Society Dialogue (June 17, 2004) (stating that private associations were
called "civil society organizations" from the beginning of the dialogue).
351
There are two ways in which NGOs can take responsibility for implementing European international development aid. Since
the 1970’s, NGOs have been paid to distribute specific forms of aid such as food aid, and since 1976, they have been able to
propose projects to the Commission for co-financing (at least 15% of the financing must come from the NGOs' own resources).
See E-mail from France Marion, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, European Commission (Aug. 4, 2004) (on file with author); see
also Agnès Philippart, The relations between NGDOs and the European Commission 1 (Executive summary of unpublished
thesis, Oct. 2002, on file with author) (identifying the Lome Convention of 1975 as the first instance of Commission-NGO
partnership).
352
See Interview with Peter Bangma, Civil Society and NGO Liaison, DG Development, European Commission (June 17,
2004); European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic
and Social Committee, COM (2002) 598 final, Brussels, Nov. 7, 2002.
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See E-mail from France Marion, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, European Commission (Aug. 4, 2004) (on file with author)
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c. Supranational interest: The interest of the Commission in reclaiming political standing
within the European institutional complex
Civil society consultation served the interest of the Prodi Commission in reestablishing
credibility because it brought the Commission closer to the ideal of good global governance.354
The strategic use of the concept was manifest in the policy documents setting down the
procedures for civil society consultation. A brief excursion into theories on the role of language
in political conflict is necessary to fully understand the deployment of the civil society concept in
the White Paper and, later, the Communication on Consultation. The mechanism by which
words and ideas are used by actors like the Commission in struggles to define political authority
has been analyzed by political theorists such as Quentin Skinner, James Tully, and Charles
Taylor, drawing on J.L. Austin's concept of speech act.355 A statement made in the context over
the struggle to define, exercise, extend, or modify political authority should be understood as
action.356 It is not epiphenomenon. What was the individual doing by using certain words?
Speech act analysis builds on the crucial insight that language is used strategically by the
participants in a political debate and because this is so, it cannot be assumed that words are being
used in accordance with prevailing linguistic conventions: a political actor might use an old
word unconventionally or, albeit rare, might even coin a new word rather than work within the
limits of the existing linguistic conventions. Furthermore, in the speech act theory of language,
authors use words to affirm or change the existing structure of authoritative decisionmaking.
They can do so openly, by working within linguistic conventions to criticize or praise the
powers that be, but they can also do so covertly, by using old words in new ways, and hence
recharacterize existing political relations.
A couple of examples will help make the point. Feminists like Betty Friedan have
applied the old language of "exploitation" to the new setting of middle-class housewives in the
suburbs, thereby mounting a formidable challenge to existing structures of patriarchy.357 In the
literature on social movements, this practice is identified as framing. Thus Margaret Keck and
Kathryn Sikkink argue that the international movement against female genital mutilation was
able to place the issue on the agenda of national governments and international organizations
only after it applied the language of "castration" to female genital mutilation, a radical
innovation given the previous use of the word "circumcision" to describe the very same
practice.358
How, then, did the Commission use strategically the language of "civil society" in the
debate over the constitution of European public authority and reclaim a central role itself in the
institutional balance of powers? First, what were previously understood as "special interest

is evidence of this shift: the former refers to “non-governmental organizations,” the latter to non-state actors, which are defined
as comprising the private sector, economic and social partners, and civil society, i.e. what in former times would have been called
NGOs. See Agreement Amending the Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lomé signed in Mauritus on 4 November 1995, arts. 38;
ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, arts. 6, 32.
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355
See James Tully, The pen is a mighty sword: Quentin Skinner's analysis of politics, in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner
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groups,"359 "voluntary associations,"360 the "social partners," 361and "lobbies"362 were redefined
as "civil society organizations." The word "civil society" was used to transfer the positive
connotations developed in the rhetoric of the international sphere to a set of social actors and
government practices that were very familiar in European politics yet were looked upon with
suspicion by citizens of a number of Member States and by some of the civil society actors
themselves. 363 In the Communication on Consultation, drawing upon the definition in the earlier
White Paper, the Commission gave the following definition of civil society organizations:
Problems can arise because there is no commonly accepted--let alone legal-- definition of
the term 'civil society organisation'. It can nevertheless be used as shorthand to refer to a
range of organisations which include: the labour-market players (i.e. trade unions and
employers federations--the 'social partners'); organisations representing social and
economic players, which are not social partners in the strict sense of the term (for
instance, consumer organisations); NGOS (non-governmental organisations) which bring
people together in a common cause, such as environmental organisations, human rights
organisations, charitable organisations, educational and training organisations,etc.; CBO's
(community-based organisations), i.e. organisations set up within society at grassroots
level which pursue member-oriented objectives, e.g. youth organisations, family
associations and all organisations through which citizens participate in local and
municipal life; and religious communities.
So 'civil society organisations' are the principal structures of society outside of
government and public administration, including economic operators not generally
considered to be 'third sector' or NGOs. The term has the benefit of being inclusive and
demonstrates that the concept of these organisations is deeply rooted in the democratic
traditions of the Member States of the Union.364
With this definition, the Commission recharacterized in a positive light a set of longstanding interest organizations and government practices that were the subject of debate and
contention in Europe. The Germans might deny a role for the World Federation of Advertisers
in European governance because it is considered a lobby, the British might do the same for the
European Trade Union Conference because it is labor, and the French might oppose the
involvement of the Vatican's charitable organization known as Caritas because it would represent
the introduction of religion into public life. None of them, however, would say that "civil
society" should be excluded. In essence, the Commission sidestepped the thorny issues of
whether and what interest groups can be considered legitimate actors in government
decisionmaking.
In the White Paper and then the Communication on Consultation, the Commission
adopted the prevailing theory of civil society as good for democracy and global governance
because private associations contest power holders in government, foster republican participation
in government, and promote communitarian values. First, the White Paper:
359
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Civil society plays an important role in giving voice to the concerns of citizens
and delivering services that meet people's needs. . . . The organisations which
make up civil society mobilise people and support, for instance, those suffering
from exclusion or discrimination.365
Another passage in the White Paper reads:
Civil society increasingly sees Europe as offering a good platform to change
policy orientations and society. This offers a real potential to broaden the debate
on Europe's role. It is a chance to get citizens more actively involved in achieving
the Union's objectives and to offer them a structured channel for feedback,
criticism and protest.366
The Communication on Consultation repeated the point:
The specific role of civil society organisations in modern democracies is closely linked to
the fundamental right of citizens to form associations in order to pursue a common
purpose as highlighted in Article 12 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Belonging to an association is another way for citizens to participate actively, in addition
to involvement in political parties or through elections.367
The last move made by the Commission was to ally itself with civil society by setting
down a set of rules for consulting civil society in the policymaking process. In the White Paper,
the Commission promised that it would take the steps necessary for "[i]nvolving civil society."368
It committed to "[m]ore effective and transparent consultation"369 and "a reinforced culture of
consultation and dialogue."370 And I explained earlier, in the follow up Communication on
Consultation, the Commission put forward full-blown standards for the routine, structured
participation of civil society in drafting policy initiatives.
To conclude, what was the Commission doing by saying it would consult "civil society"?
The Commission was saying that it was closer to the good government ideal of today and should
continue to govern. 371 Given the overtly political nature of the White Paper, there really is no
need for much interpretation of what the Commission was doing. The Commission was explicit:
Better consultation and involvement, a more open use of expert advice and a fresh
approach to medium-term planning will allow it to consider much more critically
the demands from the Institutions and from interest groups for new political
initiatives. It [the Commission] will be better placed to act in the general
European interest.372
And hence, to finish the thought, the Commission should retain its position at the epicenter of
European integration:
Both the proposals in the White Paper and the prospect of further enlargement lead
in one direction: a reinvigoration of the Community method. This means ensuring
that the Commission proposes and executes policy; the Council and the European
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Parliament takes decisions; and national and regional actors are involved in the EU
policy process.373
Before moving on, I would like to stress one point. The fact that the civil society idea was
adopted by the Commission for the strategic reason of reclaiming political standing after the
resignation of the Santer Commission does not bear upon the normative analysis of civil society
participation. To put it in the bluntest way possible, civil society is not superstructure.374 In
seeking to defend the Community method and reclaim authority, the Commission had to work
within certain parameters of democratic discourse. The Commission could not say obey me
because I represent divine authority on earth. Nor could it say obey me because I represent a
European nation bound together by a common blood and a common language. Rather, it had to
say obey me because I am democratic. Civil society, as one variation of "I am democratic," is
not an infinitely malleable concept. The revival of civil society in the 1990's was accompanied
by a set of judgments as to what qualifies as civil society--not corporations in their profit-seeking
guise--and what values civil society serves-- pluralism, protest, republican citizenship, and
community--and the Commission, in consulting civil society, was, and continues to be,
constrained by this set of judgments. Because "consultation of civil society" cannot be stretched
to accommodate, for instance, European regulatory policy dictated by a single profit-seeking
corporation, it is an idea with autonomous force that must be evaluated on its own merits.
3. The evolution of the right to civil society participation
In fall of 1999, at the same time that the Prodi Commission began the good governance
exercise that culminated in the White Paper, it was influential in setting into motion a chain of
events that produced one of the major innovations of the recent Constitutional Treaty, an article
on the right of civil society to participate in European governance. The Charter of Fundamental
Rights of 2000 was an important precedent for the Constitutional Treaty in both the structure of
the drafting process and the substance of the commitments made therein.375 Drafting of the nonbinding Charter of Fundamental Rights began in fall of 1999 and it was approved by the
European Council at Nice in December 2000.376 The Charter was the idea of the German
presidency of the European Council.377 It was not intended to introduce new rights, rather it was
conceived as vehicle for rendering the existing rights of European citizens in their relations with
European institutions (as opposed to their national governments) more visible and thus improve
the legitimacy of the EU.
In line with this purpose, the European Council designed an inclusive and open drafting
process. The drafting body (“Convention”) include a number of actors that had, in the past been
excluded from the high politics of European treaty negotiations: representatives of the European
373
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Parliament and national parliaments were given membership on the Convention, alongside the
Member States and the Commission, and representatives of the Court of Justice and Council of
Europe378 were given observer status.379 Furthermore, the European Council instructed the
Convention to conduct its affairs as openly as possible. Thus the Convention was required to
hold all of its hearings in public, make the documents submitted at the hearings accessible on a
website, and seek the opinions of the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the
Regions, and the Ombudsman. The Convention was also encouraged to invite “other bodies,
social groups or experts” to give their views.
The European Council conclusions establishing the Convention did not carve out a
specific role for NGOs or other private associations.380 Nonetheless, a number of public
hearings of NGO representatives were held and a Convention website was created where citizens
and organizations could submit their views.381 The Commission, as a member of the
Convention, strongly supported including civil society organizations in the deliberative process
and was one of the main reasons that civil society came to be so heavily involved.
The Constitutional Convention, which did include a formal role for civil society, was
modeled on the earlier experience with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. And it was because
of the suggestion of civil society representatives heard at that Convention that the Constitutional
Treaty now contains a far-reaching right to civil society consultation. In December 2001, the
Laeken European Council decided to create the Convention responsible for drawing up the
Constitutional Treaty. The Convention was composed of 102 members and 102 alternates,
chosen by national governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the
Commission.382 Alongside the Convention was a Forum for civil society organizations. The
Forum consisted of a website, open to all voluntary organizations, on which drafts of the
Constitutional Treaty were published and on which comments and proposed amendments from
members of the public could be posted.383 The function of the Forum was purely advisory. The
Praesdium, led by a Chairman (Giscard d'Estaing), two Vice-Chairmen (Giuliano d'Amato and
Jean Luc Dehaene) and composed of nine members drawn from the Convention, set the agenda
and drafted proposals for the Convention and the Forum to consider.
The early months were devoted to soliciting views from the members of the Convention,
what d'Estaing called the "listening stage."384 In this context, a meeting of civil society
organizations was held in Brussels on June 24-25, 2002.385 There, Joseph Bresch, the President
of the Economic and Social Committee, put forward the suggestion that the Constitutional Treaty
provide for the principle of participatory democracy and include civil society.386 A skeleton
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outline of the Constitutional Treaty was then circulated and posted on the Convention's website
in the fall of 2002.387 The drafters anticipated a provision on "participatory democracy" which
would guarantee that: "the Institutions are to ensure a high level of openness, permitting citizens'
organizations of all kinds to play a full part in the Union's affairs."388 Anyone, including
individuals, voluntary associations, and interest organizations could submit comments on the
draft, which were also posted on the Convention's website. They did, and many called for
including a duty on the part of the European institutions to consult civil society in policy
planning and decisionmaking.389 The fuller draft released on April 2, 2003 included an article on
participatory democracy very similar to the final version, in which civil society organizations
were given the right of participation in the decisionmaking of the European institutions.390 Thus,
the decision to attribute constitutional status to civil society participation was linked to the
structure of the Convention and its Forum for civil society organizations, which in turn was tied
to the experience with citizen groups in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Prodi
Commission’s decision to support civil society organizations in the bid to improve its democratic
credentials and re-establish institutional stature after the fall of the Santer Commission.
The provision dedicated to relations between European institutions and civil society says:
Article 46: The principle of participatory democracy
1. The Union Institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views on all
areas of Union action.
2. The Union Institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with
representative associations and civil society.
3. The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to
ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent.
....
The comments that accompanied the first appearance of Article 46 in the draft of April 2, 2003
were explicit in drawing the connection between participatory democracy and civil society: "The
purpose of this Article is to provide a framework and content for the dialogue which is largely
already in place between the institutions and civil society."391
While the Articles of the Constitutional Treaty on the right to good administration and the
right to transparency simply constitutionalize existing law, Article 46 both elevates civil society
consultation to the rank of higher law and extends the right to a host of new areas. Insofar as the
Commission is concerned, Article 46 converts what was previously an administrative practice set
down in a non-binding policy document into a constitutionally guaranteed procedure. With
respect to other European institutions, the provision creates an entirely novel set of rights and
duties. The duty to engage in “dialogue” and the duty to give citizens and their associations an
387
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opportunity to make their views known, were good government principles originally developed
by the Commission, for the Commission, but in the Constitutional Treaty they have been
extended to all European institutions. Article 46 transforms a procedure designed for and by a
single European institution--the Commission--into a general principle of democracy applicable to
all.
The turning point for European rights that started in 1999 with the resignation of the
Santer Commission has still not come to a close. A number of basic questions continue to
surround the right to civil participation and will probably not be resolved until the Constitutional
Treaty is ratified (or not), the first legal challenges are brought to European measures on the
ground that the principle of participatory democracy was violated, and the first legislative
measures are taken to give effect to the principle. Among the most significant questions that
remain open are: Will the right be legally binding and enforceable in the European Courts or
will it be interpreted as a programmatic article, that is, a right that European public officials are
bound to respect and uphold in their activities but that is not an area for the intervention of
judges?392 What types of Commission measures are subject to the duty to consult, just European
laws or also implementing regulations, and if implementing regulations, all of them or only the
most significant ones? Lastly, how will the right of civil society participation be construed in the
different institutional setting of adjudication by the European Courts, intergovernmental
bargaining in the Council of Ministers and European Council, and technical administration and
information-gathering in the European agencies? The coming years promise to be eventful ones
for the right to civil society participation.
4. European value: Civil society in European and global governance compared
The Commission drew from the international realm when it set into motion the civil
society phase of European governance. None of the Member States had a developed discourse
on the importance of civil society for good government or a procedure, applicable to all
lawmaking, in which citizens and associations were systematically invited to comment on the
early drafts of legislation. Yet the civil society ideal in the international realm was nebulous and
ill-defined. Unlike the right to a hearing and transparency, public law principles that had been
elaborated in the thick institutional space of the nation-state, the idea of legitimacy through civil
society left the Commission with significant latitude in designing the organizational change that
would constitute governing with civil society. The latitude, however, was illusory because of the
ever-present constraints of European mental maps, in this case the mental map of corporatist
relations between public bodies and private interest organizations.
The European right to civil society participation differs in two critical respects from the
international right. First, the understanding of civil society is different. Civil society in the
international realm is generally used to refer to NGOs that seek social or environmental justice,
not associations of firms or workers whose agendas are informed by their market activities. 393
Moreover, the term encompasses an extremely fluid set of private associations. An association
qualifies as civil society just by virtue of being an organization that is one-step removed from the
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institutions of government. As long as the group has a name, an e-mail address, and a core of
activists, it counts as civil society. Civil society in Europe means NGOs. But it also embraces
producer groups such as farmers, employer associations, sectoral industry groups, labor unions,
and professional associations. Furthermore, civil society in the Commission documents and the
Constitutional Treaty signifies a structured reality of organizations that represent distinct
functional interests, religious traditions (churches), and political values. It refers to a selfcontained universe of labor unions, employer organizations, consumer federations, umbrella
environmental organizations, anti-discrimination groups, political liberties associations, and
churches. Lastly, to count as a civil society organization in Europe, an association is expected to
have a membership base, a physical address with offices, and a bit of history.
The different, European understanding of civil society is directly tied to the Commission's
strategic use of the international discourse in the old institutional setting of European corporatist
interest group representation that I described at the beginning of this section. All of the
Commission documents borrow their definition of civil society from the corporatist European
institution par excellence, the Economic and Social Committee, which had developed earlier a
definition of civil society that, not surprisingly, reflected its own model of interest
representation.394 The new, central data base of Commission organizations with civil society
representation is simply a compilation of already existing advisory bodies composed of
organized interests, many of which can trace their roots to the 1960's.395 I do not wish to suggest
that civil society is only a label and that nothing has changed in the relationship between
European institutions and the public. Certainly, the civil society concept brought with it a
commitment to consult a wider array of non-state organizations with a broader set of concerns
than the old peak associations of labor, business, the professions, and farmers. Yet these new
associational actors must still fit a distinctly European mold. They are defined as organizations
with a long-standing role in national politics, i.e. churches, or are expected to reach out to a
significant number of Europeans through membership or other activities and show some
organizational stability before the Commission will take their claims seriously.
The second major difference between the European right to civil society participation and
the international right is the breadth of the organizational change that has occurred in order to
include civil society in public decisionmaking. The consultation procedure adopted by the
Commission is more comprehensive than the institutional practices of any of the major
international economic organizations (World Bank, IMF, NAFTA, WTO). While, for instance,
the World Bank has developed venues for civil society participation, they do not stretch acrossthe-board to all policy areas, do not entail the same, weighty sequence of publication, public
comments, and official explanation, and do not have binding, legal status.396 The participation
that can be expected once (and if) the Constitutional Treaty is ratified and Article 46 takes effect,
will surpass wildly anything that exists in the international realm. As with the previous episodes
of rights creation, the Commission did not simply borrow mental maps of liberal democracy,
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rather it was driven to construct a more extensive rights scheme than existed in the place of
origin.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AND THE EVIDENCE
My analysis of the historical record shows that the historical institutionalist
understanding of human preferences and collective processes of constitutional change can help
explain the development of rights before the European Commission. European actors were
motivated by values, what I also call mental maps of good government: the common law right to
a fair hearing, the northern right to transparency, and the international right to civil society
participation. Earlier, in Part I, I foresaw that these would be social understandings that actors
had developed through their experiences as citizens of their different nation-states. The first and
second generations of rights were clearly driven by individuals with allegiances to their national
constitutional symbols and practices but the third generation was more complex. The
Commission adopted a normative discourse of good government that had been developed outside
Europe, yet precisely because the institutions and social understandings in the international realm
were so ill-defined, the old European mental maps quickly took over. As anticipated in Part I,
European actors were not only motivated by values but also by their strategic interest in
preserving and consolidating authority: the interest of the Court of Justice and the Commission in
the enforcement of their decisions; of Heads of State in securing ratification of a hard-fought set
of political deals contained in the Maastricht Treaty; of the Parliament in improving its
legislative powers; and of the Commission in preserving its institutional role as the engine of
European integration.
The collective processes that led to the transformation of rights also fit a familiar mold.
New procedural rights emerged sporadically, in response to historical, highly contextualized
challenges to the powers of specific European institutions: the accession of a common law
country, the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, and the resignation of the Santer
Commission. After rights were added to the European toolkit, they showed real staying power
and conceptual constancy. Lastly, the national and international values that spurred
constitutional change are different from the European ones that the rules serve today: the
European right to a hearing affords parties more procedural guarantees than the British
counterpart; the European right to transparency covers a wider array of government activities
and affords citizens additional means for obtaining government information as compared to the
northern right; and the European right to civil society participation covers a more structured
organizational reality, through a more extensive and well-defined procedure, than does the
international right.
In Part I, I presented three alternative theories of rights and constitutional change in the
EU and derived specific hypotheses for the case of procedural rights in Commission
decisionmaking.397 Legal constitutionalism, intergovernmentalism, and neo-functionalism
generate predictions on a number of dimensions of rights in Commission proceedings: the
bundle of rights that individuals enjoy, the time when different types rights are acknowledged by
the Commission, and the European institution responsible for advocating and imposing the rights
on the Commission. Now that I have presented the history, I return to the competing theories
and examine how they fare when matched against the pattern of institutional change that has
occurred over time. If they were successful in predicting rights, notwithstanding their very
different assumptions about human motivations and collective decisionmaking processes, then I
397
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would have to conclude that historical institutionalism fails to capture the essential elements of
constitutional change that can be used to explain rights before the Commission and elsewhere.398
As it turns out, although the competing theories are able to account for certain features of
procedural rights, they each fall short of providing a comprehensive and accurate set of
predictions.
A. Legal Constitutionalism
As we saw earlier, legal constitutionalists work from the premise that constitutional
designers are motivated by higher principles of democracy, fairness, and justice and that the rules
and rights that are adopted by conventions and courts further those principles. Hanns Peter
Nehl's work best exemplifies this approach in the context of the European Commission. Give
the normative underpinnings of this form of scholarship the forward-looking element of the
theory combines the positive "will" with the normative "should." Therefore it is difficult to
discern the concrete mix of rights Nehl believes a constitution designer will (and should) protect
at a given historical moment because they best guarantee the basic values that Nehl discerns as
fundamental to modern administration, namely individual dignity, administrative rationality, and
workability. His analysis, however, does produce expectations as to which institutions will press
for rights in the administrative process and when they will do so. First, given that their
professional and institutional mission is inextricably woven with higher principles of justice,
judges should be the most receptive to claims that European administration is unfair and
illegitimate. Bureaucrats, by contrast can be expected to focus on getting the work of
administration done. In other words, procedural rights should be driven by the judgments of the
European Courts. Second, such rights should emerge as soon as the Commission begins
exercising different types of power and private parties go to the courts to complain that it was
exercised unfairly.
In the case of the right to a hearing and other types of rights in individualized
Commission proceedings, Nehl's expectations as to the institutional proponent of the right are
mostly borne out by the historical record. The Court of Justice set down the right to a hearing in
competition proceedings and then extended the right to other areas of Commission
administration where private parties could show that they were similarly burdened. Yet the late
arrival of the right--eight years after the first competition case was decided--and the
Commission's entrepreneurship in undertaking organizational change are difficult to explain.
The events that pose real difficulties for legal constitutionalism are the rise of the right to
transparency and civil society participation. Many years before they became standard elements
of European rights discourse, individual litigants had made functionally similar claims before the
Court of Justice and had been rejected. For instance, Nehl narrates a case from 1984 in which a
trader vindicated, unsuccessfully, the right of access to documents.399 In Tradax Graanhandel
BV v. Commission, a Dutch importer of maize challenged a duty ("levy") assessed as part of the
European price support scheme for agricultural commodities, but rather than challenging the
implementing regulation setting down the duty, the Dutch importer requested the information
that had been used to make the calculations that resulted in the duty. The Commission turned
down the Dutch importer's request and, when Tradax went to the Court of Justice, both the
Advocate General and the Court dismissed the claim.
Tradax argued that general principle of good administration required the Commission to
provide the documents--as evidenced by the access to documents laws common to a number of
398
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Member States--and that the right to a hearing, through which parties obtained documents in
competition proceedings, should also apply to a business affected by an implementing
regulation.400 Neither the Advocate General nor the Court were persuaded. The reasoning of
the Advocate General illustrates the institutional limits of judges and fairness doctrines in
reforming administration:
Nor does it seem to me that there is any general or absolute principle of
Community law, as is suggested, which requires information to be disclosed by
the institutions of the Community to persons affected by Community acts in the
absence of express provision and in the absence of litigation. The provisions of
the laws of Member States which have been cited requiring disclosure of
information in the possession of governments, in the interests of more open
government, may support an argument that there should be specific or general
measures laying down some rules. It does not seem to me to establish a general
principle of "unwritten law" which aids the applicants in this case. Moreover, the
fact that in competition and staff cases the Court has recognized that, before a
decision is taken affecting an individual he has a right to be heard and to know the
case against him, does not seem to me to lead to the conclusion that after a levy is
fixed for all traders (since it is not contended that there is a right to the
information before the levy is fixed) the information must be given to individual
traders.401
Moreover, unlike the English right to a hearing, there was no threat to the legal authority of the
Commission or the Court. Both the Advocate General and the Court were satisfied that Tradax's
rights were adequately protected by the right to challenge to the implementing regulation in
court, at which point Tradax and the court would be able to review the documents underpinning
the levy.402 They obviously believed that a Dutch court would see the matter in the same light.
A Dutch litigant, acting according to a mental map formed through education and
experiences in the Dutch public law system of open government, was unable to persuade the
Court to adopt an access to documents rule.403 It was only after Maastricht, the declarations of
European Heads of State in fall of 1992, and the enactment of the first Commission access to
document rules in 1993 and 1994, that the Court began enforcing a right of access to documents
to the benefit of traders in situations almost identical to that of Tradax.404
The same unsuccessful testing of legal theories before the Court of Justice has occurred
in the sphere of civil society participation. The primary doctrinal candidate for obtaining,
through the Court of Justice, the functional equivalent of the right to participation is the duty to
give reasons under Article 190, now 253, of the EC Treaty.405 A requirement that the
Commission respond to the objections of interested parties in the statement of reasons supporting
a regulation or law would approximate the explanatory memorandum that the Commission now
issues in civil society consultations. Yet the Court has always rejected the claim that the
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Commission is obliged to engage in an exchange of views with the European public, now known
as civil society, before adopting regulations and proposing laws.406
As far as the anticipated timing of rights in concerned, unsurprisingly, legal
constitutionalist theory also disappoints. The Commission has always had the power to adopt
rules and propose laws and it has done so since the 1960's. Yet, notwithstanding the objections
from individual litigants chronicled above, until recently the Commission exercised such powers
free of any duty to disclose documents or engage in an exchange of views with civil society
organizations and members of the public. Only in 1993 and then in 2002 did such rights and
obligations come into being. In sum, it appears that even though judges are moved by
complaints of oppressive, government action to do justice and make administration fairer, they
face limits based on their pre-existing mental maps of rights, both in what they will recognize as
oppressive and unjust and in what they believe that they can do to remedy injustice as a court of
law as opposed to a democratically elected legislature.
B. Intergovernmentalism
According to intergovernmentalists, the preferences of Member States and bargaining
among them are responsible for the rules through which European institutions govern. Most
intergovernmentalists base their model of European integration upon the same self-interested
individual preferences and strategic behavior at the foundation of domestic rational choice
theories of constitutional design. Given the market-creating ends of the original European
Community, intergovernmentalists focus on domestic economic lobbies, whose views are filtered
through their governments, and then serve as the grounds for national preferences in treaty
negotiations and bargaining on European laws in the Council of Ministers.407 As we saw in Part
I, if pressed to anticipate national preferences for individual rights, an intergovernmentalist
would say that states seek to protect the material well-being of their own citizens from arbitrary
government action and that the definition of what constitutes arbitrary should follow national
patterns of individual rights and public duties. This type of preference verges on altruistic value,
as opposed to selfish interest. However, because rational choice theorists that attempt to
accommodate value-driven preferences rank them as insignificant compared to material interests,
we would not expect states to exhibit much variation in the intensity of their preferences for
rights. 408 And therefore, an intergovernmentalist would not predict that weaker states would
used the possibility of linkage across policy areas to secure their rights for their citizens by
406
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making significant concessions on other issues.409 Hence the specific rights that should emerge
from negotiations should be the ones existing in the most powerful Member States.
From the beginnings of European integration to the present day, France and Germany
have been and continue to be the two most powerful Member States, notwithstanding the many
waves of accession and the membership of another large country, namely the UK.410 An
intergovernmentalist, therefore, would expect European citizens to enjoy the rights that French
and German citizens are guaranteed under their domestic constitutions and laws. Moreover, an
intergovernmentalist would anticipate that rights are promoted by Member States and are
contained in treaties and laws negotiated among Member States. Lastly, the timing of rights
should follow the same historical sequence as the conferral of powers upon the Commission,
since states would only want to protect their citizens from arbitrary government action once they
perceived that the Commission had the power to impose it.
The intergovernmental explanation is persuasive in the early days of the Commission. As
the reader will recall, the first area in which the Commission exercised direct enforcement
powers was competition law. The right to be notified of the Commission's evidence and
arguments and reply in writing and orally, at a hearing, were set down in a Council regulation.
The Commission was also required to give a statement of the reasons supporting the final
competition decision under Article 190 of the Treaty of Rome. This conformed to French
competition procedure (notice, a right to reply in writing, and a reasoned opinion of the
Technical Commission on Cartels and Dominant Positions) and German competition procedure
(the same plus the right to an oral hearing). The institutional advocates of rights also followed
expectations: the basic framework was set down, in part, by the states that negotiated the Treaty
of Rome and the Council Regulation. And the timing is historically correct: as soon as the
Commission was given direct enforcement powers (Council Regulation of 1962) it was also
required to respect basic rights (Council Regulation of 1962 and Commission Regulation of
1963).
By the time the Court of Justice recognized the right to a hearing in 1974, however, the
intergovernmental model of European institutional change ceased to hold true. The right was not
drawn from France or Germany or even the legal tradition of a majority of the Member States,
but from a state (the UK) with little power, given her recent entry into the European Community
after years of having been denied admission by De Gaulle. Furthermore, the right was
established by supranational institutions, the Court of Justice and, to a lesser extent, the
Commission, and emerged at a time when there had been no change in the Commission’s
powers.
The same initial consistency with intergovernmentalism followed by departure from the
model is true also of transparency and civil society participation. Before 1993, individuals did
not have a right to documents, as in the majority, closed government tradition, which included
France and Germany. After 1993, the intergovernmental predictions falter, for the right came
from Member States that were powerless as a matter of their economies and populations
(Denmark and the Netherlands), were established partly by a supranational institution (the
European Parliament), and were introduced well after the Commission had come to exercise
significant rulemaking and lawmaking powers independent of the Member States represented on
the Council.411
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Likewise, before 2002, public participation in rulemaking and lawmaking had followed
the majority corporatist model of consulting advisory bodies on which select interest
organizations were represented. The Economic and Social Committee was established in the
Treaty of Rome and advisory committees were set down in a number of European laws that
dated to the 1960's and 1970's. Thus, both forms of interest representation were promoted by the
Member States and at the time that the Commission was first given rulemaking and lawmaking
powers. After 2002, while the definition of the interested public retained the original corporatist
bent, procedure for consulting interests, as well as the types of private associations that were
consulted, became much more inclusive. Moreover, the institutional proponent of the right was
supranational Commission. Lastly, the right to civil society participation did not appear at a time
when the Member States transferred new powers to the Commission.
In summary, the European experience shows that states initially do control the rights that
their citizens enjoy before international organizations but, sooner or later, they lose control to
those organizations. Intergovernmental theory offers an important corrective to my analysis of
the European Commission because it accounts for the procedural baseline that existed before
each of the historical challenges that prompted organization change and new rights.
Nevertheless, because this theory does not provide any intellectual tools for understanding the
dynamics of European institutional change outside of intergovernmental bargaining, it remains
fundamentally incomplete.
C. Neo-Functionalism
As the reader will recall from Part I, neo-functionalist explanations of Europe, like
intergovernmentalist ones, are based on self-interested motives and constitutional processes, but
they identify supranational European institutions rather than inter-state bargaining as the critical
forum in which such motives operate. Martin Shapiro has come the closest to articulating a neofunctionalist view of constitutional innovation in the Commission. As I explained earlier,
Shapiro employs a rational choice model of human behavior, in which litigants with the money
to hire lawyers and the interest in avoiding administrative action, challenge Commission
decisions on novel legal theories and judges are driven by competence-expanding, activist
tendencies to rule in their favor. His account also includes anti-technocracy, pro-democracy
values and the internal logic of the legal doctrine of the duty to give reasons. Nevertheless, these
value-driven premises are complementary to the rational choice ones: all elements of the neofunctional model point in the direction of an ever-expanding bag of procedural rights.
According to Shapiro, procedural rights before the Commission should gradually come to
approximate those under American administrative law. The institutional advocate of rights
should be the Court of Justice, since judges are interested in expanding their powers, as well as
remaining faithful to the doctrinal demands of the duty to give reasons and the political demands
of protecting litigants (and democracy) against overweening bureaucrats. Lastly, the timing of
the rights should track, with a slight lag, the exercise of different types of government powers by
the Commission: the Commission issues decisions and rules, litigants oppose the measures and
test the waters with new legal theories, the Court of Justice considers and initially rejects the
theories, but is moved eventually, in response to self-interest, pro-democracy values, and
doctrinal logic, to accept the litigants' arguments.
their citizens. Before 1986, Member States might have believed that they could control Commission activities in the rulemaking
and lawmaking areas through unanimity voting on comitology committees and the Council, or that, in the isolated areas where
such checks did not exist, in the nooks and crannies of the management of agricultural prices and customs duties, the decisions
were simply too technical to be able to adversely--and arbitrarily--harm the economic well-being of their citizens.
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Even though Shapiro's model of constitutional change is very different from Nehl's, his
predictions on institutions and timing are virtually identicaland as I explained, neither finds
support in the historical record of transparency or civil society participation. The history of
litigation before the European Courts contains many instances in which plaintiffs advanced
theories that would give them access to documents and an exchange of views with the
Commission in advance of the enactment of a rule or law, and the Courts consistently refused to
entertain their claims. In establishing the right to transparency and the right to civil society
participation, the Court of Justice was a marginal actor and the incremental logic of judge-made
law did not apply.
In addition to the predictions on institutions and timing, Shapiro anticipates that the
Commission will be required to respect procedures analogous to American ones, by which he
means principally notice and comment rulemaking. The judicial interpretation given to the
Administrative Procedure Act in the late 1960's and 1970's requires federal agencies to publish
rulemaking proposals, including the policy considerations and scientific information underlying
proposals, accept comments from the public, and give detailed explanations of their policy
choices in the final rule.412 As the reader will recall, Shapiro argues that the duty to give reasons
will eventually be interpreted in such a way as to give individuals a very similar set of rights.
But that has not happened. Even in the core administrative area of individual enforcement
decisions under competition, anti-dumping, and customs law, the Commission's statement of
reasons is far from the exhaustive rebuttal of all of the objections of the parties required under
American law.413
The difference between the European and American practices lies in the origins of the
duty to give reasons. It was contained in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and was imposed on
European institutions to give effect to the rule of law principle common to the founding Member
States that all government acts must be based on law.414 The European institutions promulgating
the act had to give the reasons for it: the legal provision on which it was based and the grounds
for holding that the government act furthered the purposes of the legal provision.415 The duty to
give reasons was not conceived as a device for guaranteeing pluralist participation in
administrative proceedings, as the analogous provisions of American law have been interpreted
by American courts.416 In the droit administratif systems of the original Member States, if the
parties believed that the administration had not taken into account an important consideration
and hence had acted contrary to the dictates of the enabling law, they could go to court.417
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When the right to a hearing came to be recognized as part of European law, it had no impact on
the duty to give reasons because the common law right to a hearing did not provide for a judiciallike opinion at the end of the proceeding, indeed it had nothing to say about the form of the final
administrative decision.418 Thus, the statement of reasons that the Commission today gives in
competition and international trade cases does not answer each and every point made by the
parties in the administrative proceeding.419 Knowing the grounds for a Commission decision is
one thing, obtaining a reply on every objection of fact, policy, and law is another thing. The
European Courts only require that the statement of reasons be complete enough to enable the
parties to determine whether the administration acted according to law or whether it is necessary
to go to court to vindicate their right to a government of laws and not of men.420
If we move beyond the category of individual decisions and consider the duty to give
reasons for general acts, the European path has also taken an unexpected turn, at least compared
to the American one. With the right to civil society participation, the proceduralized sequence of
public notice, opportunity to comment, and government response has been introduced for acts of
a general nature but, for the time-being, only for European laws, not implementing regulations.
The Commission, in reasserting authority after the resignation of the Santer Commission, needed
the normative support of civil society to justify its role in making the fundamental, political
choices contained in European legislation. It had no strategic interest in involving civil society
in what was perceived as the technical domain of rulemaking. This is precisely the opposite
from what would be expected based on American law. In the U.S., regulations must adhere to
notice and comment procedures but congressional statutes, as a matter of constitutional and
statutory law, are free from requirements of public debate before they are passed.421 Although
politically inconceivable, legislation could in theory be enacted by the President and Congress
without any opportunity for public comment.
In sum, the pattern of rights that has emerged in Europe cannot be explained fully by the
universal, or at least Western, anti-technocratic values and strategic interests identified by
Shapiro. The relative strengths of the historical institutionalist explanation are apparent. By
postulating a number of competing social understandings of good government and rights, based
on different institutional experiences within the nation-state, and by assuming that the strategic
interests of European actors will be defined by reference to historical events, historical
institutionalism both gives a more complete account of the emergence of rights and a more
accurate understanding of where European rights stand today, on the books and in practice.
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The specific predictions of the alternative theories, compared to the historical
development of rights, are summarized below.
Table 2---Predictions of the alternative theories matched against the historical record
Legal
constitutionalism

Intergovernmentalism

Neo-functionalism

Historical record

Individualized
proceedings
(rights,
institutions,
timing)

--; European Courts;
gradually after 1962.

Procedural rights of French
and German traditions;
Member States; 1962.

Rights under U.S. law;
European Courts; gradually
after 1962.

Originally rights
of French and
Germany
traditions (1962
and 1963)
followed by
English right to a
hearing (1974);
Member States,
European Courts,
Commission.

Transparency
(rights,
institutions,
timing)

--; European Courts;
gradually after 1957.

Limited or no access to
documents as in French and
German closed government
traditions; Member States;
1986 or before.

--

Originally no
access to
documents
followed by
northern right to
transparency
(1993); Heads of
State and
European
Parliament.

Civil society
participation
(rights,
institutions,
timing)

--; European Courts;
gradually after 1957.

Functional representation in
certain policy areas as in
France and Germany;
Member States; 1986 or
before

Procedure similar to U.S.
notice and comment for
implementing regulations;
European Courts; gradually
after 1957.

Originally
functional
representation on
ESC (1957) and
advisory
committees
(1960’s and
1970’s), now
routine and formal
procedure for
early consultation
of public on all
legislative
proposals (2002);
Commission.

To conclude this examination of the competing theories, let me point to some avenues of
future research for historical institutionalism. In essence, by reviewing the historical record of
rights before the Commission, I selected a number of cases based on a range of values taken by
the dependent variable, i.e. rights change or rights stasis.422 My theoretical claims, however,
would be stronger if I had also included cases selected on the independent variable, namely the
presence or absence of historical crisis.423 One promising line of future research, therefore,
would be to examine other possible crises-- accessions, voter revolt, and strident opposition to
the Commission from other European institutions—to see whether they indeed were crises and
whether they too prompted rights change.
422
423
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CONCLUSION
I conclude by taking stock of rights before the European Commission and advancing
some predictions for the future of rights in Europe and other systems of global governance.
Before the Commission may issue adverse determinations against specific individuals, it must
notify the parties of all aspects of the planned decision, allow the parties to examine the
information in its files, accept written submissions, hold an oral hearing, and give a complete
enough statement of the grounds for the final administrative decision so that the parties, and
eventually the European Courts, can discern whether the Commission has adhered to the
substantive requirements of European law. As we have seen, this set of rights is most extensive
in competition and anti- dumping proceedings, slightly less so in customs remissions
proceedings, and even less so in the other, rare instances in which the Commission bypasses
national administrations and makes adverse individualized determinations. This is a set of rights
inspired by the droit administratif tradition and the English right to a hearing. When the right to
a hearing migrated to Brussels, it guaranteed the parties more thorough-going disclosure of the
government's case than in the administration of origin, the UK Monopolies and Mergers
Commission. It also operated largely free of political discretion after the parties were heard,
contrary to British administration of competition policy.
Moving along to transparency, the Commission now is under a legal duty to maintain a
public, electronic register of all the documents generated in the administrative and legislative
process--technical studies, committee agendas, and reports that serve to prepare official acts-together with the official acts. The Commission is under a duty to make those documents
immediately accessible through the register or, if not possible, as a second-best, to provide the
documents upon a request from a European citizen or resident. The right of citizens to know
how government makes decisions day-to-day, before and after the public debates in a
parliamentary assembly, expanded in its adoptive home. None of the northern systems, where
the right originated, combined the transparency guarantee of a public register, with full-text,
immediately accessible electronic documents, with that of access to documents that are
preliminary and political in nature.
Lastly, when the Commission drafts proposals for European laws, it now must respect the
right of civil society participation. It is obliged to make an early draft of the proposal available
to European civil society, accept comments, and explain in the final version why it did or did not
modify the proposal in light of the comments. The definition of which associations count as the
civil society that must be taken seriously in the consultative process borrows from the European
corporatist tradition of interest representation, although it is more inclusive than the corporatist
model. The systematic and cross-cutting procedure for involving civil society in Commission
decisionmaking goes beyond any of the reforms yet undertaken by international organizations,
the place where the demand for civil society participation originated.
Notwithstanding the fact that procedural rights emerged in different historical periods and
were informed by different cultural traditions and supranational interests, they display one,
striking common characteristic: the right to a hearing, the right to transparency, and the right to
civil society participation all afford citizens a greater set of entitlements against European
government than in their place of origin. What is the common thread that explains this
surprising outcome? It is the weak nature of the Commission as a government organization. As
we saw earlier, the Commission relies on cooperation from national administrations and national
courts in enforcing European law. It does not have a police force that it can call into action,
European courts in which it can directly appear to seek the execution of orders, or jails into
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which it can put recalcitrant citizens. It does not have independent enforcement powers.
Politically too the Commission is weak. It is not led by a popularly elected official, as are
executive branches at the national level, a directly elected president in presidential systems of
government, or a prime minister and cabinet appointed after parliamentary elections in
parliamentary systems of government. It is led by a College of Commissioners, headed by a
President, that is appointed by common consensus among the Member States, with some input
from the European Parliament. In no way can the Commission be said to enjoy an electoral
mandate when it undertakes its mission. In responding to challenges from national judges,
lawyers, and statesmen, as in the case of a right to a hearing, the Commission cannot use legal
enforcement powers. In responding to challenges from national voters and elected officials, as in
the case of the right to transparency and civil society participation, the Commission cannot use
the political mandate of a popular vote. The Commission cannot say, as generally national
executive authorities do when faced with demands for rights, that it governs in the name of the
people and therefore, the will of the majority and the greater good must, under the circumstances,
prevail over the rights of the individual.
The history of procedural rights before the Commission is reassuring because it shows
that as authority migrates beyond the confines of the nation-state, citizens, lawyers and judges
with allegiances to their strong national--and to some extent international--rights cultures are
vigilant in protecting rights in new political spaces. Nonetheless, there also is a certain irony to
history that I have told in this Article. The European project, at the heart of which is the
Commission, was begun in response to one, calamitous failure of the political space of the
nation-state: war. European leaders have given up exclusive powers over a variety of policy
areas and transferred them to the EU on the belief that their countries do better by pooling
sovereignty rather than going it alone. Yet even though the Commission has obtained significant
powers to carry out the European aims of the treaties, it is circumscribed by extensive procedural
rights. The institutional weakness responsible for this outcome is the result of the design of the
same Member States that originally conferred powers upon the Commission. No European Head
of State wants competition from a directly elected President of the European Commission. Nor
would any national voter want to be arrested, tried, and sentenced by a public official who spoke
a different language, had been schooled in a different legal system, and had allegiances to a
different set of cultural and political institutions. As I have shown, the extensive procedural
guarantees have also been driven by an unexpected institutional competitor of the Commission:
a directly elected European Parliament with extensive, treaty-based powers. As the different
dimensions of the still-uncertain right to civil society participation are decided, the margins of
the right to a hearing and the right to transparency are worked out in existing and novel policy
areas, and new rights arise, this dynamic should kept in mind. The Commission is not an
ordinary executive branch and for that reason it might well be more dangerous, but for that
reason too, it is less able to resist demands for rights.
Now I turn to speculating about the future. One possible objection to my historical
analysis is that the forces that I identify as determinants of European rights are so culturally and
historically specific that they do not count as elements of a general theory of constitutional
change that can be applied going forward in time or in analyzing other international settings. To
the contrary, my study of the Commission has brought to light a number of features of rights in
the era of global governance that are lasting and cross-cutting. The national traditions that
inspired European rights are quite stable.424 Comparatists have long been fascinated with the
424
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resilience of national legal cultures in the face of legal transplants from abroad and, even in a
globalizing world, differences in language, legal education, and the national institutions in which
lawyers and legal scholars pursue their careers, can be expected to produce continuity.425
Moreover, the distinctive, supranational interest in maintaining and extending authority that
motivated European actors can be expected to persist in the EU and to drive organizations in
international regimes. Lastly, even the historical crises that provoked organizational change in
the Commission have a certain generalizable quality: a fundamentally different legal culture (the
common law vs. the civil law), a new set of policy prerogatives in areas of high politics (the
commitments to defense, immigration, and a single currency contained in the Maastricht Treaty),
and the entrepreneurship of a supranational institution rendered newly powerful through a
combination of the political authority of direct elections and the legal authority of new treaty
powers (the Parliament).
What then might the future hold for European rights? The accession of Central and
Eastern European countries on May 1, 2004 was a historic event for the EU. To some extent, the
dynamics of this accession are different from previous ones because of the enormous
discrepancy in wealth between the new and old Member States. The new states gain far more
from becoming members of the European club than the old states gain from letting in the new
members.426 Nevertheless, especially for supranational European institutions like the Court of
Justice where power differentials do not animate decisionmaking to the same extent as in the
intergovernmental institution of the Council, lessons can be drawn from the previous experience
with rights before the Commission.
After the fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, all of those countries
adopted new constitutions and established constitutional courts to safeguard rights. Some, in
particular the Hungarian Constitutional Court, have become very active.427 It is quite common
for members of the legal establishment in newly democratized countries to be wed to
fundamental rights, especially highly visible, sweeping, and symbolic statements of such
rights.428 The Court will not be able to resist the pressure to engage in searching constitutional
review of European acts because of the strategic need to reassure courts like the Hungarian one
that fundamental rights have been protected. In the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice,
therefore, even before the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty that would render the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding, we should expect a marked shift in the rhetoric
of fundamental rights.
Furthermore, the distinction between European and national acts, which determines
whether European fundamental rights apply, will come under siege. (Currently European
fundamental rights apply only to European acts, much like the U.S. Bill of Rights only protected
individuals against acts of the federal government before incorporation against the states in the
1960's.) That is because the Central and Eastern European judges on the Court of Justice and
those sitting on national courts can be expected to insist on ensuring respect for fundamental
rights in their countries, regardless of whether government authorities are acting under national
or European law. The prestige and authority of the Court of Justice will be perceived as a unique
institutional opportunity to do so. The Court might be able to resist the pressure to serve as a
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constitutional court for all acts, European and national, in those instances where the
implementation of European policy is not at stake and hence there is no strategic need to
accommodate local courts in order to ensure enforcement of European measures.
In other areas of global governance, predictions are complicated by the absence of any
organization even matching the relatively weak European Commission of the 1950's and 1960's
and by the presence of one state, the U.S., that is significantly more powerful than the rest. The
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is one of the most likely international bodies to become
an institution whose decisions will be executed at the national level as a routine matter, without
extensive diplomatic politics and national debate. Like the European Court of Justice, the DSB
relies upon the cooperation of national authorities in implementing its decisions under the WTO
agreements: the government administrations that must change their laws and regulations to
come into compliance and the courts that must uphold those laws and regulations. Like the
Court of Justice, the DSB also operates across widely divergent legal systems. Therefore, the
dynamics of national mental maps of rights, on the one hand, and the strategic interest in
affirming supranational authority, on the other hand, that drove the adoption of the right to a
hearing in the Court of Justice in the 1970's can be expected to animate the development of rights
in the DSB as well.
The DSB is often called upon to settle disputes among states involving highly technical,
scientific issues.429 One state claims that another's domestic regulation in the area of consumer
or food safety is an illegal barrier to trade and the other state replies that the regulation is
justified by the need to protect the health or consumer welfare of its citizens. The parties
generally furnish extensive scientific evidence in their briefs. The DSB can also appoint
scientific experts to give their opinion on the matter and refer to the technical standards adopted
by specialized international organizations, the UN's Codex Alimentarius Commission being the
most commonly cited. Because of the necessity of obtaining the cooperation of U.S.
administrative agencies and courts in implementing DSB decisions, the procedure through which
the DSB decides whether a national regulation legitimately furthers a public safety concern
should take on some of the idiosyncratic aspects of American administrative law. Unlike the
administrative procedures of European WTO members, DSB procedure should assume a highly
formal, adversarial bent in which governments and interest groups have an opportunity to
examine and object to the scientific evidence underlying the conclusions in the briefs, expert
reports, and international standards.
Let me unpack this analysis a bit further. Comparative studies show that one of the
significant differences between American and European systems of administrative law is the
extent to which scientific rulemaking is proceduralized and judicialized in the U.S.430 Under the
notice and comment procedure outlined in Part III, American administrative agencies must
publicly disclose the proposed rule, together with all of the underlying scientific facts, give the
public the opportunity to submit written objections and observations, and furnish an exhaustive
reply to the comments. In most European systems, as explained in Part II, bodies composed of
representatives of different producer and consumer interests are often consulted, but draft
regulations are not made widely available to the public. In anticipation of the reaction of
American administrative agencies and reviewing courts, the DSB should gradually allow the
429
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state parties to the dispute and interest groups, through the device of the amicus curiae brief,
extensive rights to participate in the scientific fact-finding process. The DSB, however, walks a
thin line. To the extent that the procedure is perceived as overly politicized, driven by the
interest groups submitting the amicus curiae briefs and the unelected trade specialists sitting on
the DSB, administrations and courts on the European side of the Atlantic might call into question
the legitimacy of the outcomes and, in turn, deny their cooperation.
Prediction is always a hazardous intellectual exercise and especially so in the world of
international law and politics. Nonetheless, it demonstrates how the experience with rights and
citizenship in the world's only firmly established system of global governance can inform our
understanding of other, emerging ones.
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